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In 1968 the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure underwent substantial
revisions.1 Since that time, the Florida appellate courts have decided sev-
eral hundred cases interpreting the new rules, and the legislature has
enacted several statutory provisions dealing with civil procedure.' In
addition, this survey is being published simultaneously with the promulga-
tion of major changes in the discovery and pleading provisions of the
rules.8
I. COURTS, JUDGES, AND ATTORNEYS
A. Jurisdiction of the Courts
"Jurisdiction is the oxygen of an action. If present, the action is
alive and the court may act."4 Once a court acquires jurisdiction, it is
retained until the termination of the action as long as the court does not
exceed the limits of its authority.
A court's jurisdiction is continuing and remains vested even if a party
leaves the geographical limits of the court's authority.' In Keena v. Keena,6
the court had before it an appeal from a divorce and custody action. The
appellant husband had filed for divorce in a Florida circuit court while
his wife was residing in Germany. The wife returned to Florida to answer
the complaint and to file a counterclaim. While the action was pending,
however, the wife returned to Germany and took the children without her
husband's consent or knowledge. The court ordered the wife to return to
Florida; she refused. Subsequently, an order was entered granting the
divorce and holding the wife in contempt of court. The trial court also
ruled that the matter of custody would have to be held in abeyance be-
1. In re Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 211 So.2d 206 (Fla. 1968).
2. This survey covers cases reported in volumes 222 through 247 of the Southern Re-
porter, Second Series, and laws enacted by the 1970 and 1971 Regular and Special Sessions
of the Florida Legislature.
3. See In re The Florida Bar: Rules of Civil Procedure, 265 So.2d 21 (Fla. 1972).
4. Keena v. Keena, 245 So.2d 665, 666 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
5. Id. Where there is concurrent jurisdiction between two courts, the first court which
exercises jurisdiction acquires control to the exclusion of the others. Thus, where one court
had exercised jurisdiction in a custody matter, the entry of an order modifying that decree
at a later date by another court was improper. Haley v. Edwards, 233 So.2d 647 (Fla. 4th
Dist. 1970).
6. 245 So.2d 665 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
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cause the court did not have jurisdiction to award custody until the
children were returned to Florida. The District Court of Appeal, First
District, reversed this order and held that once the court's jurisdiction
attached, it continued despite the removal of the children from the country.
Two other cases presented situations where the trial court improperly
limited the exercise of its jurisdiction. In Forbes v. National Industrial
Bank,7 a bank brought an unlawful detainer action under Florida Statutes
section 82.04 (1969) in the civil court of record. The defendant denied
all of the allegations of the complaint and filed a compulsory counterclaim
seeking specific performance. On plaintiff's motion to dismiss for lack of
the court's jurisdiction to hear the action, the counterclaim was dismissed.
This was held to be reversible error. "When the lower Court was made
aware of the counterclaim exceeding its jurisdiction, it was required to
transfer the action to the Court in the same county having jurisdiction of
the demand in the Counterclaim."18 In the second case,9 a two-count com-
plaint was filed in the circuit court, but only one of the two counts alleged
the requisite jurisdictional amount. The judge, on motion, transferred the
smaller claim to the civil court of record. The District Court of Appeal,
Third District, reversed and held that a complaint which satisfied the
jurisdictional limits of the circuit court on at least one count vested the
circuit court with jurisdiction of the entire action and that the action
should not have been split.
Often, however, the real problem is caused by overreaching of juris-
dictional limits, rather than by a hesitancy to exercise jurisdiction. Gen-
erally, the problem arises in connection with proceedings in courts with
less than general jurisdiction." The county judge's court, for instance, is
a court of limited jurisdiction and its jurisdiction will not be presumed.
"Its jurisdiction should appear by its records, and when its records and
proceedings do not disclose jurisdiction in a particular case, (it) may be
attacked . . . ."I' Thus, where the record of a case did not show that the
notice of an incompetency hearing was served timely, the county judge
improperly denied an evidentiary hearing which was sought to determine
whether notice had been sufficient. Similarly, in the absence of a specific
rule or statute, a county judge's court is incapable of reopening a final
judgment which it has entered regardless of custom and practice to the
contrary. 2 Additionally, that court does not always have jurisdiction to
7. 243 So.2d 613 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
8. Id. at 615. The transfer should have been made to the circuit court pursuant to FLA.
R. Crv. P. 1.170(j). This rule has been amended. See note 158 infra.
9. Edgar v. Economic Opportunity Legal Services Program, Inc., 230 So.2d 487 (Fla.
3d Dist. 1970).
10. See, e.g., Thomas v. Greene, 226 So.2d 143 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969), cert. denied, 234
So.2d 117 (Fla. 1969) (order exceeding jurisdiction of court held to be a nullity).
11. In re White, 230 So.2d 480, 482 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970), quoting Krivitsky v. Nye, 155
Fla. 45, 54, 19 So.2d 563, 568 (1944). See also In re White, 237 So.2d 55 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
12. In re Estate of Armistead, 240 So.2d 830 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970). In that case, the
county court had construed a will in a final order to include homestead and certain other
1972]
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entertain a devastavit action; 3 nor does a justice of the peace court have
the authority to refuse pleadings submitted for filing.'4
When the court is acting within its jurisdictional scope, though, a
great deal of discretion lies with a judge in the conduct of the proceedings.
For instance, a judge is allowed to conduct a more informal trial in a
non-jury action than in a jury proceeding. 5 In addition, a judge is given
wide discretion in the manner of conducting any trial as long as he does
not abuse his discretion.'" Likewise, interlocutory orders or judgments
made by a court during the progress of a case remain under the control
of the court and may be modified or rescinded if necessary up until the
time of final judgment.' 7
Removal, however, denies a court of its control and deprives it of its
jurisdiction. Since the removal process wrenches jurisdiction away from
a court, the procedural guidelines to accomplish removal are strictly
construed and must be closely followed. In fact, the burden of proving
compliance with each of the requisites lies squarely with the prospective
transferor. In Dade County Teachers' Association v. Rubin,"8 the failure
to give proper notice was held to bar a removal. There, the appellant
association had engaged in a massive work stoppage on February 19,
1968, and the county authorities had filed for injunctive relief in the
circuit court the following day. A hearing was set for February 22. On
that day, an injunction was entered, but the association appealed on the
grounds that the proceedings had been removed to the United States
District Court hours before the injunction had been issued. The District
Court of Appeal, Third District, affirmed the lower court's jurisdiction
and held that the record had not demonstrated that notice had been given
property in the "gross estate." The executor then filed a motion for rehearing which the
court granted and entered a new order construing the will to exclude homestead from the
"gross estate." The District Court of Appeal, First District, reversed.
In the absence of a rule promulgated by competent authority authorizing a petition
for rehearing or motion for new trial subsequent to the entrance of a final order, a
probate court loses jurisdiction as to that order save for those matters involving the
inherent power and jurisdiction of the probate court ....
Id. at 831.
13. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Moon, 234 So.2d 402 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
14. State ex rel. Kaufman v. Sutton, 231 So.2d 874 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
The acceptance of the filing of a complaint is a mere ministerial act, and the officer
charged with the responsibility of receiving same is required to accept what is
tendered to him if it is accompanied by the proper fee .... It is not incumbent upon
one who has the ministerial function of accepting the filing of a complaint to judi-
cially determine the legal significance of the tendered document.
Id. at 875.
15. See Belcher Towing Co. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 233 So.2d 456 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1970). There, it was held not to be prejudicial error for the judge to allow the written opinion
of a federal district judge to be submitted for consideration by the court since the record
clearly showed that the court later expressly rejected the proffer and ruled that it had no res
judicata or estoppel by judgment effect.
16. Potock v. Turek, 227 So.2d 724 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969), cert. dismissed, 238 So.2d 106
(Fla. 1970) (limiting time at closing argument held not to be an abuse of discretion).
17. Holman v. Ford Motor Co., 239 So.2d 40 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
18. 238 So.2d 284 (Fla. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1009 (1971).
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to the county authorities or that a copy of the federal court removal pro-
ceeding had been filed with the clerk of the circuit court, both specific
requisites under the applicable federal statute.'" The court concluded by
pointing out that the appellants had failed to meet the burden of demon-
strating that both of these requisites had been satisfied prior to the entry
of the injunction, and thus, the circuit court retained jurisdiction.2"
B. Court Costs2
The amount and award of court costs after a final judgment often
have a significant effect on the value of a successful verdict. The assess-
ment of costs (even appellate costs) lies within the province of the trial
court and is largely discretionary.22 "The justice of the cause, in the light
of all the circumstances involved, is the governing criterion."2
In General Capital Corp. v. Tel Service Co., 4 the court held that
the imposition of court costs need not necessarily follow the judgment.
"Special circumstances might . . . dictate a contrary apportionment." 5
In that case, a lower court order which granted part of the appellate costs
to the victorious appellant was upheld because the victory had been based
solely on a legislative change effected while the case was on appeal.28 The
court indicated that the case was one of first impression in Florida, but
cited as precedent two out-of-state cases where appellate costs had been
taxed against successful appellants. In both of those cases, the result on
appeal had been completely influenced by legislation enacted during the
appellate process.
Florida Statutes section 57.071 (1967) provides that if costs are
awarded to any party in an action, court reporter expenses shall also be
allowed. 28 The language of this statute appears mandatory, especially
when compared with its predecessor, Florida Statutes section 58.13
19. 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (1970).
20. As it turned out, the federal district court remanded the case within a couple of days.
In an interesting bit of dicta, the court quoted from Hornung v. Master Tank and Welding
Co., 151 F. Supp. 169, 172 (D.N.D. 1957) where a federal district court held:
There is a subsisting dual jurisdiction as to a removed case, and during the brief
interlude between filing the Petition for Removal in federal court and the filing in
state court of a copy of such Petition, both courts have active jurisdiction.
id. at 286.
21. Fla. Laws 1970, ch. 70-134, has raised many of the fees charged by the courts. The
allowance of attorneys' fees in judicial proceedings will be considered at section I, D, infra.
22. General Capital Corp. v. Tel Service Co., 239 So.2d 134 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970), cert.
denied, 240 So.2d 815 (Fla. 1970). Costs are only allowable when provided by statute.
23. Id. at 136.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. For a full discussion of the legislation in question, see Boyer & Goldberg, Real Prop-
erty, 1969-71 Survey of Florida Law, 26 U. Mia.ri L. REv. 96, 99-100 (1971).
27. State Bd. v. Hays, 190 Ky. 147, 227 S.W. 282 (1920) ; National Carloading Corp. v.
Phoenix-El Paso Express, Inc., 142 Tex. 141, 178 S.W.2d 133 (Ct. App. 1943).
28. "If costs are awarded to any party the following shall also be allowed . . . (2) [t]he
expense of the court reporter for per diem, transcribing proceedings and depositions. .. .
FLA. STAT. § 57.071 (1967).
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(1965) which bespoke "discretion." The District Court of Appeal, Fourth
District, in a case dealing with the later statute, held that "the signifi-
cance of costs being related to a useful and meaningful purpose is not
altered ... 29 by section 57.071. Indeed, the court interpreted the pur-
pose of the new section as providing costs only "in those instances where
the court reporter has served a useful and necessary purpose . . ." in
depositions or proceedings." Accordingly, that court reversed a lower
court's award of costs in the wake of a successful motion for partial
summary judgment where the costs assessed against the appellant in-
cluded payment for the depositions of two doctors who testified about
damages where the summary judgment order did not reach that ques-
tion, but only resolved the question of liability.
A less frugal District Court of Appeal, Second District, held in a
short per curiam decision that a trial court in the proper exercise of its
discretion could assess as costs the preparation time of an expert wit-
ness." The court in so ruling looked to the language of Florida Statutes
section 90.231(2) (1967) and found that nothing in that statute, which
provides that expert witness fees may be levied as costs, could be con-
strued as forbidding an assessment for an expert's preparation time.
C. Judges
A judge generally has wide discretion in the administration of his
judicial functions.2 Indeed, the exercise of the discretion of a trial judge
will not be questioned or altered on appeal unless a clear showing of
abuse is demonstrated 8
Sometimes the question arises, though, as to the propriety of a
judge hearing a certain case for one reason or another. In State ex rel.
Gerstein v. Stedman,84 a criminal case, the state attorney sought a writ
of prohibition which sought the recusation of a criminal court of record
judge on the grounds that the judge had openly criticized grand juries
and questioned the reliability of the testimony of witnesses who had re-
ceived immunity from prosecution. The case before the judge involved
both a grand jury indictment and the testimony of an immunized wit-
ness. In denying the writ, the District Court of Appeal, Third District,
held that a judge need not disqualify himself from hearing a case merely
"because he has formed an opinion as to the legal questions involved in
the case."85 Absent a showing that a judge will refuse to follow the law
in a certain case, the court indicated that recusation was not warranted
29. Wilkins v. Superx [sic] Drugs, 232 So.2d 19, 20 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
30. Id.
31. Conboy v. City of Naples, 230 So.2d 476 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970), cert. denied, 237 So.2d
537 (Fla. 1970).
32. See notes 22, 29 and 31 supra and accompanying text.
33. Thrifty Super Market, Inc. v. Kitchener, 227 So.2d 500 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
34. 233 So.2d 142 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970), aff'd, 238 So.2d 615 (Fla. 1970).
39. Id. at 144, citing State ex rel. Sagonias v. Bird, 67 So.2d 678 (Fla. 1993).
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simply because a judge's personal views were contrary to certain princi-
ples of law.
Another question that frequently arises is the extent to which a
successor judge may alter the rulings of a predecessor jurist. While a
successor judge may not alter or modify final judgment ordered by his
predecessor outside of the scope of review authorized by rule 1.540, he
may indeed modify or change interlocutory orders previously entered
according to a recent decision of the Supreme Court of Florida. 8 The
court indicated, though, that "a judge should hesitate to undo his own
work, and should hesitate still more to undo the work of another
judge .... I'll In addition, a successor judge is free to adopt previously
determined questions of fact and render a judgment upon those findings.
D. Attorneys
Apart from cases dealing with disciplinary actions initiated by The
Florida Bar, most of the cases dealing with attorneys during the survey
period involved fees.
The allowance of attorney's fees as court costs38 is strictly governed
by statute unless provided for by contract. In two cases, one dealing
with a mechanic's lien foreclosure" and the other involving a quiet title
action,40 attorney's fees were disallowed as costs since there was no stat-
ute authorizing such a grant. However, in City of Hallandale v. Chatlos,41
the Supreme Court of Florida held that when the legislature enacted a
statute allowing the levy of court costs in eminent domain proceedings,42
it fully intended that reasonable attorney's fees would be includable in
such costs.
43
36. Tingle v. Board of County Comm'rs, 245 So.2d 76 (Fla. 1971).
There is a limitation, however, on a successor judge's reconsideration of his predeces-
sor's final judgments and orders, (1) upon the merits on the same facts absent
mistake or fraud (and now on the extended grounds in Civil Rule 1.540), and (2)
upon discretionary final rulings where the facts remain unchanged. Such prior final
rulings have been held by this Court not to be subject to reversal, modification or
review by a successor judge, absent the grounds in Civil Rule 1.540. In the event,
however, that subsequent events may defeat the prior judgment, the successor does
have authority even after final judgment to make such further order as may be
necessary to effectuate the judgment. Also, where the final order or judgment is not
complete, the succeeding judge may supply the element which may have been
omitted.
Id. at 77-78 (emphasis supplied by the court).
37. Id. "This 'code' of restraint is not based solely on the law of the case but is founded
upon considerations of comity and courtesy." Id. (emphasis supplied by the court).
38. See section I, B, supra.
39. Goldberg v. Banner Supply Co., 230 So.2d 714 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
40. Weisenberg v. Carlton, 233 So.2d 659 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970), cert. denied, 240 So.2d
643 (Fla. 1970).
41. 236 So.2d 761 (Fla. 1970).
42. Fla. Stat. § 73.091 (1969).
43. The case involved a voluntary dismissal, but since rule 1.420 provides for costs to be
levied in favor of a non-dismissing party, the court held that attorneys fees could properly
be assessed as costs pursuant to section 73.091. See also Dawson v. Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co., 233 So.2d 860 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970), where attorney's fees were awarded pursuant to
FLA. STAT. § 627.0127 (1967) upon dismissal of an insurer-filed declaratory action where the
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Two conflicting cases have been decided by the district courts of
appeal in Florida regarding the award of attorney's fees to successful
insurance policy holders in actions brought against their insurers to enforce
the terms of out-of-state insurance contracts. In General Insurance Co. v.
Roth," a plaintiff secured coverage from a carrier in Ohio to insure per-
sonal goods and furnishings which the plaintiff was transporting to his new
domicile in Florida. During one of the trips, an accident occurred, and
property damage was sustained. His Ohio-based agent instructed the in-
sured to contact the company's Miami office, which he did. Subsequently,
the insured filed suit to enforce his rights under the insurance contract
and recovered a judgment. Part of the costs awarded him by the court
were attorney's fees, and the defendant contested this award on appeal.
The question presented to the appellate court was whether attorney's fees
could properly be awarded to an insured based on the enforcement of
an out-of-state insurance contract pursuant to Florida Statutes section
627.0127 (1967)41 in light of the express language of Florida Statutes sec-
tion 627.01001 (1967)." Citing a decision of the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida47 which held that a statute similar to section 627.0127 was "plainly
... procedural" and "applies to suits in Florida courts on insurance con-
tracts made anywhere... ,,,4 the District Court of Appeal, Third District,
held that the attorney's fee award was proper despite the fact that the
relied-upon case had been decided before the adoption of section 627.01001.
One year later, the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, re-
jected the decision of the Third District and held that the award of
attorney's fees was clearly improper when based upon an out-of-state
insurance contract. 49 The court indicated that the language of section
insured had filed a counterclaim: "The dismissal of the insurance company's action, therefore,
in our opinion is the '* * rendition of a judgment * * * against an insurer in favor of an
insured.'" Id. at 861, tracking the language of FLA. STAT. § 627.0127 (1967). See also notes
44 and 45 infra and accompanying text which recite the language of the statute and deal
with other applications of this statute.
44. 233 So.2d 662 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970) [hereinafter cited as General Insurance].
45. FLA. STAT. § 627.0127 (1967) [19691 provides:
(1) Upon the rendition of a judgment or decree by any of the courts of this state
against an insurer and in favor of an insured or the named beneficiary under a
policy or contract executed by the insurer, the trial court, or in the event of an
appeal in which the insured or beneficiary prevails, the appellate court, shall adjudge
or decree against the insurer and in favor of the insured or beneficiary a reasonable
sum as fees or compensation for the insured's or beneficiary's attorney prosecuting
the suit in which the recovery is had.
(2) As to suits based on claims arising under life insurance policies or annuity
contracts, no such attorney fee shall be allowed if such suit was commenced prior to
expiration of sixty days after proof of the claim was duly filed with the insurer.
(3) Where so awarded, compensation or fees of the attorney shall be included in the
judgment or decree rendered in the case.
46. FLA. STAT. § 627.01001 (1967) provides in part: "No provision of part II of this
chapter [including FLA. STAT. § 627.0127 (1967)] shall apply to ... (p)olicies or contracts
not issued for delivery in this state nor delivered in this state . .. ."
47. Fellar v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 57 So.2d 581 (Fla. 1952).
48. Id. at 583, adopting the language of Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co. v. Cortez Cigar
Co., 92 F.2d 882, 885 (5th Cir. 1937) (emphasis of court omitted).
49. Pan-American Life Ins. Co. v. Fuentes, 258 So.2d 8 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971). According
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627.01001 commanded their conclusion, and the court distinguished Gen-
eral Insurance on the grounds that it relied on a decision which predated
the enactment of section 627.01001. Although the issue is ripe for con-
flict certiorari review, no petitions appear to have been filed to the Su-
preme Court of Florida. While certainly not dispositive of the conflict,
the United States Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, has recently decided
a case which adopts the position of the Fourth District.5 °
In the day-to-day operations of a law firm, problems arise in con-
nection with fees for professional services. Generally speaking, attorneys
are charged with a high degree of care in establishing the amount of
their clients' fees. Consequently, it is improper for a lawyer to deduct
monies from the proceeds of a real estate transaction for professional
services rendered and then later bill his client for additional sums, es-
pecially when the client could properly believe that full payment had
been made.5 In addition, a lawyer cannot charge a fee for his profes-
sional services and at the same time appear as a material witness in
his client's court action. Indeed, "[i]f from the very outset, the lawyer
knows or can reasonably anticipate that his testimony will be essential
to the prosecution of his client's case, he should decline the representa-
tion altogether ...,"1 as should other members of the lawyer's firm.53
II. JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON 5 4
A. In General
Generally, before a court proceeds in an action, three requisites
exist: jurisdiction over the subject matter,5 venue,5 and jurisdiction over
the person. Of the three, the greatest amount of confusion is caused by
to the Clerk of the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, this decision was mistakenly
omitted from publication in the Southern Reporter, Second Series, for several months.
50. Oliva v. Pan American Life Ins. Co., 448 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1971). So confident
was the federal panel of the dispositive nature of section 627.01001 and the Fourth District
opinion (supra note 49) on the matter before it that the court elected not to certify the
question to the Supreme Court of Florida pursuant to FLA. STAT. §§ 25.031-.032 (1969).
51. Jones v. Hearn, 230 So.2d 50 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970). In that case, the court held it
improper for a lawyer to "hold his clients' valuable papers as ransom for an additional sum
invoiced for the first time four months after closing . . . ," especially when no fee had been
specifically established initially, and a payment of $1,000.00 had been collected at settlement.
Id. at 52.
52. Hubbard v. Hubbard, 233 So.2d 150, 152 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970) (lawyer appeared as a
material witness and co-counsel in a divorce proceeding).
53. Id. at 150 n.3. Subsequent to the period covered by this survey, the Supreme Court
of Florida decided that in certain instances an attorney might well be permitted to collect a
professional fee if it was necessary for him to withdraw from a case in order to appear as a
material witness. However, the attorney must not have known prior to accepting the case
that his testimony would be needed. Hill v. Douglass, No. 41,241 (Fla. filed March 1, 1972),
rev'g 248 So.2d 182 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
54. See Bayitch, Conflicts of Law, 1970-1971 Survey of Florida Law, 26 U. MxA.s L.
Rv. 1 (1971).
55. See sections I, A, supra.
56. See section III infra.
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the last. However, jurisdiction over the person relates very simply to the
power of the court to bring some "person" or "thing" within its control.
There are three types of actions in Florida: in personam, in rem,
and quasi in rem. An in personam action is one in which the plaintiff
"either seeks to subject the defendant's general assets to execution in
order to satisfy a money judgment," or to secure a judgment "directing
[a] defendant to do an act or refrain from doing an act under sanction
of the court's contempt powers. ' ' 51 In rem actions "are those which seek
not to impose personal liability, but rather to effect the interests of per-
sons in a specific thing (or res)."58 Jurisdiction is acquired in these ac-
tions by the court's exercise of control over the property. The third type
of action is quasi in rem, which is a hybrid of the first two. Here, the
court acquires jurisdiction
by attachment or garnishment or other seizure of property where
the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
but has jurisdiction over a thing belonging to the defendant or
over a person who is indebted or under a duty to the defendant.5"
Such jurisdiction, though, is normally limited to the value of the property
attached or garnished in most United States jurisdictions. °
Regardless of the type of action filed or jurisdiction sought, it is
clear that a defendant is entitled to notice of an action and a reasonable
opportunity to defend the claim.6 A defendant, in an in personam action,
must either be served with process within the state62 or have sufficient
minimum contacts there to allow some alternate statutory method of
service." In quasi in rem and in rem actions, the thing to be seized,
attached, or garnished must lie within the jurisdiction of the court. 4
Thus,
[t] he state has jurisdiction to entertain an action "in personam"
over persons within its territory and to entertain an action "in
57. T.J.K. v. N.B., 237 So.2d 592, 594 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970). Included in this category are
tort and contract actions.
58. Id. This category encompasses suits to quiet title, partition suits, lien foreclosure
actions, and also divorce proceedings (the place of domicile being the situs of the res).
59. Id.
60. See RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 40 (1942). Florida, however, appears to hold to
the contrary at the present time. See Newton v. Bryan, 142 Fla. 14, 194 So. 282 (1940), a case
decided before the current procedural rules were promulgated. In that case, the Supreme Court
of Florida appeared to hold that a special appearance to contest jurisdiction over the person in
in rem actions subjects a defendant to the general jurisdiction of the court. See Robinson v.
Loyola Foundation, Inc., 236 So.2d 154 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970), (infra at section II, C) where
a defendant who defended on the merits in a quasi in rem action was held to have submitted
himself to the general jurisdiction of the court.
61. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust
Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964);
State ex rel. Weber v. Register, 67 So.2d 619 (Fla. 1953).
62. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
63. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); McGee v. International
Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
64. See Section II, C, infra.
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rem" with respect to things within its territory. It has jurisdic-
tion by an action "quasi in rem" to enforce a personal claim
against the defendant to the extent of applying the thing or prop-
erty seized in satisfaction of the claim. The state through its
courts has jurisdiction to exercise this power provided its pro-
cedure is reasonably calculated to give the persons effective
notice of the action and a reasonable opportunity to contest the
claim.6 "5
While statutes which prescribe the methods of serving process are
strictly construed,66 there is a strong presumption regarding the validity
of process when a return is filed by the sheriff."7 Cases dealing with
service by a sheriff generally make dull reading, but two decisions re-
cently handed down by the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District,68
are an exception to the rule.
The facts giving rise to both cases were the same and centered
around two recalcitrant defendants. When one of the defendants ob-
served a deputy sheriff emerging from his car, she fled up the sidewalk
to her house with the deputy in hot pursuit. Though fleet afoot, the
officer was met by a slammed door when he reached the house. Un-
daunted, he read the summons aloud on the doorstep and announced
that he was leaving a copy of the summons and complaint for both hus-
band and wife on the doorstep. The following day an employee of the
husband found the papers and informed the defendants of their con-
tents upon request. The circuit court, on motion, quashed service as to
one defendant but refused to do so as regards the other. On interlocutory
appeal, the Fourth District held that service was effective as to both
defendants. The court stated that when an officer reasonably attempts
to personally serve a party at home and that person reasonably should
know the officer's purpose and identity, the service "cannot be frustrated
by the simple expedient of . . . closing the front door in the officer's
face and wilfully refusing to accept service of process . ... When
a summons is offered to someone, service cannot be avoided by "refus-
ing physically to accept the summons." In fact, a person has an obliga-
tion to accept service of process when it is reasonably attempted.70
Unlike jurisdiction over the subject matter which can be attacked
65. T.J.K. v. N.B., 237 So.2d 592, 594 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
66. American Liberty Ins. Co. v. Maddox, 238 So.2d 154 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
67. Winky's, Inc. v. Francis, 229 So.2d 903 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969). In that case, the un-
corroborated testimony of a resident agent denying receipt of service of process was held
insufficient to rebut the presumption of adequate service. However, in Black v. Black, 227
So.2d 53 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969), the uncontradicted testimony of a party to a divorce action
denying that she had ever lived at the place where service was made washeld sufficient to
rebut the presumption.
68. Olin Corp. v. Haney, 245 So.2d 669 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971); Haney v. Olin Corp., 245
So.2d 671 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
69. Haney v. Olin Corp., 245 So.2d 671, 673 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
70. Id., adopting the language of Bergen County v. Kozuck, 98 N.J. Super. 235, 236
A.2d 630 (1967), aff'd, 103 N.J. Super. 151, 246 A.2d 744 (App. Div. 1968).
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at any stage of the proceedings, personal jurisdiction must be contested
in a proper and timely fashion or any assault on its legality will be
waived.7' It is a defense and must be raised either by motion or, in the
absence of a motion, in a responsive pleading. 2
B. Substituted Service and the State's Long Arm Jurisdiction
Substituted service of process is the device by which the state is
able to acquire in personam jurisdiction over non-residents who have
sufficient in-state contacts so as to warrant a court's exercise of juris-
diction. 73 Over the last two years, some of the cases dealing with sub-
stituted service have dealt with non-resident motorist mishaps, 74 but most
long-arm cases have concerned the delineation of what constitutes "doing
business" within the state so as to subject one to jurisdiction.75
There are several tests which the courts employ to determine whether
a "person" is "doing business" within the state. It is clear, however,
that there must be some contact with the state to justify the court's
exercise of jurisdiction,76 and some connection between a business ac-
tivity and the subject matter of the suit. Consequently, non-resident
stockholders and officers of a corporation cannot be served through the
resident agent of their corporation in a personal action regardless of the
degree of business activity of the corporation.77 There is a strong burden
which rests upon a party who attempts substituted service on a non-
resident to show clearly that the use of long arm jurisdiction is justified,
and the courts strictly construe any of the statutes granting such power.78
71. See FrA. R. Civ. P. 1.140(h).
72. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.140(b).
73. See FLA. STAT. §§ 48.151, 48.161, 48.171, 48.181, 48.19 (1969); FLA. STAT. § 48.182
(Supp. 1970).
74. In Hoover v. Gates, 229 So.2d 909 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969), a non-resident automobile
owner, who parked his vehicle in such a manner that a connected trailer protruded into the
street, was held amenable to service of process under FLA. STAT. § 48.171 (1967) in a suit
arising out of injuries to a minor who sustained personal injuries when his bicycle struck the
trailer. In another case which touched upon the application of FLA. STAT. § 48.161 (1967), a
suit involving an automobile accident, the court held that the use of substituted service of
process depends on the location of the prospective defendant at the time of the filing of a
suit. Thus, a non-resident of Florida was properly served under that statute even though
he was a domiciled resident of Florida at the time of the events giving rise to the suit. Penn
v. Ashley, 226 So.2d 351 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969). See also FLA. STAT. § 48.182 (Supp. 1970);
FLA. STAT. § 48.161 (1969), as amended by Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-308 (amendment allows
service on statutory agent by certified mail in addition to other prescribed methods).
75. See FLA. STAT. §§ 48.071, 48.151, 48.181 (1969).
76. Where a plaintiff was unable to show any connection between the interests of two
defendants within Florida and a promissory note entered into with one of the defendants in
Massachusetts while he was still a resident of that state, the trial court acted properly when
it quashed service brought in a Florida court based on the note. Lipman v. Zuk, 244 So.2d
496 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
77. Meiselman v. McKnight, 226 So.2d 437 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969).
78. Lipman v. Zuk, 244 So. 2d 496 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970). Substituted service is so stringently
applied that it cannot be used as a method of preserving the validity of service improperly
attempted under another statute. See Olin Corp. v. Haney, 245 So.2d 669 (Fla. 4th Dist.
1971), where the court held that substituted service could not be relied upon to validate
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To be "engaged in business" in Florida under the statutes, "[t]he
determinative question is whether goods, property or services are dealt
with within the state for the pecuniary benefit of the person providing
or otherwise dealing with those goods, property or services."79 The ac-
tivities of the "person" sought to be subjected to the court's control
"must be considered 'collectively' and show a general course of employ-
ment and conduct of carrying on business activity in the State for pecu-
niary benefit.""0 It has been held, for instance, that a non-resident who
opened a bank account in the state, signed a contract to purchase a
Florida restaurant business while in the state, applied for a liquor license,
and signed an assignment of lease document in Florida was engaged in
business there.8" Similarly, a defendant who subleased, repaired, and hired
a pilot for an aircraft in Florida was held to be doing business within
the state. 2
Regardless of the degree of business activity in the state, it is clear
that the aim of serving process is not the forwarding of the papers, but
rather the receipt of the service. In Home Life Insurance Co. v.
Regueira,8' a beneficiary of a life insurance policy brought suit against
the insurance company, and service was attempted as provided by stat-
ute8 4 on the state insurance commissioner. Instead of promptly dispatch-
ing the papers to the out-of-state company's office, the commissioner's
staff inadvertently mailed the summons and complaint back to the plain-
tiff's attorney. The company later denied ever having received a copy of
the process, and even though the commissioner's files contained a carbon
copy of a letter of transmittal, the District Court of Appeal, Second
District, held the service ineffective and quashed a lower court order
which held the service valid, indicating that "'the essential purpose of
what was thought to be improper service under FLA. STAT. § 48.031 (1969). In that case, as it
developed, the court found that service had been proper under that statute. See notes 68-70
supra and accompanying text.
79. De Vaney v. Rumsch, 228 So.2d 904, 906 (Fla. 1969), rev'g 218 So.2d 238 (Fla.
1st Dist. 1969).
80. Id. at 907, adopting the language of Matthews v. Matthews, 122 So.2d 571, 573
(Fla. 2d Dist. 1969). There is no distinction between professional and non-professional busi-
ness activities. Id. at 906.
We hold the intent of the Legislature in enacting Florida Statute § 48.181, F.S.A.,
to be that any individual or corporation who has exercised the privilege of practicing
a profession or otherwise dealing in goods, services or property, whether in a pro-
fessional or nonprofessional capacity, within the State in anticipation of economic
gain, be regarded as operating a business or business venture for the purpose of
service under Florida Statute § 48.181, F.S.A., in suits resulting from their activity
within the State.
Id. at 906-07. Although Mr. Justice Boyd referred to the service contemplated under FLA.
STAT. § 48.181 (1967) as "constructive," the gravamen of the opinion centered around the
application of "substituted" service (a common error of the bench and bar).
81. Dans v. Gran Habana Restaurant & Lounge, Inc., 244 So.2d 157 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
See also duPont v. Robin, 237 So.2d 795 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
82. C.I., Inc. v. Travel Internationale, Ltd., 236 So.2d 441 (Fla. 1970), aff'g 228 So.2d
451 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
83. 243 So.2d 460 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
84. FLA. STAT. § 624.0222(1) (1969).
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process is notice, * * *', and there can be no notice in the legal sense
without receipt of process.""5
C. Constructive Service
When the court has jurisdiction over property (real or personal,
tangible or intangible) in an in rem or quasi in rem action, constructive
service is employed to give notice to the effected party that the court
has "seized" property pending the outcome of litigation involving the
party. As with all other types of service of process statutes, constructive
service provisions are strictly construed."6 There is, however, a limita-
tion on the types of actions which can be commenced with this type of
service. Suits to quiet title, divorce actions, lien foreclosures, and per-
sonal property attachments are all amenable to constructive service; but
for instance, where this type of service was purportedly employed to
obtain in personam jurisdiction over a defendant in a bastardy proceed-
ing, the judgment granted was held invalid."' Likewise, constructive
85. Home Life Ins. Co. v. Requeira, 243 So.2d 460, 462 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970) (emphasis
supplied by court). The court in this case specifically rejected the contention that actual
service, rather than substituted service, was envisioned by FLA. STAT. § 462.0222(1) (1969).
It was indicated, however, that the legislature had carefully prescribed that notice was to
be given by registered or certified mail and implied that evidence of such statutory compli-
ance might well have disposed the court to decide differently. Id. at 462-63.
86. Gmaz v. King, 238 So.2d 511 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970). In that case, personal service
in a quiet title action was not possible, and the plaintiff attempted constructive service. The
court found that the plaintiffs had not utilized all of the available means to secure a proper
address for the defendants to which notice of the action could be sent. Thus, a judgment
predicated upon constructive service by publication (based upon an affidavit of plaintiff
stating that defendant's address was unknown) was reversed. The court stated:
The principle involved herein is clearly outlined in Klinger v. Milton Holding Co.:
"When a complainant resorts to constructive service, he should make an
honest and conscientious effort, reasonably appropriate to the circumstances,
to acquire the information necessary to fully comply with the controlling
statutes, to the end that the defendant, if it be reasonably possible, may be
accorded notice of the suit." [Emphasis supplied]
and the full test of this principle is "* * * whether the complainant reasonably
employed knowledge at his command" in making the appropriate effort spoken of.
(Italics supplied) Where personal service of process cannot be had, then service
of process by publication may be had upon the filing of an affidavit on plaintiff's
behalf stating the residence of the person to be served as particularly as is known
after "diligent search and inquiry." In addition to the publication required as afore-
said, notice of the suit must be mailed to such address as "diligent search and in-
quiry" may cause to be discovered. We note, parenthetically, the strict compliance
with these statutory procedures, at the peril of rendering the proceedings void, is
rudimentary.
Id. at 514, quoting in part Klinger v. Milton Holding Co., 136 Fla. 50, 67-68, 186 So. 526,
534 (1938); McDaniel v. McElvy 91 Fla. 770, 800, 108 So. 820, 821 (1926); FLA. STAT.
§§ 48.02, 48.04, 48.13 (1965) ; FLA. STAT. §§ 49.021, 49.041, 49.12 (1969). See also authorities
cited in Gmaz v. King, 238 So.2d 511, 514 n.8 (Fla. 2d Dist 1970).
87. T.J.K. v, N.B., 237 So.2d 592 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
Bastardy proceedings are purely statutory in nature, and the remedy given by the
statute must measure the rights and liabilities of the parties. Certainly the theory
that this type of action is an action "in rem," the child being the "rem," is unten-
able. It is impossible to sustain an argument that the action is one "in rem" as there
is nothing to effect the interests of persons in a specific thing or res.
Id. at 595.
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service was found to be ineffective to acquire personal jurisdiction for
a negligence count in a multi-count complaint.88
In Robinson v. Loyola Foundation, Inc.,89 the District Court of Ap-
peal, First District, decided an interesting case involving several aspects
of constructive service. In that case, a plaintiff-lessor sued a defendant-
lessee on a lease affecting out-of-state property which had been negotiated
and signed in another state. Neither party to the action was a resident
of Florida. Since the defendants were not amenable to personal service
of process within the state, constructive service of process predicted upon
the attachment of real property owned by the defendants in Volusia
County, Florida, was obtained. The defendants appeared and timely
filed motions to abate the action for lack of jurisdiction over the person
and to dismiss the action for insufficiency of service of process, which
were denied by the trial court. The defendants then answered and de-
fended on the merits, but were unsuccessful, and a personal judgment
was entered against them. On appeal, the defendants claimed that con-
structive service of process by attachment was inapplicable on unliqui-
dated damage claims under Florida Statutes section 76.04 (1969), that
the attachment statute was unconstitutional since it provided for prop-
erty to be attached on an ex parte basis without an opportunity for a
hearing, and that the trial court improperly rendered a personal judg-
ment when the judgment should have been limited to the extent of the
real property attached. The First District disposed of the three objections
and affirmed the trial court's decision.
In Robinson, the defendant had contended that the damages sought
were unliquidated according to the holding of Papadakos v. Spooner.90
In Papadakos, an attorney had filed suit against a former non-resident
client and had sought the recovery of attorney's fees. Process was ef-
fected by attachment of real property. The District Court of Appeal,
Third District, held that since the amount of attorney's fees had never
been set, the claim was unliquidated and could not form the basis for
attachment under section 76.04. Applying the reasoning of that case, the
First District held that the damage claim was liquidated since the pro-
visions of the lease clearly delineated the amounts due through simple
calculation.91 The court also approved the lower court's ruling that a
demand for reasonable attorney's fees was proper and includable despite
Papadakos because the defendant had not objected to the inclusion of
this claim at the proper time.9
88. See Freedman v. Freedman, 226 So.2d 455 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969) (per curiam).
89. 236 So.2d 154 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
90. 186 So.2d 786 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966) [hereinafter cited as Papadakos].
91. "A claim for debt or damages is held to be liquidated in character if the amount
thereof is fixed, has been agreed upon, or is capable of ascertainment by mathematical com-
putation or operation of law." Robinson v. Loyola Foundation, Inc., 236 So.2d 154, 157
(Fla. 1st Dist. 1970) and authorities cited therein.
92. The court . . . held that if the inclusion of the claim for attorney's fees in the
complaint was improper in any respect because of its unliquidated character, such
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As to the defendant's second point, the court rejected the attack
on the constitutionality of section 76.04 on two grounds: first, that the
matter had not been raised in the trial court; and second, that Sniadach
v. Family Finance Corp.,93 a case relied upon by the appellant, did not
apply to the attachment provisions of section 76.04. In Sniadach, the
Supreme Court of the United States struck down a Wisconsin garnish-
ment statute which allowed the quasi in rem seizure of a wage earner's
pay by his garnishee-employer without affording the defendant prior notice
of the application for the writ of garnishment or an opportunity to be
heard. The First District looked to language in Sniadach which indicated
that the significance of the holding lay in the fact that wages were being
garnished 94 and held that the Sniadach rationale did not apply to the at-
tachment of property under section 76.04. The court concluded that
"[t]he attachment amounts to little more than constructive notice that
a suit for damages is pending against the owner and if judgment is
rendered . . . , the attached property might be subjected to levy and
sale to satisfy the judgment."" Thus, the statute was held to be con-
stitutional.
The third point is the most intriguing. The defendants had staunchly
maintained that regardless of the correctness or constitutionality of sec-
tion 76.04, the recovery in the suit should have been limited to the value
of the res seized and that the trial court's entry of a personal judgment
had been improper and invalid. In overruling this objection, the court
accepted the general principle as set forth by the defendant, but held
that the defendant had nonetheless fallen victim to a procedural nicety
which rendered the personal judgment valid. According to the court,
when constructive service is effected by attachment, the non-resident de-
fendant must first challenge such jurisdiction by motion or in his re-
sponsive pleading. If the trial court holds that it has jurisdiction, then
the non-resident defendant must take an interlocutory appeal to contest
jurisdiction. "In the event the jurisdiction issue was resolved against
appellants on appeal, then any judgment rendered in the case . . . would
necessarily have been one in rem to be satisfied, if at all, out of the
inclusion would not affect the validity of the attachment based on liquidated claims
properly included in the complaint but might be subject to being struck or disal-
lowed on proper defensive motion filed by the defendants. No such motion was
filed, however, so the defendants are considered to have waived their objection to
the inclusion of this claim as part of the damages sought to be recovered. The rea-
soning of the trial court is sound and we approve its application to the facts and
circumstances of this case.
Id. at 158.
93. 395 U.S. 337 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Sniadach].
94. Robinson v. Loyola Foundation, Inc., 236 So.2d 154, 159 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970), citing
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 340 (1969): "We deal here with wages-a
specialized type of property presenting distinct problems in our economic system. We turn
then to the nature of that property and problems of procedural due process."
95. Robinson v. Loyola Foundation, Inc., 236 So.2d 154, 159 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
"Such proceeding does not create the evils nor result in the hardships which often follow
the garnishment of wages owed to a worker." Id.
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property attached." '96 However, failure to follow this procedure submit-
ted the defendants to the general jurisdiction of the court and made the
entry of a personal judgment by the trial court proper. The court did
point out, however, that the failure to take the interlocutory appeal
would not waive the right to challenge the correctness of a court's juris-
dictional rulings on appeal after final judgment, but as is evident by the
results in this case, such an approach is fraught with peril.97
III. VENUE
A. In General
The purpose of venue provisions "is to require that litigation be
instituted in the forum which will cause the least amount of inconve-
nience and expense to those required to respond . . ." to an action.9" It
is a creature of statute and does not affect the jurisdiction of the court.
In fact, it is a privilege which is waived unless a proper and timely
challenge is made in the early stages of a lawsuit.99
A plaintiff is not required to plead facts in support of venue in his
complaint; the burden of establishing the impropriety of venue lies
squarely with the defendant, if he wishes to contest the place of trial.100
As part of that burden, the defendant must demonstrate where proper
venue lies.1 ' An unsupported affidavit which simply states that venue
has accrued in a different county, without more, is insufficient to meet
the requisite burden. There must be specific averments negativing the
plaintiff's right to commence suit where it was initiated, and a demon-
stration made of where proper venue lies.0 2 Where a suit was com-
menced in Brevard County for conversion and negligent handling of
negotiable instruments, an officer of the defendant corporation filed an
affidavit stating that it had no agent in that county at the time of the
transaction and that all negotiations and dealings giving rise to the ac-
96. Id. at 161.
97. The appellant took a direct appeal to the Supreme Court of Florida. Robinson v.
Loyola Foundation, Inc., appeal docketed, No. 39,636 (Fla. 1970). On July 27, 1971, on
motion, the supreme court temporarily relinquished jurisdiction to the Volusia County dr-
cult court for rule 1.540(b) proceedings. It will be very interesting when the case returns to
the high court to observe the reception which the First District's third point (relating to the
necessity of taking interlocutory appeals to protect against the entry of personal judgments)
will receive. Although there appear to be no cases squarely on point, the authors submit that
this opinion has not properly set forth the law of Florida relating to the submission of a
defendant to the general jurisdiction of a court, where initial service is effected by construc-
tive process in an in rem or quasi in rem action.
98. James A. Knowles, Inc. v. Imperial Lumber Co., 238 So.2d 487, 488 (Fla. 2d Dist.
1970).
99. See generally FLA. STAT. ch. 47 (1969); FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.140(b), (g)-(h).
100. Stolley & Assoc., Inc. v. Lawrence, 243 So.2d 446 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971); Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. National Bank of Melbourne & Trust Co., 238 So.2d
665 (Fla. 4th Dist. -1970).
101. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. National Bank of Melbourne &
Trust Co., 238 So.2d 665 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
102. Stolley & Assoc., Inc. v. Lawrence, 243 So.2d 446 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
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tion had occurred in Orange County. The court remanded the cause to
the trial court for further testimony on the question of where venue
would be proper.
103
Generally, venue is proper where the defendant resides, where the
cause of action accrues, or where property in litigation is located. 10 4
Although few cases have been decided recently dealing primarily with
defendant's place of residence venue,"0 5 there have been several deci-
sions which turned on the determination of the accrual situs of a cause
of action. In one suit, a libel action predicated upon statements pub-
lished in a newsletter, venue was held to be proper in the county where
the newsletter was circulated as well as in the county of publication.'0
Contract actions raise some rather interesting venue questions. When
a contractor sues his subcontractor for damages, venue is proper in the
county where the work is to be performed, but when a subcontractor
sues the contractor, venue lies where payment is to be made, regard-
less of where the work is to be done.10 7 The fact that a contractor breaches
or repudiates a contract with a subcontractor does not alter this rule. 08
Generally, in a contract action against a corporation, venue lies in the
county where performance is called for by the contract (in addition, of
course, to the county of corporate residence) and not where the benefits
of the contract are to be enjoyed. 09 So, in an action upon a surety
promise, venue was held proper in the county where the breach oc-
curred, the place of the surety's business, and not in the county of the
surety holder's business office where the benefits of the contract were to
be enjoyed." 0 In another contract action, the District Court of Appeal,
Second District, accepted the general rule that payment under a con-
tract is to be made at the place of a creditor's residence, absent con-
tractual provisions to the contrary, and that a breach of such a contract
by the debtor will be held to have given rise to a cause of action in the
county of the creditor's residence. The court added, though, that venue
attaches in the county of the creditor's residence at the actual time of
breach and that such venue will not be affected by a later transfer of
103. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. National Bank of Melbourne & Trust Co.,
238 So.2d 665 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
104. FLA. STAT. § 47.011 (1969).
105. See Stolley & Assoc., Inc. v. Lawrence, 243 So.2d 446 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971) ; Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. National Bank of Melbourne & Trust Co., 238 So.2d
669 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970); Maloney v. Fleishaker, 238 So.2d 496 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
106. Steinhardt v. Palm Beach White House No. 3, Inc., 237 So.2d 590 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1970).
107. B & F of Clearwater, Inc. v. Wesley Construction Co., 237 So.2d 790 (Fla. 2d Dist.
1970).
108. Id.
109. See Henry v. Lemac Builders, Inc., 245 So.2d 115 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971). There, the
court held that venue in an action to recover unpaid rent was proper in the county where
the rent was to be paid, not the county where the lease was executed.
110. James A. Knowles, Inc. v. Imperial Lumber Co., 238 So.2d 487 (Fla. 2d Dist.
1970).
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residence by the creditor to another county. In that case, Hill v. Vetter,"'
plaintiff-creditor sued defendant-debtor in the county where the plain-
tiff alleged that "demand" had been made for payment. The court re-
jected the creditor's contention that the time and place of "demand"
controlled and held that venue was proper in Charlotte County where
the debtor had repudiated (and thus breached) the contract two years
previously. Venue was thus held to have been proper in Charlotte
County. 12
B. Transfer, Consolidation, and Severance
As a general rule, "[w]hen any action is filed laying venue in the
wrong county or district, the court may transfer the action . . ." to a
court where proper venue exists."' Even if venue is proper, a court may
transfer an action to another court, where the action could have been
originally filed, for "the convenience of the parties or witnesses or in
the interest of justice .... ,111 Moreover, where allegations giving rise
to several causes of action are contained in one complaint, suit may be
brought in any county where any one of the actions could have been
filed; but if expedient, the court may order separate trials." 5 However,
when one cause of action is brought involving a number of defendants,
a court may not divide the action and transfer some of the defendants
to another court while retaining jurisdiction over others."'
Generally, where there are multiple defendants in an action, venue
is proper in any county where any of the defendants reside or can be
found. 1 7 However, in Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Mercer,"' it was held
that if all of the defendants can be found within one county, then, upon
proper motion, the action must be tried in that county despite the pro-
visions of Florida Statutes section 47.021 (1969). Also, if an individual
defendant is joined as a party defendant with a foreign corporation,
"and the corporate defendant has an agent in the county in which the
individual defendant resides these statutory sections [Florida Statutes
sections 47.021, 47.051 (1969)] cannot be applied to defeat the indi-
111. 231 So.2d 286 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
112. "[T]he critical point of time is when the contract was breached, or to put it another
way it is when payment was due, and from thence we can determine where it was breached
[and consequently, where venue was proper]." Id. at 287 (emphasis supplied by the court).
113. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.060(b).
114. FLA. STAT. § 47.122 (1969).
115. Steinhardt v. Palm Beach White House No. 3, Inc., 237 So.2d 590 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1970). See FLA. STAT. § 47.041 (1969).
116. McCue v. Lane, 228 So.2d 101 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969). In its deliberations, the court
considered the provisions of FLA. STAT. § 47.122 (1969), the "forum non-conveniens" statute,
and held in remanding the case that the entire civil action might well be transferable to
another county by the trial court if the requisites of that statute were met.
117. FLA. STAT. § 47.021 (1969).
118. 226 So.2d 270 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
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vidual defendant's venue privileges under Section 47.011 [the general
venue statute] .""
A defendant may properly raise venue objections by a motion to
dismiss, but the more appropriate and favored procedure is to file a
motion to transfer the action to an appropriate court pursuant to rule
1.060(b).120 In fact, the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, ruled
that if a defendant properly carries his burden of showing improper
venue on a motion to dismiss, "the trial court should make an affirma-
tive finding as to the proper venue and, unless there is a compelling
reason to the contrary, transfer the cause to that venue . . . rather than
dismiss it."'
' 2'
The trial of insurer joinder cases"' has raised special venue problems.
In Sage v. Travelers Indemnity Co.,'23 the insurer, a foreign corporation
authorized to do business in the state, was joined as a party defendant in
an action brought against a motor vehicle operator for personal injuries
arising out of a collision. Suit was filed in Orange County, Florida, where
the insurer had an agent, and the insurer moved for and was granted a
transfer to Lake County, Florida, the place of both the plaintiff's and
individual defendant's residence and the situs of the collision.124 The plain-
tiff appealed the change of venue, and the District Court of Appeal, Fourth
District, reversed. The court held that in the absence of a showing that the
individual defendant had asserted his venue privileges, a plaintiff could file
and prosecute an action against both the individual and the out-of-state
carrier in any county where the insurer had an agent pursuant to the
Florida Statutes. 25 The court was concerned, though, that these insurer-
joinder cases would encourage and allow plaintiffs "to shop for forums
almost anywhere within the state without regard to convenience, expense
119. Sage v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 239 So.2d 831, 833 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970), citing
Enfinger v. Baxley, 96 So.2d 538 (Fla. 1957). See also Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Mercer,
226 So.2d 270 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
120. Knowles v. Imperial Lumber Co., 238 So.2d 487 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
121. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. National Bank of Melbourne & Trust Co.,
238 So.2d 665, 667 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970) (emphasis added).
122. Shingleton v. Bussey, 223 So.2d 713 (Fla. 1969) ; Beta Eta House Corp. v. Gregory,
237 So.2d 163 (Fla. 1970) ; Stecher v. Pomeroy, 253 So.2d 421 (Fla. 1971). See Section V, A,
infra.
123. 239 So.2d 831 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
124. See note 118 supra and accompanying text. When a foreign corporation and an
individual Florida resident are sued in a state court, and the foreign corporation has an agent
residing in the same county as the individual, upon proper motion by that individual, suit
must be prosecuted in his county of residence.
125. FLA. STAT. § 47.011 (1969) is the general venue statute which provides that an ac-
tion may be brought in any county where the defendant resides, the cause of action accrued,
or property in litigation is located. FLA. STAT. § 47.021 (1969) provides that where two or
more defendants residing in different counties are sued, venue is proper in any county where
any defendant resides. FLA. STAT. § 47.051 (1969) provides, inter alia, that an action brought
against a foreign corporation doing business in the state may be brought in any county where
there can be found a corporate agent, where the cause of action accrued, or where the prop-
erty in litigation is located.
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and the justice of the matter."' 26 However, the court indicated that the
addition of the "Forum Non Convenience Statute,"' 27 which was modeled
after its federal counterpart, 28 "will serve as an effective tool in prevent-
ing forum shopping or venue abuse .... ."2 ' The court consequently over-
turned the lower court order because the individual defendant had not
asserted a venue preference for Lake County, where he resided, nor was
there any showing on the record that the ruling had been made in conjunc-
tion with Florida Statutes section 47.122 (1969) or "based upon any
criteria relevant and material to its application."3 0 Thus, in a suit brought
by an insured against an individual defendant and an out-of-state insur-
ance carrier, venue is proper in any county where the insurer has an agent
as long as the individual defendant does not properly object, and the forum
non conveniens statute is not successfully invoked.
IV. THE INITIAL PHASES OF AN ACTION
A. Setting Forth a Cause of Action
1. COMPLAINT
A complaint'3' must contain jurisdictional allegations, a statement of
the ultimate facts giving rise to the action, and a demand for relief.
82
Generally, rule 1.110 (b), which sets forth these requisites, tracks the lan-
guage of its federal counterpart, 33 but there is one major distinction in
Florida pleading rules, the requirement of setting forth ultimate facts
rather than simply stating a claim.'34 The greater showing required by the
state rules gives rise to a number of unique problems in Florida pleading.'35
126. Sage v. Travelers Indem. Co., 239 So.2d 831, 832 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
127. FLA. STAT. § 47.122 (1969).
128. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1970).
129. Sage v. Travelers Indem. Co., 239 So.2d 831, 833 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
130. Id.
131. The allowable pleadings in Florida are: complaint or petition [FLA. R. CIV. P.
1.100(a)], answer [FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.100(a)], counterclaim [FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.170(a)-(b)],
answer to counterclaim denominated as such [FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.100(a)], cross-claim [FLA. R.
Civ. P. 1.170(g)], answer to cross-claim [FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.100(a)], third party complaint
[FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.100(a), 1.180], answer to third party complaint [FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.100(a)],
and reply (to an answer when ordered by the court) [FLA. R. CIv. P. 1.100(a)]. See M. MAS-
SEY, CIVIL PROCEDURE FEDERAL AND FLORIDA 367 (Temp. Ed. 1972).
It should be noted that changes in the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure have been en-
acted by the Supreme Court of Florida at the time this survey is going to press (effective
January 1, 1973). Some of those changes have expanded the pleadings allowable to include,
inter alia, mandatory responses to affirmative defenses contained in responsive pleadings.
This is, of course, contrary to the current practice. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.100(a), 1.110(d)-(e),
1.140(b). See also In re The Florida Bar: Rules of Civil Procedure, 265 So.2d 21, 23-24
(Fla. 1972) (as regards FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.100(a) and 1.140).
132. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.110(b). This rule applies not only to the original complaint,
but also to counterclaims, cross-claims, and third party claims. See note 131 supra.
133. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
134. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.110(b) requires "a short and plain statement of the ultimate
facts showing that the pleader is entitled to relief ... " while FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a) demands
only "a short and plain statement of the claim . . . ." (emphasis added).
135. See cases reported in M. MASSEY, CIVIL PROCEDURE FEDERAL AND FLORIDA 404-18
(Temp. Ed. 1972).
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A complaint which fails to set forth a short and plain statement of
the ultimate facts may be dismissed,"3 6 but this general rule is not to be
carried to extremes. For instance, "where a complaint contains sufficient
allegations to acquaint the defendant with the plaintiff's charge of wrong-
doing so that the defendant can intelligently answer the same, it is error
to dismiss the action on the ground that more specific allegations are re-
quired. '1 7 The Supreme Court of Florida used this language in reversing
a ruling of the District Court of Appeal, Third District, which affirmed the
dismissal of a second amended complaint. The case had arisen over the
payment of money due a hotel as a result of a political fund-raising ban-
quet held at the establishment's place of business. The complaint alleged
that the hotel's facilities had been "engaged" by the defendant, the dinner
had been given, the defendant had agreed upon the price of the banquet
before it was held and for payment out of the proceeds of the dinner, a
certain fixed sum of money was due and payable, and the defendants had
refused to tender payment. The defendants contended that the complaint
did not state a cause of action because it failed "to specifically set forth
the form of the agreement from which certain alleged obligations arose,
as well as a detailed description of each element required to establish those
obligations."" 81 In rejecting that contention and reversing the Second
District, the supreme court noted that the "primary intent" of the ultimate
facts pleading requirement was "to eliminate technicalities and simplify
the procedures involved in the administration of justice. .""' and held
that the facts set forth in the complaint, if true, were sufficient to conclude
that some relief was warranted. In Sorkin v. Rovin, 4° however, a com-
plaint alleging that the plaintiff had purchased apartments from the de-
fendant and that the defendant had built a seawall and warranted its
quality and construction was held not to have stated sufficient ultimate
facts. The District Court of Appeal, Third District, observed that there
had been "no allegations that Sorkin [the plaintiff] purchased the realty on
which the apartments were located, or whether the purchase was by oral or
written contract or by warranty, special or quit claim deed."'' The court
concluded that the complaint had properly been dismissed by the trial
court.
Complaints based upon fraud 42 and conspiracy create special prob-
lems. "It has been held that general allegations of conspiracy are inade-
quate. The allegations must be clear, positive and specific."' 4 ' In Bond v.
136. International Design, Inc. v. Rubin's Franchises, Inc., 247 So.2d 778 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1971).
137. Fountainbleau Hotel Corp. v. Walters, 246 So.2d 563, 565 (Fla. 1971), rev'g 231
So.2d 240 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
138. Id. at 564.
139. Id. at 565.
140. 227 So.2d 492 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
141. Id.
142. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.120(b).
143. Bond v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 246 So.2d 631, 635 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
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Koscot Interplanetary, Inc.,44 a complaint framed in a conspiracy action
was dismissed for failure to specifically set forth damages to the plaintiff.
The court held that the failure to factually set forth the elements of a cause
of action for conspiracy was a fatal flaw. 4' When an action sounding in
fraud is alleged, the facts giving rise to the claim must be stated with a
great deal of particularity. "In other words, the allegations should be
specific and the facts constituting fraud clearly stated."' 46
While a party is generally "bound by the admissions and allegations
contained in his pleadings and cannot take a position inconsistent with
these admissions and allegations at the time of trial . . . ,,,. " this rule
cannot serve to limit the liberalized pleading provisions in Florida which
allow a party to state as many claims or defenses as he wishes. These
claims and defenses may be inconsistent and may demand legal or eq-
uitable relief. "The inconsistency permitted in pleadings may be in the
statement of the facts or in the legal theories adopted."'14 8 The District
Court of Appeal, First District, so held in Ogden v. Groves,49 and
adopted the following language:
"Such form of pleading permits the pleader maximum freedom
in the development of his case, and permits his claim for relief
or defense to be adjudicated on facts which are developed by
discovery and evidence introduced at the trial rather than on the
pleadings filed in the cause. The salutary purpose of the rule
would be emasculated if not completely destroyed if the allega-
tions of fact contained in an alternative and inconsistent state-
ment of a cause of action or defense could be used in evidence
against the pleader as proof of the facts alleged in such plead-
ing."'
50
144. 246 So.2d 631 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
145. The essentials of a complaint for civil conspiracy are (a) a conspiracy between
two or more parties, (b) to do an unlawful act, or to do a lawful act by unlawful
means, (c) the doing of some overt act in pursuance of the conspiracy, and (d)
damage to plaintiff as a result of the acts done under the conspiracy.
It is not to be presumed that a mere conspiracy per se has resulted in civil damages;
therefore, that fact must be pleaded in the complaint in order to make a good cause
of action against motion. (Emphasis added).
Id., citing 4 FLA. LAW & PRAC. Conspiracy § 13, at 219 (1956).
146. Nantell v. Lim-Wick Constr. Co., 228 So.2d 634, 637 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
For fraud to be actionable, the following elements must be made to appear: (1) a
misrepresentation of material fact; (2) [a] knowledge of the representor of the
misrepresentation, or [b] representations made by the representor without knowl-
edge as to either truth or falsity, or [c] representations made under circumstances
in which the representor ought to have known, if he did not know, of the falsity
thereof; (3) an intention that the representor induce another to act on it; and (4)
resulting injury to the party acting in justifiable reliance on the representation.
Id. at 637. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.120(b).
147. Ogden v. Groves, 241 So.2d 756, 758 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
148. Id. at 759. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.110(g). See section III, A, 2 infra.
149. 241 So.2d 756, 758 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
150. Id. at 759, quoting Hines v. Trager Constr. Co., 188 So.2d 826, 831 (Fla. 1st Dist.
1966).
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2. COUNTERCLAIMS, CROSS-CLAIMS, AND THIRD PARTY CLAIMS
There are two varieties of counterclaims, compulsory and permissive.
A compulsory counterclaim is one which arises "out of the transaction
or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim
and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties
over whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction."'"' A permissive coun-
terclaim is one "against an opposing party not arising out of the trans-
action or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's
claim."
152
Both varieties of counterclaim may demand relief in excess of the
amount of relief sought as well as defeat the recovery requested in the
main claim; 113 may be presented as a supplemental pleading by leave
of court if accrued after the commencement of the action;"' may be
permitted by the court when omitted through oversight, inadvertence,
or excusable neglect;' 55 and may involve additional parties which the
court shall order brought into the action (as long as such parties can be
brought in and the court will not lose jurisdiction by doing so). 16 How-
ever, the rules permitting counterclaims do not alter the law of sovereign
immunity,157 nor do they expand the jurisdiction of a court. If a coun-
terclaim is filed which contains a demand for relief in excess of the ju-
risdictional authority of a court, the action will be transferred to an
appropriate court. 158 In addition, a court does not lose jurisdiction of a
counterclaim if the main claim is dismissed. 5 9
A compulsory counterclaim must be brought during the proceed-
ings of the principle action involving the same transaction or occurrence,
or it will be waived. In Lawyers Title Insurance Corp. v. Little River
Bank & Trust Co., 6 ° the bank filed a cross-claim against the insurance
151. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.170(a).
152. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.170(b).
153. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.170(c).
154. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.170(e).
155. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.170(f).
156. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.170(h).
157. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.170(d).
158. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.170(j). See also In re The Florida Bar: Rules of Civil Procedure,
265 So.2d 21, 25 (Fla. 1972). Such a transfer will only be made if the filing fee for the
transferee court accompanies the pleading which exceeds the court's jurisdiction. If the fee
is not filed with the pleading, the claim will not be transfered, and recovery will be limited
to the lower court's jurisdictional ceiling.
159. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.170(i).
160. 228 So.2d 412 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969), cert. discharged, 238 So.2d 846 (Fla. 1970),
petition quashed, 243 So.2d 417 (Fla. 1970). It is very interesting to note in this case that
the Supreme Court of Florida filed an opinion in quashing the petition for certiorari. The
opinion was filed, in the words of Justice Carlton, "to remind our fellow practitioners that
jurisdiction in this Court is a matter strictly described by Article V, Section 4(2) of our
Constitution .... " Id., 243 So.2d 417 (1970). The sole ground stated in the petition for
certiorari was that the District Court of Appeal, Third District, had misconstrued or mis-
applied rule 1.170(a).
The supreme court either retained this written admonition for some particular reason or
it was inadvertently omitted from publication since the discharging of certiorari on rehearing
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company in an action where both were defendants. The insurance com-
pany filed a motion for summary judgment on the cross-claim which
was granted and later filed a motion to file a third party claim against
the bank which was granted. On appeal, the District Court of Appeal,
Third District, reversed the lower court ruling allowing the third party
complaint. Analogizing to the federal rules,' 6' the court held that the
failure to file the claim against the bank as a counterclaim before sum-
mary judgment was entered on the bank's cross-claim constituted a
waiver of the claim since it was compulsory in nature: "By failing to
file its compulsory counterclaim asserting such rights, it [the insurance
company] has waived or is estopped to assert such rights, if any existed,
and it may not later attempt to assert them in a third party complaint
filed against the Bank.'
6 2
A permissive counterclaim has been held to be properly filed in an
interpleader action by one of the defendants against the plaintiff-stake-
holder."' It has also been held that regardless of the permissive or com-
pulsory nature of a counterclaim, such a pleading may be inconsistent
with denials in the defendant's answer. "A defendant may both deny
the plaintiff's action and seek relief by counterclaim, and the assertion
of a counterclaim does not operate as an admission of the plaintiff's
claim."' Those pleadings were viewed merely as a "tentative outline
of the position which the pleader takes before the case is fully developed
on the facts through discovery and evidence introduced at the trial." 6
Under rule 1.180, a defendant may implead any third person "not
a party to the action who is or may be liable to him for all or part of
the plaintiff's claim against him." The purpose of the rule is to avoid
a multiplicity of actions arising out of the same subject matter and
facts. 6 However, in Dick v. Dick,6 7 the court refused to allow the de-
fendant husband to implead the plaintiff wife's father into a divorce
action because the claim against the father was totally unrelated to the
(238 So.2d 846) was published before the quashing of the petition for certiorari (243 So.2d
417), even though the later reported quashing was handed down six months before the
discharge of certiorari.
161. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a).
162. Lawyer's Title Ins. Corp. v. Little River Bank & Trust Co., 228 So.2d 412, 414
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1969). In so holding, the court looked in part to the federal courts and au-
thorities. See 2A J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE f1 7.04, at 1539 (2d ed. 1968); 3 J. MooRE,
FED ERAL PRACTICE I 13.12, at 30 (2d ed. 1968). See also Committee Note, FLA. R. Civ. P.
1.170.
163. Trak Microwave Corp. v. Medaris Man., Inc., 236 So.2d 189 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
See section VI infra.
164. Ogden v. Groves, 241 So.2d 756, 759 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970). See notes 147-49 supra
and accompanying text.
165. Id. In so holding, the court struck down a lower court's refusal to grant a dismissal
motion on the grounds of an inconsistency between the denials in defendant's answer and
the allegations in that same defendant's counterclaim.
166. Mins Crane Service, Inc. v. Insley Mfg. Corp., 226 So.2d 836 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969),
cert. denied, 234 So.2d 122 (Fla. 1969).
167. 238 So.2d 469 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970), cert. denied, 240 So.2d 641 (Fla. 1970).
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divorce action. The court indicated that since the subject matter of that
claim was unrelated to the principle action, it was an independent action
and should not be joined in the divorce action.
There are limitations, though, to third party practice. Since the
rules allowing impleading are governed by certain provisions of rule
1.170, a court may not assert jurisdiction over any third party defendant
if by so doing, the court would oust its own jurisdiction over the ac-
tion. Accordingly, in Mandala v. Sarrow,'16 the District Court of Appeal,
Fourth District, reversed a summary judgment in favor of a third party
defendant and ordered the entry of a dismissal order. Noting that such
joinder had deprived the lower court of jurisdiction over the action,
that the third party defendant was in no way liable to the defendant in
the principle action, and that a reversal of summary judgment on the
grounds of extant factual questions would simply result in another appeal
asserting improper joinder, the court reversed the judgment and ordered
the entry of dismissal on jurisdictional grounds.
3. AMENDING THE PLEADINGS
A party is permitted to amend a pleading once before a responsive
pleading is served or within 20 days after service if no response is re-
quired. Any other amendments can only be made by leave of court or
by written consent of the adverse party.169 "When issues not raised by
the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they
shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the plead-
ings.1170 Generally, a judge's determination as to whether leave to amend
should or should not be granted "will not be disturbed in the absence
of some demonstration that he has abused his discretion."' Amend-
ments are, however, to be liberally allowed." 2
The purpose of rule 1.190 is to further justice.17 Thus, amend-
ments are often permitted late in the proceedings. However, there are
limitations. Mere mistake or inadvertence on the part of an attorney is
not a sufficient excuse to warrant an exercise of a court's amendment
powers,7 4 nor must a court permit a plaintiff to amend his complaint
168. 234 So.2d 14 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970) (per curiam).
169. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.190(a).
170. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.190(b). If a motion is made to conform the pleadings to the
issues tried, it should be granted at any time. The failure to do so will not, however, affect
the judgment on such issues. See Cheek v. Long, 235 So.2d 349 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
171. E & E Elec. Cont., Inc. v. Singer, 236 So.2d 195, 197 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970), cert.
dismissed, 239 So.2d 827 (Fla. 1970).
172. Sharpe v. Kelly, 238 So.2d 315 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970), cert. denied, 240 So.2d 645
(Fla. 1970); Maiden v. Carter, 234 So.2d 168 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970); Worth Ins. Co. v.
Gammons, 228 So.2d 127 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969).
173. See FLA. R. Crv. P. 1.190(e).
174. E & E Elec. Cont., Inc. v. Singer, 236 So.2d 195 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970). In this case,
two counts of a complaint were dismissed with prejudice, while a third count was dismissed
with leave to amend within 20 days. On the fourteenth day after the entry of the order, the
plaintiff filed notice of interlocutory appeal, and the court set a supersedeas bond. The plain-
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when that pleading fails to show matters within the court's jurisdic-
tion.' Where a defendant sought to allege an affirmative defense after
the trial court had announced its ruling, the court was justified in re-
fusing to entertain the defense." 6 Similarly, a court which receives a
motion to amend pleadings in a grossly untimely fashion may also prop-
erly refuse to permit such additionsY.
77
On the other hand, "[a] motion to amend a complaint following a
final summary judgment is not necessarily untimely .... 11178 The fact
that a summary judgment may be in order should not preclude the court's
allowance of amendments to the plaintiff's pleadings especially where it
is apparent that a proper defense or cause of action might well exist if
correctly pleaded.179 Likewise, the granting of an ore tenus motion to
amend a complaint at the end of all testimony at a trial is not improper
as long as the amendment does not change "the cause of action."' i ° The
fact that the "legal theory" of the action is changed by an amendment
is of no consequence.''
The addition of parties through pleading amendments is more strictly
controlled. One reason for this is that amended pleadings relate back
to the time of the initial filing8 2 and thus have an effect on the running
of the statute of limitations. The determination of whether an amend-
ment changing parties relates back to the time the suit was brought "de-
pends upon the nature of the matter asserted by the amendment, i.e.,
whether the amendment states a new cause of action or merely recites in
a different form the cause of action stated in the original pleading."'
8 3
An amendment to plaintiff's complaint changing the parties to
the suit so long as it does not introduce a new cause of action
or make a new demand or substantially change the cause of ac-
tion but merely restates in a different form the cause of action
tiff never paid the bond or filed assignments of error, and the appeal was dismissed. Sixty-
three days after the expiration of the initial 20 day period, the plaintiff filed an amended
complaint together with an affidavit claiming "mistake and inadvertence" by the attorney.
The court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, and that determination was affirmed on
appeal.
175. Williams & Reed, Inc. v. Chase, 227 So.2d 75 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969), appeals dismissed
without opinion, 237 So.2d 175 (Fla. 1970).
176. Cohen v. Landow, 242 So.2d 801 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
177. McKnight v. Hialeah Race Course, 235 So.2d 552 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970) (per curiam)
(leave to amend not requested for five month period between dismissal and issuance of final
judgment) ; Maiden v. Carter, 234 So.2d 168 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970) (two years, one amended
complaint filed, and no further facts offered to court to justify second amendment).
178. Sea Shore Motel Corp. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 233 So.2d 651, 652 (Fla. 4th
Dist. 1970), cert. denied, 238 So.2d 425 (Fla. 1970).
179. Id. See also Watier v. Rew Crane Service, Inc., 240 So.2d 177 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
180. Ferrer v. McMurry, 238 So.2d 315 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970) ; Bernard Marko & Assoc.,
Inc. v. Steele, 230 So.2d 42, 44 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970) (dictum).
181. Strickland v. St. Petersburg Auto Auction, Inc., 243 So.2d 603 (Fla. 4th Dist.
1971).
182. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.190(c).
183. Lindy's of Orlando, Inc. v. United Electric Co., 239 So.2d 69, 72 (Fla. 4th Dist.
1970), cert. denied, 242 So.2d 463 (Fla. 1970).
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originally pleaded relates back to the commencement of the ac-
tion so as to avoid the operation of the statute of limitations,
and may therefore be made even after the statute of limitations
has run. But where the amendment by the change of the parties
introduces a new cause of action or one which is different and
distinct from that originally set up, the new pleading is deemed
equivalent to the bringing of a new action, and there is no rela-
tion back to the filing of the original pleading, which will pre-
vent the statute of limitations from running against the new
cause of action down to the time that it is introduced by the
amendment. 84
In Lindy's of Orlando, Inc. v. United Electric Co., 8' the District Court
of Appeal, Fourth District, reversed a lower court ruling which had
granted a judgment on the pleadings on the grounds that the statute of
limitations had run after the court permitted an amendment changing the
name of the plaintiff from one corporation to another. Noting that both
corporations were owned by the same man (one corporation owning the
building, the other owning the business); that the defendant corpora-
tion was not being adversely affected; and that the "mere substitution
of parties plaintiff ... [did not constitute] a new cause of action ...
the Fourth District reinstated the plaintiff's action and remanded.
In a personal injury action brought against Viele Groves, Inc., 187
responsive pleadings as well as interrogatories and requests for admis-
sions had been filed, and the defendant corporation had denied that it
did business in the state or that it owned or had any interest in property
where the injury occurred. By stipulation, the parties agreed to continue
the proceedings to allow the plaintiff to amend her complaint which she
did by naming Charles E. Viele and his wife as co-defendants. The de-
fendant corporation through its president, Charles Viele, then moved for
and was granted summary judgment on the grounds that the corporation
was a shell and had never engaged in business in Florida. Subsequently,
Viele and his wife moved for dismissal on the grounds that the four-
year statute of limitations had run. That motion was also granted. On
appeal, the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, was faced with
the question of whether an amendment to a complaint attempting to
substitute the names of an individual for that of a corporation "relates
back to the commencement of the action so as to defeat a defense based
on the statute of limitations. . ." under the purview of rule 1.190 (c)-(e).188
The court saw- the critical concern as whether the amendment sought to
184. Id.
185. 239 So.2d 69, 72 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970), quoting Griffin v. Workman, 73 So.2d 844,
847 (Fla. 1954).
186. Id. "'The mere change of the name of the plaintiff in the title would not of course
change the cause of action.'" Id.
187. Galuppi v. Viele, 232 So.2d 408 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970), cert. denied, 238 So.2d 109
(Fla. 1970).
188. Id. at 409.
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correct a misnomer or whether it was an attempt to make new. parties
to the suit.'89 Looking to federal cases which turned on "the relation-
ship between the old and the new party,"'90 the Fourth District held
that the amendment was proper as to Charles Viele because he had ac-
tively participated in the suit and had notice from the time of the com-
mencement of the action as an officer of the defendant corporation. The
court did not, however, impute this knowledge to Viele's wife, but re-
manded the case to the trial court for a factual determination to be
made as to her knowledge of the action.
B. Defenses
1. PLEADING DEFENSES GENERALLY
Defenses are generally set forth in a responsive pleading,19' although
certain defenses may be raised by motion. 92 Unless ordered by the court,
no reply is needed to an affirmative defense raised in a responsive plead-
ing.' Estoppel is one defense which must be affirmatively set forth in
a pleading. 9 4 However, in a fashion similar to the rules affecting amended
pleadings, if a defense is raised during the course of the proceedings,
though not specifically pleaded, justice may demand its consideration. In
Criado v. Milgram,95 a mortgage foreclosure action, the defendant main-
tained that the plaintiff had notice of the fact that defendant had con-
tinued to make mortgage payments to plaintiff's assignor, and that the
foreclosure action was fraudulent. The court granted a motion by de-
fendant to assert the defense of estoppel. The defendant failed to amend
the pleadings and at the termination of the trial was refused a jury
instruction on estoppel. In reversing this determination on appeal, the
District Court of Appeal, Third District, observed that the trial court's
entry of the order allowing the estoppel defense "represents an initial
recognition of the parties' right to defend their position under applicable
189. In arriving at a determination of this issue we must of necessity consider sub-
paragraphs (c) and (e) of Florida RCP 1.190, 30 F.S.A. We must determine if the
proposed amendment corrects a misnomer or whether it brings in new party defen-
dants. If the amendment is granted and its effect is merely to correct a misnomer,
there is no doubt that the amendment would relate back in time to the date of the
original complaint . . . . But if its effect is to make new parties to the suit, the




191. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d), 1.140(a)-(b).
192. See section IV, B, 3 infra.
193. FiA. R. Civ. P. 1.140(b). However, newly enacted rules promulgated by the Su-
preme Court of Florida require responses to such defenses in an additional pleading.
See In re The Florida Bar: Rules of Civil Procedure, 265 So.2d 21, 23-24 (1972) (effective
January 1, 1973).
194. Coppedge Terminal Corp. v. Hill, 241 So.2d 743 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970); Rod-Lyn
Corp. v. De Belay, 231 So.2d 233 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970), cert. denied, 237 So.2d 754 (Fla. 1970).
195. 237 So.2d 596 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970), cert. denied, 240 So.2d 813 (Fla. 1970).
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law .... Their failure to later embody the court's ruling should not ...
be held to bar them from asserting this meritorious defense."' 96
2. LIMITATIONS
Of the 19 enumerated affirmative defenses listed in rule 1.110(b),
the most frequently litigated one during the survey period was the stat-
ute of limitations. The specific periods of time which activate the statute
are for the most part set down in Florida Statutes chapter 95 (1969).
It is clear in Florida, though, that the limitations statute does not begin
to run until an aggrieved party knows or by exercise of reasonable dili-
gence should have known of a cause of action, in the absence of fraud
or fraudulent concealment. The question of when a party knew or should
have known of a certain occurrence is a question of fact.'97 So, in an
action brought by a mother against her sons for fraudulent conversion
of her savings account, the granting of a summary judgment based on
the running of the statute was found improper in the absence of a deter-
mination by the fact finder as to the date the cause of action properly
accrued. 8 In a similar vein, a claim based on indemnification cannot be
said to have accrued until such time as liability has been assessed against
the owner of the product.'
Even though some jurisdictions hold that the cause of action in a
malpractice action against a lawyer accrues at the time of the attorney's
negligence, the District Court of Appeal, First District, squarely re-
jected this contention. In a case of first impression,00 the court held
that a legal malpractice action accrues for purposes of the statute of
limitations on the date when the lawyer's negligence first becomes known
to the client. And, lest it be thought that the insurance lobby has been
inactive, attention should be directed to a recent amendment of Florida
Statutes chapter 95 (1969) which shortens the time for filing a medical-
related malpractice action from four to two years as of July 1, 1972.201
In a decision affirming the dismissal of a personal injury action
brought for the benefit of a four-year-old girl who had been orphaned
and injured in a March 1964 automobile crash, 02 the District Court of
196. Id. at 598.
197. Hart v. Hart, 234 So.2d 393 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
198. Id.
199. Mims Crane Service, Inc. v. Insley Mfg. Corp., 226 So.2d 836 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969),
cert. denied, 234 So.2d 122 (Fla. 1969). For purposes of tolling the statute, the court will
look to the substance of the allegations to see if they make out a cause of action for a
specific legal remedy. The fact that the complaint does not clearly state its cause of action
will not control. In this case, the court found that the elements of an indemnification action
had been alleged, and thus the statute would toll for an indemnification action and save the
suit from dismissal. (It should also be noted that the court looked both to the complaint
and an attached exhibit to find the needed elements.)
200. Downing v. Vaine, 228 So.2d 622 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969), appeal dismissed, 237 So.2d
767 (Fla. 1970).
201. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-254, amending FLA. STAT. § 95.11(6) (1969).
202. Gasparro v. Homer, 245 So.2d 901 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
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Appeal, Fourth District, held that the four-year limitations provisions
began to run on the date the accident occurred despite the fact that the
child had not been adopted until 21 months after the accident which
took her natural parents' lives. In a stinging dissent, Judge Walden at-
tacked the position taken by the majority and stated:
[I]t is manifestly unfair to penalize an innocent child for the
inaction of others, especially when there is no showing that those
persons exist or were in any way under any duty, requirement,
authorization, or direction to act .. . .In sum, the Statute of
Limitations should be tolled as concerns the tort claim of an
infant where and while such infant has neither parent, guardian,
next friend, or other legal representative in existence capable
of bringing suit for and on behalf of such minor. °
Noting a distinction between salaries and wages, 2°4 the Supreme Court
of Florida held in Broward Builders Exchange, Inc. v. Goehring,205 that
the statute of limitations for an action for recovery of salary withheld
was not governed by the one year provision of Florida Statutes section
95.11 (7) (b) (1969), but that actions involving wages were. In an opin-
ion which examined legislative intent so closely that the grammar and
punctuation of a provision were analyzed, the court rejected a statutory
construction which excluded wage claims accruing under a contract
2O6
and observed that "it is difficult to conceive of a claim for wages which
does not in some manner arise from a contract expressed or implied."20 7
While conceding that a federal statute of limitations has preempted the
field in cases arising under specific federal law, the court held that
section 95.11(7)(b) still remained in full force and effect as to cases
arising out of Florida legislation and common law. Thus, that section
"was intended to apply to all suits for wages or overtime, however ac-
cruing, as well as to suits for damages and penalties accruing under the
laws respecting the payment of wages and overtime. '20 8 In another case
203. Id. at 903. It is significant that Judge Walden's dissent was addressed to a per
curiam affirmance without an opinion. Subsequently, the majority wrote an opinion on re-
hearing which was effectively a rebuttal to Judge Walden's opinion, which the judge was
quick to observe in his second dissent to the later opinion. The court did, however, certify
the question to the Supreme Court of Florida as a matter of great public interest. Id. at
906-07.
204. "Courts usually restrict the term 'wages' to sums paid as hire to domestic or
menial servants and those employed in the various manual occupations. On the
other hand, the term 'salary' usually has reference to the compensation of clerks,
salesmen, bookkeepers, other employees of like class and performing like services
and supervisory personnel and officers of corporations, as well as public officers."
..."The word 'salary' imports a specific contract for a specific sum for a specified
period of time, while 'wages' are compensation for services by the day or week."
Broward Builders Exchange, Inc. v. Goehring, 231 So.2d 513, 514 (Fla. 1970), rev'g in part
222 So.2d 801 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969), and authorities relied upon therein.
205. 231 So.2d 513 (Fla. 1970).
206. Goehring v. Broward Builders Exchange, Inc., 222 So.2d 801 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
207. Broward Builders Exchange, Inc. v. Goehring, 231 So.2d 513, 514 (Fla. 1970), rev'g
in part 222 So.2d 801 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
208. Id. at 515.
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dealing with federal preemption," 9 the District Court of Appeal, Third
District, held that even though contractual provisions shortening stat-
utory limitation periods are against public policy and are void,210 con-
tracts controlled by federal maritime law which permit such alterations
of the limitations period can have such provisions if specifically autho-
rized by statute.2 '
The defense of the statute of limitations may be raised in an answer
or by motion,212 but to have an action dismissed, it must affirmatively
appear on the face of the complaint that the statute has run.212 In
Williams v. Covell,214 an action had been filed in 1963, but the sum-
mons had not been issued and served until 1969. The defendant moved
for, but was refused an order of dismissal on the grounds that the stat-
ute of limitations had run. On appeal, this ruling was upheld because,
according to the court, "[a] reading of the complaint clearly shows that
the same was filed within three years after the alleged accrual of the
cause of action .... 215
3. MOTION PRACTICE
At the option of the pleader several defenses can be raised by
timely motion if filed before a responsive pleading, when one is due.216
All of these defenses must be raised at one time or be waived with two
exceptions. An attack on jurisdiction over the subject matter may be
raised at any time, and the defenses of failure to state a legal defense,
join an indispensable party, and state a cause of action may be made
by a later pleading, if allowed, by a motion for a judgment on the
209. Coquette Originals, Inc. v. Canadian Gulf Line of Florida, Inc., 240 So.2d 847
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
210. FLA. STAT. § 95.03 (1969).
211. See, e.g., 46 U.S.C. § 1300-15 (1970).
212. Williams v. Covell, 236 So.2d 447 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
213. Id. See also Lindy's of Orlando, Inc. v. United Elec. Co., 239 So.2d 69 (Fla. 4th
Dist. 1970), cert. denied, 242 So.2d 463 (Fla. 1970).
214. 236 So.2d 447 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
215. Id. at 448. While the result in this case seems somewhat ludicrous and is not
improved any by the court's reticence to solve the riddle at the conclusion of their opinion,
there would appear to be several options open to the defendant. If the defendant had known
of the filing of the complaint, he should have filed a motion to dismiss for failure to prose-
cute under FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.420(e) after one year had elapsed. In fact, since there are no
cases holding that the return of process constitutes "action" under that rule, it might well
be that such a motion could still be filed by the defendant. In the event that either or both
of these methods fail, the defendant could file an answer setting up the defense of the running
of the statute of limitations, file an accompanying affidavit from the county sheriff indicating
that service had not been attempted for the six year period, and move for summary judg-
ment. While the running of the statute must appear- on the face of the pleadings to succeed
in a motion to dismiss or a motion for judgment on the pleadings, this requirement is not
effective when a motion for summary judgment is sought.
216. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.140(b). Those defenses are: lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter (See Section I, A supra) ; lack of jurisdiction over the person (See Section II supra) ;
improper venue (See Section III supra) ; insufficiency of service of process (See Section II
supra); failure to state a cause of action (See Section IV supra and infra); and failure to
join an indispensable party. Id.
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pleadings, or at trial on the merits.2 17 In addition, in the pretrial stages,
motions to strike all or part of the pleadings21 and for a more definite
statement 219 may also be made.
The purpose of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of
action is "to ascertain if the plaintiff has alleged a good cause of ac-
tion . ,2. o In disposing of such a motion, the court must confine it-
self to the allegations and facts contained within the four corners of the
complaint, 22' and all of the allegations and facts contained in the plead-
ings of the non-moving party must be taken as true for purposes of
the motion.222 The defendant is deemed for those purposes to have ad-
mitted not only the truth of the plaintiff's allegations and facts, but also
all reasonable inferences that would arise from such facts. 223 "It is not
the court's duty to speculate as to what the true facts may be or what
facts may ultimately be proved at the trial of the cause. ' 224 Thus, the
question of evidentiary sufficiency is wholly irrelevant and immaterial
in considering the motion. 25 So, allegations in a workmen's compensa-
tion action complaint which alleged that architects had been negligent
in failing to provide a sufficient guardrail around a 12 foot high jobsite
were found sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. 26
The determination of the sufficiency of a complaint is clearly a
question of law, and the allegations in a complaint taken as true are to
be measured against the applicable legal standards.2 If a complaint sets
217. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.140(g)-(h). See Schmauss v. Snoll, 245 So.2d 112 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1971), cert. denied, 248 So.2d 172 (Fla. 1971), and Kirk v. Kennedy, 231 So.2d 246 (Fla.
2d Dist. 1970) (sovereign immunity is not a defense, but rather goes to the question of a
court's jurisdiction; it can be raised at any time); Wilds v. Permenter, 228 So.2d 408 (Fla.
4th Dist. 1969) (jurisdictional objections cannot be waived and may be raised at any time).
218. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.140(f).
219. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.140(e).
220. Geer v. Bennett, 237 So.2d 311, 315 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
221. Id. See also Bond v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 246 So.2d 631, 633 (Fla. 4th Dist.
1971).
222. Bond v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 246 So.2d 631 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971); Geer v.
Bennett, 237 So.2d 311 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970) ; Hendler v. Rogers House Con., Inc., 234 So.2d
128 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970); Nantell v. Lim-Wick Constr. Co., 228 So.2d 634, 637 (Fla. 4th
Dist. 1970) ; Popwell v. Abel, 226 So.2d 418 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
It should be noted that pursuant to FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.130(b) any exhibit attached to a
pleading as an exhibit "shall be considered part thereof for all purposes." In Harry Pepper &
Assoc., Inc. v. Lasseter, 247 So.2d 736 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971), cert. denied, 252 So.2d 797 (Fla.
1971), the court held that in considering a motion to dismiss, the trial court had to consider
a deposition attached to the complaint as an exhibit. The court also noted that where there
is an inconsistency between the allegations of the complaint and the facts set forth in an
exhibit, the effect is a neutralization of each allegation against the other which renders the
pleading objectionable.
223. Bond v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 246 So.2d 631, 633 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971),
citing Russell v. Community Blood Bank, Inc., 185 So.2d 749, 750 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
224. Nantell v. Lim-Wick Constr. Co., 228 So.2d 634, 637 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
225. Id.
226. Geer v. Bennett, 237 So.2d 311 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
227. "A motion to dismiss a complaint must be decided on questions of law and ques-
tions of law only." Id. at 315. See also Nantell v. Lim-Wick Constr. Co., 228 So.2d 634
(Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
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forth a cause of action "upon any ground," a motion to dismiss should
be denied.228 However, "[a] motion to dismiss a complaint for failure
to state a cause of action does not reach the defects of vague and
ambiguous pleading. '2 29 The proper vehicle to reach this type of situa-
tion is a motion to strike under rule 1.140(f) or a motion for more
definite statement under rule 1.140(e).
In Fountainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Walters,' ° the Supreme Court of
Florida quashed a lower court ruling which affirmed a trial court's dis-
missal of a complaint. The court held that where a complaint was ade-
quately framed to sufficiently acquaint the defendant with the plaintiff's
claim to allow an intelligent response, it was not necessary for the plain-
tiff to state the theory of his case in the pleadings, and the trial court
improperly dismissed the complaint.23' In a case where a motion to strike
was filed,232 the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held that
"[a] motion to strike an affirmative defense alleged in an answer tests
the legal sufficiency of such defense. 23  In so holding, the court re-
versed a lower court order striking an affirmative defense of lack of
consideration in a suit brought against an estate executor on a promissory
note. Indicating that the lower court most likely had ruled in that man-
ner because of a deposition on file in which the executor indicated that
the defense was based on oral representations made by a decedent to
him, the court rejected this reasoning and stated that:
Lack of consideration being a valid defense to a suit on a promis-
sory note,... it was error to strike such defense .... It may be
that at the trial the defendant will be unable to offer any compe-
tent evidence to sustain such affirmative defense . . . [b]ut a
defense which is legally sufficient is not subject to a motion to
strike ... simply because at some time prior to trial it appears
that the defendant may be unable to produce evidence at the trial
to sustain such defense.234
After the pleadings have been filed, and before trial, a defendant can
move for a judgment on the pleadings pursuant to rule 1.140(c). In pass-
ing on such a motion, the court applies the same test used in determining
a motion to dismiss and proceeds under the same presumptions of the
228. Bond v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 246 So.2d 631, 633 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971). See
authorities cited therein.
229. Fountainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Walters, 246 So.2d 563, 565 (Fla. 1971).
230. Id. See Section IV, A, 1, notes 136-39 supra and accompanying text.
231. While the second amended complaint might well have been subject to a motion
for more definite statement under F.R.C.P. 1.140(e), or a motion to strike under
F.R.C.P. 1.140(f), the record that is now before us demonstrates that the com-
plaint was dearly sufficient to state a claim for relief under F.R.C.P. 1.110(b),
should not have been dismissed with prejudice, and should proceed to trial on the
issue made by an answer.
Id. at 566.
232. Windle v. Sebold, 241 So.2d 165 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
233. Id. at 166.
234. Id.
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truthfulness of the allegations of the non-moving party 35 However, a
defendant may not rely upon, nor may the court consider, the allegations
contained in the defendant's answer for purposes of the motion." 6 There-
fore, in an employment contract action where the defendant denied the
plaintiff's allegations regarding the length of time of employment, the trial
court acted improperly in granting a judgment on the pleadings for the
defendant since an issue of fact had been clearly raised. 37 In addition, a
judgment on the pleadings cannot be granted pursuant to rule 1.140(c)
on the basis of uncontroverted allegations in a defendant's answer where
no responsive pleading is required by the procedural rules, because all such
allegations are deemed denied.238
There is another similarity which exists between a motion to dismiss
and a motion for judgment on the pleadings. While it is correct to grant
a motion for judgment on the pleadings of the plaintiff's complaint if
legally insufficient, the entry of final judgment on the pleadings may be
a harsh result. In two cases where the courts pointed to the similarity
between a motion for judgment on the pleadings and a motion to dismiss,
239
final judgments were reversed with orders to allow the filing of an amended
complaint. In one of the cases, Baird v. Continental Insurance Co.,2 40 the
District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held that "the rules should not
be so finely drawn as to prohibit a second chance to plead an acceptable
cause of action .. ,241 It is probably safe to assume, then, that the
Florida Rules of Civil Procedure will not be interpreted in such a fashion
as to deny a plaintiff his remedy on procedural technicalities, though it
is equally clear that those same rules (especially regarding motions for
judgment on the pleadings) will also not be interpreted to allow frivolous
and inadequate actions to continue unchecked.
A recent decision rendered by the District Court of Appeal, Third
District, relating to hearings and notices affects motion practice in gen-
eral. 2  In that case involving consolidated appeals, defendants had filed
motions to dismiss in response to complaints filed against them. The
235. "In passing on such a motion made by defendant all well pleaded material allega-
tions of the complaint and all fair inferences to be drawn therefrom must be taken as true
and the inquiry is whether the plaintiff has stated a cause of action in his complaint."
Glidden Co. v. Zuckerman, 245 So.2d 639, 640 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971), adopting the language
of Reinhard v. Bliss, 85 So.2d 131, 133 (Fla. 1956). See also London Distrib. Co. v. Bastone,
244 So.2d 550 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971) ; White v. Strange, 237 So.2d 16 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
236. "It is well established that the allegations of the answer are deemed denied, where
no reply is required and such allegations cannot be a basis for any such judgment on the
pleadings." Glidden v. Zuckerman, 245 So.2d 639, 640 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
237. White v. Strange, 237 So.2d 16 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
238. City of Pompano Beach v. Oltman, 228 So.2d 610 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969) (per
curiam).
239. International Design, Inc. v. Rubin's Franchises, Inc., 247 So.2d 778 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1971) ; Baird v. Continental Ins. Co., 237 So.2d 206 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970), cert. denied, 241
So.2d 858 (Fla. 1970).
240. 237 So.2d 206 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970), cert. denied, 241 So.2d 858 (Fla. 1970).
241. Id.
242. Polland v. Visual Graphics Corp., 240 So.2d 835 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
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motions were noticed for hearing on a certain date, but because of the
judge's illness were not heard on that day. However, notice appeared in
a legal newspaper which had been designated by the circuit court as offi-
cial, shifting all hearings scheduled for that day to another date. Later,
another notice was published in the same newspaper, but on the appointed
day, the plaintiffs failed to show, and their actions were dismissed with
prejudice. Subsequent motions and supporting affidavits to set aside the
final dismissal were denied, and an appeal was taken. The Third District
set aside the dismissals and held pursuant to rule 1.090(d) that written
notice to the plaintiffs should have preceded the later hearing and that the
failure to do so was fatal. The court indicated that the purpose of the rule
was to provide proper notice to a party which had not been accomplished.
Rejecting the appellees' contention that the rule's requirements were
satisfied by publication of notice in the circuit court's "official newspaper,"
Chief Judge Pearson, speaking for the court, stated that a local court rule
could not be made which overruled the requirements of the rules of pro-
cedure, and that "there is no showing that the designation of the official
newspaper was intended to or could have the effect of making notices
therein a substitute for written notices required by the Florida Rules of
Civil Procedure."' 3
C. Pretrial Conference
The pretrial conference is designed to streamline the litigation process
by providing for the simplification of issues, the amendment of pleadings
if necessary, the securing of admissions of fact and documents to obviate
unnecessary proof at trial, the limitation of the number of expert witnesses,
and any other matters which may aid in the disposition of the action.244
Pursuant to rule 1.200, the conference is not compulsory, but must be
held if either party or the court desires such a meeting. 45 In addition, if
an attorney or party fails to appear at such a conference the court "may
dismiss the suit or strike the answer or take such action as justice re-
quires."24 However, in Goldman v. Tabor,247 the District Court of Appeal,
Second -District, reversed a lower court ruling which entered a default
judgment and struck all of the pleadings of a defendant whose attorney
had failed to attend a pretrial conference. Noting that the defendant's
attorney claimed that he had received no notice (which was not refuted
243. Id. at 836.
244. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.200. The rule also provides for a determination of the advisability
of referring certain or all of the issues to a special master "for findings of fact for use by
the court for pre-trial purposes . . . ." Id.
245. All of the federal district courts in Florida require such a conference in every civil
case. See Rule 5, United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida (1971);
Rule 10, United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida (1968); General
Rule 14, United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida (1971).
246. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.200.
247. 239 So.2d 529 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
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by the plaintiff), the court observed that "such action ...punishes the
litigant rather than the attorney.)
248
Even though a pretrial conference is normally followed rather closely
by the trial, the holding of the conference does not terminate the right to
take depositions, and a deposition should not be cancelled by the court
simply because the notice of taking is delivered at the conference s.24 Any
inequities in trial preparation can easily be balanced by the granting of a
continuance. Similarly, the court has the power to refuse to permit a wit-
ness to testify whose name has not been furnished to the opposing party at
the pretrial conference. However, in Green v. Shoop, 250 an action to re-
cover a real estate brokerage commission, a Florida appellate court re-
versed a trial court order which refused to allow the testimony of a witness
who had been a party to a transaction on the grounds that the calling of
the witness and his testimony would not involve an element of surprise to
the opposing party. The court recognized the wide discretion of a trial
court in permitting or prohibiting the use of witnesses whose names had
not been furnished to the opposing party, but stated that "the exercise of
such discretion should be guided largely, though not exclusively, by
whether the use of such a witness will prejudice the opposing party.
' 251
V. PARTIES
A. Joinder of Insurers
In 1969, the Supreme Court of Florida decided Shingleton v.
Bussey,252 one of the most significant cases ever handed down on the
question of insurer joinder. The court held that "a direct cause of action
... inures to a third party beneficiary against an insurer in motor vehicle
liability insurance coverage cases as a product of the prevailing public
policy of Florida, '253 and that the third party beneficiary doctrine encom-
passed actions brought "against an insurer in favor of members of the
public injured through the acts of the insured. 254
While noting that the liability of an insured is a condition precedent to
finding any insurer liability, the court did not consider that fact to be
sufficient to postpone the time when suit can be filed against an insurer.
The court concluded that "there is nothing inherent in the general nature
of liability insurance which would operate to preclude an injured third
248. Id.
249. Brennan v. Board of Public Instruction, 244 So.2d 463 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971). See
Section VII, B, 2 infra.
250. 240 So.2d 85 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
251. Id. at 86.
252. 223 So.2d 713 (Fla. 1969), aff'g 211 So.2d 593 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968). See Rose &
Schmukler, Civil Procedure, 1967-1969, Survey of Florida Law, 24 U. MIAN L. REv. 534,
550-52 (1970).
253. Shingleton v. Bussey, 223 So.2d 713, 715 (Fla. 1969) [hereinafter cited as Shingle-
ton].
254. Id. at 716.
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party beneficiary from directly suing and joining the insurer as a co-
defendant in [an] action to determine the insured's liability.' 25 5 Rejecting
the binding effect of policy provisions which forbid joinder of or the filing
of an independent action against an insurer as contrary to public policy
and equal protection of the law, the supreme court held that the "'no
joinder' restriction" contained in the policy before the court went "much
too far and therefore should be construed as securing for the insurer only
the right to assert nonliability and not the nonjoinder of the insured with
the insurer as a condition precedent to the liability of the insurer. ' 256
In interesting dicta, the court addressed itself to one of the primary
reasons advanced in favor of nonjoinder of insurance companies, the fear
of jury prejudice against the insurer. Chief Justice Ervin, speaking for the
majority, indicated that this consideration could not serve to limit joinder
provisions against insurers and played down the potential damage to car-
riers when he stated:
While we will not go so far as to assert that the above proposition
has been all but obliterated by the more recent indications to the
effect that the injection of insurance does not operate to increase
the size of jury verdicts, we do think the stage has now been
reached where juries are more mature. Accordingly, a candid ad-
mission at trial of the existence of insurance coverage, the policy
limits of same, and an otherwise aboveboard revelation of the
interest of an insurer in the outcome of the recovery action
against insured should be more beneficial to insurers in terms of
diminishing their overall policy judgment payments to litigating
beneficiaries than the questionable "ostrich head in the sand"
approach which may often mislead juries to think insurance
coverage is greater than it is.
257
However, the court recognized that the joinder provisions which
would bring an insurer into an action might well raise particular issues
between the insured and his carrier which would not be germane to the
main action and would serve to further complicate it. An effective remedy
for this situation was seen in the liberal severability rules258 through
which a court could require the adjudication of those issues peculiar to
the insured in a separate trial. The court was quick to warn that such a
separation "would not remove from the case the identity of all parties
joined nor their claims and defenses and their right to participate and
protect their respective interests.1
2 9
Shingleton raised as many questions as it answered, however, and
eight months later the District Court of Appeal, First District, which had
255. Id. At 717.
256. Id. at 718.
257. id.
258. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.270(b).
259. Shingleton v. Bussey, 223 So.2d 713, 720 (Fla. 1969).
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originally decided Shingleton,260 handed down Beta Eta House Corp. v.
Gregory,26' which expanded the application of Shingleton. The question
before the First District was whether the Shingleton insurer joinder
doctrine applied only to automobile insurance carriers or to other forms of
liability insurance as well. Noting that the supreme court had enunciated
a broader rule in Shingleton than had the First District, the court held that
"a liability insurance carrier is a proper party defendant in any suit for
damages brought against its insured for damages proximately caused by
the latter's negligence within the coverage provisions of the policy. ' 262
The First District's decision was a natural outgrowth and extension of
Shingleton and, had it stopped at that point, much confusion might have
been avoided. But it did not. The court continued and noted that the
liberal joinder provisions were procedural innovations and that Shingleton
was not intended to nor did it change any substantive law.
Such innovation does not diminish in any manner the obligatory
judicial concern to preserve the purity of the jury verdict and to
prevent irrelevant factors from being injected into the trial of a
case which may in any manner prejudice the jury in arriving
at a fair and impartial verdict on the issues presented for deci-
sion. 2 6
3
Implicit in the court's holding was that the existence of insurance coverage
should be kept from a jury since it tended to unfairly effect the jury's
verdict. Looking to rule 1.270(b) which provides for severability of ac-
tions as a procedural device which could be utilized to insure a fair trial
free from prejudice, the court held that upon motion of a party "issues
relating to the cause of action sued upon [should] be first tried under
circumstances which exclude any reference to insurance, insurance cov-
erage or joinder in the suit of the insurer as codefendant.12 4 Upon com-
pletion of that trial, a second trial could then be held if the plaintiff has
been victorious in the first suit, and if questions of coverage were left to be
litigated. Barring such disputes, the first verdict would bind the insurer up
to the policy limits. According to the First District, "[s]uch procedure
would preserve for the plaintiff those desirable benefits flowing from the
privilege of being able to bring a direct action against the insurer .... ,,265
260. Bussey v. Shingleton, 211 So.2d 593 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968).
261. 230 So.2d 495 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
262. Id. at 499.
263. Id. at 499-500.
264. Id. at 500.
265. Id.
It has been alluded to both in this and the Supreme Court's decisions in the
Shingleton-Bussey case that juries have reached such a stage of maturity and
sophistication where disclosure during trial of insurance protection held by a de-
fendant no longer has a prejudicial effect upon their verdicts. If such assumption
implies a concern for preserving the impartiality of the trial by proponents of the
direct action theory, then the exclusion of such disclosure from the trial cannot in
good faith be considered objectionable. By such exclusion the possibility of prejudice
1972]
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The court certified both points to the supreme court as involving questions
of great public interest.
In the intervening months between the First District's decision and
the supreme court's response, several decisions were rendered on the ques-
tion of joinder of insurance carriers. The First District itself decided one
case holding that professional liability insurance carriers could be joined
as party defendants in medical malpractice actions.266 The District Court
of Appeal, Second District, reached the same result.26 7 However, none of
these cases dealt with the severability of insurance carriers to avoid preju-
dicial influences on a jury. The stage was thus set for the Supreme Court
of Florida to render its decision in Beta Eta.68
The court affirmed the extension of the joinder rule as applied by the
First District and then turned to the question of jury prejudice and sever-
ability. Assessing the purpose of Shingleton as requiring "the parties to
'lay their cards on the table' in discovery proceedings, settlement negotia-
tions, and pretrial hearings.. .,," the court emphatically stated that the
existence and limits of insurance coverage are not to be considered by a
jury. The court impliedly accepted the two-trial rule established by the
First District, observing that questions of coverage and good faith settle-
ment negotiations could just as easily be litigated at a later time. Chief
Justice Ervin and Justice Boyd, while concurring with the extension of
Shingleton to all liability carriers, filed strong dissents to the court's im-
plied adoption of the two-trial rule. The two justices interpreted their
brother justices' opinion as affirming the First District's holding that
" 'absent extraordinary circumstances' the trial court should authorize
separate trials under Rule 1.270(b) .. .for the defendant tortfeasor and
his insurer. ' 270 This holding was viewed by the two justices as gutting
Shingleton and as a distortion of the "law of severance by requiring special
treatment of liability insurance carriers not afforded other codefen-
dants.",
271
Following this decision, confusion was legion. In response, the su-
preme court handed down Stecher v. Pomeroy272 in October 1971. In that
decision, which discharged a writ of certiorari, the court discussed the
will be eliminated consistent with the long-standing principle of substantive law
recognized in this state, and the defendant's right to an impartial trial on the issue
of negligence will be preserved.
id.
266. Shipman v. Kinderman, 232 So.2d 21 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
267. Vilord v. Jenkins, 240 So.2d 68 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970); Pyles v. Bridges, 239 So.2d
279 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970). Both of these decisions cited Shingleton and Beta Eta House Corp.
v. Gregory, 230 So.2d 495 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
268. Beta Eta House Corp. v. Gregory, 237 So.2d 163 (Fla. 1970) [hereinafter cited
as Beta Eta].
269. Id. at 165.
270. Id. at 166 (Boyd, J., dissent) (emphasis added).
271. Id.
272. 253 So.2d 421 (Fla. 1971) See Stecher v. Pomeroy, 244 So.2d 488 (Fla. 4th Dist.
1971). See also Note, 26 U. MIAMI L. Rav. 255 (1971).
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problems that had arisen with Shingleton and Beta Eta,27 3 specifically the
problem of jury prejudice occasioned by mention of insurance limits and
severability of actions involving insurers. Addressing itself to the first
point, the court held that while the mention of insurance limits was cer-
tainly improper, it was not always harmful error. In the case before it, the
court suggested that a clear case of harmless error was present since there
had been a recovery of only $19,000 despite policy limits of $100,000/
$300,000 and serious injuries suffered. It was indicated, though, that the
finding of harmless error in that case "is not to be regarded as approval
... of the mention of policy limits to a jury.
2 74
Turning to the second point, the majority held that while a sever-
ance might in some instances be granted as provided by rule 1.270(b),
"absent a justiciable issue relating to insurance, such as a question of
coverage or of the applicability or interpretation of the insurance policy
or other such valid dispute on the matter of insurance coverage, there
is no valid reason for a severance and it should NOT be granted.)
275
Mr. Justice Dekle stated that Shingleton spoke of severing only issues
between insured and insurer, not on questions of negligence liability.
2 76
Thus, while not specifically admitting a change, the supreme court ex-
pressly overruled both its decision and that of the First District in Beta
Eta as that ruling related to severance of liability insurers.
The law in Florida now appears to be as follows: A party may join
as a codefendant the insurance carrier of a defendant-tortfeasor in any
tort action where the insurer is providing liability coverage for the de-
fendant-insured. If, however, any issues arise between the insured and
his insurer which are not germane to the main action and would only
serve to complicate the progress of that action, the court may sever those
issues and require separate trials.277 Under no circumstances, though,
will severance be effected solely to prevent jury prejudice against the
insurer, and while there must be full disclosure of limits and coverage
between the parties, this information is not to be presented to the jury
273. See Note, 24 U. Miami L. REV. 845 (1970).
274. Stecher v. Pomeroy, 253 So.2d 421, 422 (Fla. 1971).
275. Id. at 424 (capitalization and emphasis in original).
276. The insurance carrier's position as a real party in interest is a position of
continuing interest which includes the trial of the cause which a third party has
asserted against its insured. To rule otherwise on a motion for severance would be
to defeat the purposes of the rule enunciated in these cases with regard to the real
party in interest so as to reflect the presence of financial responsibility which should
be left apparent before the jury (without other express mention, of course) and
the other bases set forth in those holdings. The routine granting of such motions
for severance except for such good cause related to insurance coverage would be a
misapprehension of this Court's holding.
Id.
277. The question of whether or not a separate trial will be allowed is a discretionary
matter to be decided by the trial judge. "An insurer does not have an absolute right to
severance." Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Myers, 247 So.2d 83, 84 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
See also Beta Eta House Corp. v. Gregory, 237 So.2d 163 (Fla. 1970); Stecher v. Pomeroy,
244 So.2d 488 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
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since it is irrelevant. However, if such information is presented to the
jury, harmful error must be shown to warrant reversal.
B. Intervention
Rule 1.230 provides that any interested person may be permitted
to intervene in an action, but the intervening party's claim will be sub-
ordinated to the main action unless the court orders otherwise. All in-
terventions are at the discretion of the court. Subject to the qualification
of subordination to the main action, though, "an intervenor is a party
for all purposes with the same rights and privileges of other parties to
the cause." In addition, the intervenor "is bound by the court's judg-
ment entered in the cause and may appeal any adverse ruling to him.1
218
There are several criteria which must be met to qualify for inter-
vention. The applicant's interest must be shown to be involved in the
litigation; it must be direct and immediate; and it must be shown that
the intervenor "will gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect
of the judgment. A showing of indirect, inconsequential or contingent
interest is wholly inadequate .. . ."I" Thus, in a suit brought by a dis-
tiller who manufactured liquor inside and outside the state and claimed
that a recently-enacted Florida statute" ° created a larger tax burden
on it than on out-of-state distillers, a trial court correctly refused to
permit an in-state distiller to intervene because the tax rate of its prod-
ucts was not in issue, nor was there any immediate or direct threat to
it.28' However, an insurance company which has subrogation rights under
an insurance contract does have a sufficient interest to intervene as a
party plaintiff in a suit based upon personal injuries where the insurer
had paid out over $4,000 in medical bills.2"2
VI. INTERPLEADER
When the disposition of any fund or property is in question, an
interested or disinterested party may use the procedural device of inter-
pleader and name as adverse claimants all persons who may have an
interest in the fund. The claims of the different persons need not be
identical nor arise from the same source to be actionable, and any of
the named defendants may counterclaim or cross-claim.283
Historically, the right to file an interpleader action was considered
to be an equitable remedy. However, in 1962, the remedy was codified
for the first time in the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule
278. Greenhut Constr. Co. v. Henry A. Knott, Inc., 247 So.2d 517, 519-20 (Fla. 1st Dist.
1971).
279. Faircloth v. Mr. Boston Distiller Corp., 245 So.2d 240, 244 (Fla. 1970).
280. Fla. Laws 1970, ch. 70-225, amending FLA. STAT. §§ 561.46(5)(b), 561.461(2),
561.64(2) (1969).
281. Faircloth v. Mr. Boston Distiller Corp., 245 So.2d 240 (Fla. 1971).
282. Blue Cross of Florida, Inc. v. O'Donnell, 230 So.2d 706 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
283. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.240. See C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 74 (2d ed. 1970).
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regulating the interpleader remedy, rule 1.240, "does away with many of
the restrictions imposed upon [it] by case law and virtually eliminates
the tenuous distinctions between a 'strict bill of interpleader' and 'an ac-
tion in the nature of interpleader.' 284 Indeed, when the remedy was
codified in the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, it "became subject to
all of the other appropriate Rules of Civil Procedure .... ,285
In Trak Microwave Corp. v. Medaris Management, Inc.,2 186 the Dis-
trict Court of Appeal, Fourth District, expressly held that rule 1.170(b),
which provides for permissive counterclaims "against an opposing party
not arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter
of the opposing party's claim . . . ," authorizes a counterclaim to be
filed by a defendant against the plaintiff-stakeholder in an interpleader
action.287 In so holding, the court rejected secondary authorities which
suggested a contrary position288 and other cases both federal289 and
state210 which held to the contrary. Citing the language of rule 1.010,
which specifies that the rules "shall be construed to secure the just,
speedy and inexpensive determination of every action . . . ," the court
found that "it is not in keeping with the spirit of the Rules ...to lay
down a blanket interpretation absolutely denying permissive counter-
claims in all interpleader actions. ' 291 As a result of this decision 292 and
284. Trak Microwave Corp. v. Medaris Management, Inc., 236 So.2d 189, 191-92 (Fla.
4th Dist. 1970).
285. Id. at 192.
286. 236 So.2d 189 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
287. Id. at 192 (emphasis in original), citing FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.170(b).
288. The court expressly dismissed a statement in FLORIDA JURISPRUDENCE which main-
tained that "a cross-claim against the interpleading complainant is inadmissible, and he
should not ordinarily be made a party to a counterclaim by one of the defendants against
the other." Id. at 191 (emphasis added), citing 18 FLA. JUR. Interpleader § 15, at 384 (1958).
The court stated that the authorities cited by FLORIDA JURISPRUDENCE were not persuasive and
insufficient to support that "bald statement."
289. The court, in analogizing the Florida provision with FED. R. Civ. P. 13 and 22(1),
rejected "several federal decisions which hold that a counterclaim is not proper in an inter-
pleader action because the plaintiff ...is not an 'opposing party' and, ... cannot be made
the subject of a permissive counterclaim." The court felt that this was an "unduly restrictive
interpretation" of "opposing party" as used in the permissive counterclaim rule. The court
referred to other cases which held to the contrary and cited 3A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
§ 22.15, at 3129 (2d ed. 1969) as supporting its position. Trak Microwave Corp. v. Medaris
Management, Inc., 236 So.2d 189, 192 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
290. The court considered the language in Pan American Surety Co. v. Cooke, 130 So.2d
290 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961) (counterclaim found improper after interpleader dismissed) to be
"rather difficult to understand" and refused to follow it since the case was decided before the
codification of the interpleader remedy and was not on point, even though the District Court
of Appeal, Third District, later followed that case in Aquilina v. Mangus, 223 So.2d 786 (Fla.
3d Dist. 1969). The court in Trak looked rather to Riverside Bank v. Florida Dealers &
Growers Bank, 151 So.2d 834 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963), where the District Court of Appeal, First
District, had permitted a counterclaim in a suit in the nature of interpleader. Trak Microwave
Corp. v. Medaris Management, Inc., 236 So.2d 189, 192-93 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
291. Trak Microwave Corp. v. Medaris Management Co., 236 So.2d 189, 192 (Fla. 4th
Dist. 1970). The court indicated that the trial judge could still sever the counterclaim from
the interpleader action under rule 1.250 "to prevent a permissive counterclaim from embar-
rassing the interpleader action." Id.
292. (as to pure interpleader actions).
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Riverside Bank v. Florida Dealers and Growers Bank,298 the law appears
fairly clear that permissive counterclaims may be filed against the plain-
tiff-stakeholder in interpleader actions and actions in the nature of in-
terpleader pursuant to rule 1.170(b). Indeed, the language of the instant
decision could well be used as authority for the proposition that cross-
claims against the plaintiff-stakeholder may also be authorized under the
rules.
Two cases were decided during the survey period which turned on
the question of the award of attorney's fees in interpleader actions. In
the first case, De Garcia v. Seiglie,29 4 the plaintiff-stakeholder was an of-
ficer of a trust company in Cuba prior to the political upheavals in that
country, and in his capacity as trustee, he had a number of stock cer-
tificates in his possession. A dispute arose among the beneficiaries of the
trust, with one of the beneficiaries claiming absolute ownership of the
stock while her three children claimed that she owned only a life estate
in the securities. The trustee deposited the stock into the registry of
the circuit court, and the court found that the mother had only a life
estate with the remainder interest vested in her codefendant children.
The court assessed attorney's fees against the mother in favor of the
plaintiff-stakeholder and one of the other codefendants, and an appeal
was taken. The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held that "any
award of attorney's fees to the plaintiff in interpleader is paid from the
fund which has been brought into court.1295 In addition, the court held
that "when such attorney's fee is paid from the fund, the burden even-
tually falls on the defendant who was in the wrong and who made the
litigation necessary. '296 While the court affirmed the award of fees against
the unsuccessful claimant, that portion of the trial judge's order which
assessed attorney's fees for one of the other claimants was reversed. The
Fourth District reasoned that once an interpleader action had been com-
menced in the trial court, the stakeholder's involvement ceased, and the
suit became "in effect . . . a new and independent proceeding between
the defendants . . . ." The court reemphasized that "the law seems to
be well settled in this jurisdiction that attorney's fees cannot be taxed
as costs in the absence of a statute, contract or agreement of the par-
ties. ,,)2 7
293. 151 So.2d 834 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963) (as to actions in the nature of interpleader). See
note 290 supra.
294. 230 So.2d 37 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
295. Id. at 38, citing McKinnon v. Reliance Ins. Co., 113 Fla. 370, 151 So. 699 (1933);
Lucco v. Treadwell, 127 So.2d 461 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961); Brown v. Marsh, 98 Fla. 253, 123
So. 762 (1929) (dicta).
296. Id. The court also cited with seeming approval language in Lucco v. Treadwell, 127
So.2d 461 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961) (supra note 295) which held that it was "not reversible error
for the court to assess the award directly against such defendant rather than assessing the
award against the fund." DeGarcia v. Seiglie, 230 So.2d 37, 38 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
297. De Garcia v. Seiglie, 230 So.2d 37, 39 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970). The court also rejected
the appellee's contention that her involvement was in fact a protection of the fund under the
purview of FLA. STAT. §§ 690.13(2), 690.14(1) (1967), stating that "the attorney did not
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In the second case,2 98 the District Court of Appeal, Second District,
held that a trial court was correct in awarding attorney's fees to the
plaintiff-stakeholder and assessing those costs against the codefendant
who had made the original claim on the fund because the plaintiff was
an innocent stakeholder who had not caused the conflict to arise, but
was in peril of double vexation simply because he held the funds in his
possession. The case involved a suit on a brokerage commission where
a number of brokers had laid claim to the monies held by the plaintiff




Generally, the scope of discoverable matters is governed by rule
1.280(b) which provides that discovery may be had of "any matter,
not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter of the pending
action . . . ." Under that provision, objection cannot be made to dis-
covery on the grounds that materials sought will not be admissible at
trial. As long as the material "appears reasonably calculated to lead to
the discovery of admissible evidence ... ," it is discoverable. 0
The breadth of discovery under the liberalized provisions of rule
1.280(b) is wide and is meant to be.30  Indeed, a primary purpose of
the discovery rules is to prevent the "use of surprise, trickery, bluff
and legal gymnastics" in law actions, and "[r]evelation through dis-
covery procedures of the strength and weaknesses of each side before
preserve or protect a fund but only preserved and protected his client's right to a remainder
interest in the fund." Id.
298. Al Ro, Inc. v. Palermo, 230 So.2d 57 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970), citing Ellison v. Riddle,
166 So.2d 840 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
299. Under recently proposed revisions now enacted by the Supreme Court of Florida
(effective January 1, 1973), the discovery rules have undergone radical changes. They have
been brought into line with their federal counterparts, FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37. See In re The
Florida Bar: Rules of Civil Procedure, 265 So.2d 21 (Fla. 1972).
300. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.280(b). See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b). Even if materials sought do
not contain "the expected relevancy and produced no evidence admissible at trial, the rule
contemplates only that testimony sought 'appears reasonably calculated to lead to the dis-
covery of admissible evidence' . . . ." Spencer v. Spencer, 242 So.2d 786, 789 (Fla. 4th Dist.
1970) (emphasis added by court), cert. denied, 248 So.2d 169 (Fla. 1971); citing FLA. R. Civ.
P. 1.280(b).
301. (b) Scope of Discovery. Unless otherwise limited by order of the court in ac-
cordance with these rules, the scope of discovery is as follows:
(1) In General. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privi-
leged, that is relevant to the subject matter of the pending action, whether it relates
to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or the claim or defense of any
other party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and loca-
tion of any books, documents or other tangible things and the identity and location
of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. It is not ground for ob-
jection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information
sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
FLA. R. Crv. P. 1.280(b)(1). This rule is the discovery syllabus, and most discovery
rules look to it to determine scope.
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trial encourages settlement of cases and avoids costly litigation. 3 °2 The
sought-after result is that each party to a suit will be capable of making
Can intelligent evaluation of the entire case and may better anticipate
the ultimate results.13 13 There are only four exceptions to the general
rule of complete disclosure:114 1) the subject matter of the inquiry must
be relevant to the cause of action; 3 03 2) discovery may not be used to
harass, embarrass, or malign parties or witnesses; 3 0 ' 3) privileged com-
munications between lawyers and clients may not be discovered; 0 7 and
4) the work product of a litigant or his attorney prepared in anticipation




In Shingleton v. Bussey,31 0 Beta Eta House Corp. v. Gregory,311 and
Stecher v. Pomeroy,'12 the Supreme Court of Florida clearly laid down
the law in the state regarding the discovery of an adverse party's in-
surance limits in an action. The court in Beta Eta and Stecher stated
emphatically that this information is discoverable.
In establishing the first radical shift in Florida law in many years
on the question of the joinder of insurance companies in actions aris-
ing out of the tortious conduct of their insureds, the supreme court in
Shingleton held that
a candid admission at trial of the existence of insurance cover-
age, the policy limits of same, and an otherwise aboveboard
revelation of the interest of an insurer in the outcome of the
recovery action against [an] insured should be more beneficial
to insurers ... than the questionable 'ostrich head in the sand'
approach which may often mislead juries to think insurance
coverage is greater than it is.
3 1 3
The court additionally advocated that "all the cards [should be] on the
table . . ." in this type of action.3 4 If there were, however, any doubt
remaining as to the exact intent of the court in Shingleton, it became
302. Surf Drugs, Inc. v. Vermette, 236 So.2d 108, 111 (Fla. 1970).
303. Id.
304. All four exceptions and supporting authorities are set forth in Surf Drugs, Inc. v.
Vermette, 236 So.2d 108, 111-12 (Fla. 1970).
305. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.280(b).
306. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.310(b), 1.340.
307. See 35 FLA. Jun. Witnesses §§ 144-51 (1961).
308. See Miami Transit Co. v. Hums, 46 So.2d 390, 391 (Fla. 1950). See also FLA. R.
Civ. P. 1.280(b) (2).
309. See Section V, A, supra.
310. 223 So.2d 713 (Fla. 1969).
311. 237 So.2d 163 (Fla. 1970).
312. 253 So.2d 421 (Fla. 1971).
313. Shingleton v. Bussey, 223 So.2d 713, 718 (Fla. 1969).
314. Id. at 720.
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apparent one year later in Beta Eta where the court interpreted Shingle-
ton "to require the parties to 'lay their cards on the table' in discovery
proceedings, settlement negotiations, and pre-trial hearings." '15 Later in
Stecher, the court indicated its recognition that Shingleton and Beta Eta
had created a whole new area of discoverable materials which had there-
tofore been inaccessible to the litigant.31 "The reasons were for pur-
poses of negotiation as to encourage settlement between the parties and
thus shorten litigation and speed up the courts' heavy trial dockets."
3 17
Following the lead of the supreme court, the District Court of Ap-
peal, Third District, held in Montano v. Wigfield318 that policy limits
are discoverable if such information is relevant to the subject matter of
the action. In so holding, the Third District made passing reference to
the supreme court's admonition that such information is still not ad-
missible at an insured's trial, 19 but indicated that such information may
indeed "be relevant and admissible in the event there is a separate trial
against the insurance carrier. '320 In short, then, it appears clear in Florida
that the insurance limits of any insured involved in a lawsuit are dis-
coverable as long as the widely-interpreted and broadly applied rele-
vancy test under rule 1.280(b) is met. 21
2. WORK PRODUCT
One of the categories of materials which is generally nondiscover-
able is material which is compiled or developed specifically in connection
with litigation, that is, work product. However, even work product may
be discoverable if a strong enough showing is made, and the court so
orders. 22 During the survey period, there were a number of cases decided
which dealt specifically with work product questions.
315. Beta Eta House Corp. v. Gregory, 237 So.2d 163, 165 (Fla. 1970).
316. "One of the objections of Beta and Bussey was to provide a disclosure of policy
limits between the parties which had not previously been allowed." Stecher v. Pomeroy, 253
So.2d 421, 423 (Fla. 1971) (emphasis in original). See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (2).
317. Id. at 423.
318. 239 So.2d 609 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
319. "The existence or amount of insurance coverage has no bearing on the issues of
liability as damages, and such evidence should not be considered by the jury." Beta Eta
House Corp. v. Gregory, 237 So.2d 163, 165 (Fla. 1970). Later, in Stecher, the court ex-
panded on this point:
It was never intended that policy limits should go to the jury and Beta Eta ex-
pressly said so. It is immaterial for the jury's consideration, because the principles still
stand that its decision must rest solely upon the evidence and the law as charged.
Moreover, to reveal defendants' amount of insurance before the jury would equally
entitle a defendant to bring out his coverage when the limits are minimal and
advantageous to him. Neither one has relevancy and has no place before the jury.
Stecher v. Pomeroy, 253 So.2d 421, 423 (Fla. 1971).
320. Montano v. Wigfield, 239 So.2d 609, 610 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
321. See Vilord v. Jenkins, 240 So.2d 68 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970) (discovery allowed of
limits of doctor's medical malpractice coverage); Duran v. McPherson, 233 So.2d 639
(Fla. 4th Dist. 1970) (principles announced in Shingleton applicable to professional liability
insurance in general).
322. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.280(b). See also FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b).
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In Shell v. State Road Department," the Supreme Court of Florida
held that in condemnation proceedings the state would have to produce
all materials in their possession relating to surveys, maps, appraisal re-
ports, etc., when such documents were sought by a condemnee land
owner. The court in that case specifically rejected the state's contention
that such material was work product on grounds of public policy, even
though it was recognized that such a holding was in opposition to pre-
vailing discovery procedure. One year later, in Bainbridge v. State Road
Department,24 the District Court of Appeal, First District, held that
Shell required a condemning authority in all eminent domain proceed-
ings to divulge its entire work product to defendant land owners which
related to the land which was sought to be acquired and suggested that
a reciprocal right did not lie for the condemning authority.
The District Court of Appeal, Second District, found itself faced
with a novel question in 1969, where a condemning authority, Pinellas
County, moved the court to allow a deposition duces tecum of an ex-
pert appraiser retained by the defendant in preparation for litigation. 25
Notwithstanding the fact that the expert was not to testify at trial, the
circuit court allowed the deposition, denied a requested protective order,
and later permitted the appraiser to testify for the county over the ob-
jections of the defendant at trial. On appeal, the ruling was reversed,
and the district court of appeal held that Shell "meant to except only
the 'governmental authority' from the immunity protection of its work
product, in contrast to the immunity protection of the private landowner
condemnee. '3 26 The question was certified to the supreme court as pre-
senting a question of great public interest, and the appellee applied for
certiorari.
The supreme court accepted certiorari and reversed, holding that:
The fair rule is that the State may not initiate discovery in
condemnation cases, except in a reciprocal right in those cases
when the condemnee has elected to discover the State's work
product . In the latter event the work product of the con-
demnee would be subject to discovery by the condemnor.827
Thus, the rule in eminent domain actions appears to be that the work
product of a condemnee may not be made available to the condemning
authority unless the condemnee has elected to examine the work product
of the condemnor. Once the condemnor's work product has been re-
quested and examined by the condemnee, then the condemnor has a
reciprocal right of production.
323. 135 So.2d 857 (Fla. 1961) [hereinafter cited as Shell]. See Massey & Westen, Civil
Procedure, 1961-1963 Survey of Florida Law, 18 U. MiAmI L. REV. 745, 779-80 (1963).
324. 139 So.2d 714 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1962).
325. Carlson v. Pinellas County, 227 So.2d 703 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
326. Id. at 707.
327. Pinellas County v. Carlson, 242 So.2d 714, 719 (Fla. 1970), rev'g 227 So.2d 703
(Fla. 2d Dist. 1969). Followed, Corbett Motor Supply, Inc. v. City of Orlando, 245 So.2d 93
(Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
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What exactly constitutes work product and is consequently immune
from discovery is not always clearly definable. In Surf Drugs, Inc. v.
Vermette,328 the supreme court recognized this fact, but delineated certain
types of work product which were immune from discovery:
Generally, those documents, pictures, statements and diagrams
which are to be presented as evidence are not work products
anticipated by the rule for exemption from discovery. Personal
views of the attorney as to how and when to present evidence,
his evaluation of its relative importance, his knowledge of which
witness will give certain testimony, personal notes and records
as to witnesses, jurors, legal citations, proposed arguments, jury
instructions, diagrams and charts he may refer to at trial for his
convenience, but not to be used as evidence, come within the
general category of work product. 29
In that case, the court was reviewing a District Court of Appeal, Third
District, decision 3 1 which had affirmed in part a circuit court order which
ruled improper certain interrogatories which required a plaintiff to re-
spond "on behalf of his agent, attorney, servant, employee, etc., as to
the knowledge of certain facts and conclusions."3 The supreme court
rejected this ruling8 2 and held that those interrogatories were not pro-
tected by the "work product" doctrine.
We hold, therefore, that a party may be required to respond on
behalf of himself, his attorney, agent, or employee and to di-
vulge names and addresses of any person having relevant in-
formation as well as to indicate generally the type of information
held by the person listed. A party may not be required to set
out the contents of statements, absent rare and exceptional cir-
cumstances, or to divulge his or his attorneys' evaluation of the
substance of statements taken in preparation for trial."'
The court did, however, affirm the Third District's rejection of one
interrogatory which demanded the identity of any person who had given
an opinion to plaintiff or his attorney regarding the carelessness or negli-
gence of the defendant company. This was held to exceed the bounds
of proper discovery because it required an evaluation of the witness'
testimony. The court also held that the plaintiff would be required to
328. 236 So.2d 108 (Fla. 1970).
329. Id. at 112.
330. Vermette v. Surf Drugs, Inc., 226 So.2d 871 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
331. Surf Drugs, Inc. v. Vermette, 236 So.2d 108, 111 (Fla. 1970).
332. Appellee and the District Court apparently consider that anything known to
an attorney for a litigant constitutes "work product" immune from discovery pro-
cedures. This view is clearly contrary to the Hickman case, supra, wherein the United
States Supreme Court stated flatly:
A party clearly cannot refuse to answer interrogatories on the ground that
the information sought is solely within the knowledge of his attorney.
Id. at 113, cting Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 504 (1947).
333. Id. at 113. The court also cited 4 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PAcTICE § 26.38[8.-3]
(1969) which expands on this point.
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disclose whether to his or his attorney's knowledge, any doctor had as-
signed a disability rating to the plaintiff's injured wife and the doctor's
name and address. However, "[a]bsent exceptional circumstances,"-the
plaintiff was not thought to be required to "give the percentage or na-
ture of the disability rating or otherwise to summarize or evaluate the
information available." 34 Thus, while the court emphatically rejected
the theory which extends a mantle over any information in an attorney's
possession, it was made clear that a party is not required to reveal case
preparation materials, nor to submit any summaries or analyses of any
of the issues in litigation.
In a similar vein, a county is not required to produce copies of in-
department activity and accident reports prepared by the county as a
result of an automobile accident between a police officer's municipally-
owned vehicle and a privately-owned automobile which results in per-
sonal injuries and death. In Dade County v. Monroe , 3 5 a wrongful death
action brought in connection with such an accident, the plaintiff main-
tained that the police officers and their superiors had knowledge of the
accident and the chase which had preceded it. A motion was subsequently
made and granted by the circuit court requiring the county to produce
activity reports, dispatcher's cards and records, arrest reports of those
involved in the accident, transcripts of all recorded and written reports
by the officers, and various other departmental reports and records. On
writ of certiorari to the District Court of Appeal, Third District, this
order was reversed in part.
While recognizing that there were certain exceptions to the general
rule that work product is non-discoverable, the court held that the cir-
cumstances in the case did not meet any of the requisites. The Third
District reviewed the three exceptional situations set forth in Hickman
v. Taylor3 36 which would permit discovery: "(1) when witnesses are no
longer available or can be reached only with great difficulty, (2) if it
gives clues to relevant facts that cannot be secured otherwise, or (3)
for purposes of impeachment. '3 37 However, the court did not find that
the facts in this case justified the granting of an exception, even though
the stated grounds urged by the appellee appeared to track the language
of the Hickman exceptions. 8 ' It seems clear from this case, then, that
334. Id.
335. 237 So.2d 598 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
336. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
337. Dade County v. Monroe, 237 So.2d 598, 601 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970), citing Miami
Transit Co. v. Hums, 46 So.2d 390, 391 (Fla. 1950) [citing Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S.
495 (1947)].
338. Three grounds are set forth as justification of plaintiff's motion to produce
the work product of petitioners: (1) such documents and records are necessary in
order for the plaintiff to properly prosecute his law suit; (2) the sworn testimony
of the patrolman driving the pursuing police vehicle and his companion in the
criminal proceeding against the driver of the death vehicle conflicts with the sworn
testimony in that proceeding of another witness; and (3) the sworn testimony of
this same witness in the prior criminal proceeding conflicts with the affidavits of
the police officers filed in the instant case.
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an exception to the work product doctrine will be carefully considered,
and that the court's determination will not necessarily be governed by
the stated grounds urged upon the court, but rather by a careful analysis
of the facts and evidence before the court.
Insurance reports have also been held to be work product items. In
Grand Union Co. v. Patrick,339 the Third District reversed a ruling grant-
ing the production of certain documents. The court held that reports
prepared for an insurance company by an insured "are privileged340 [in]
that they are considered relevant to the defense of the action and in effect
are communications between attorney and client, being information which





Rule 1.340 prescribes the manner of serving interrogatories and de-
fines their scope pursuant to rule 1.280(b).342 While a party cannot be
questioned about contents of statements made in preparation of trial or
of his attorney's evaluation of those same statements unless an excep-
tional showing is made,"' "a party may be required to respond on behalf
of himself, his attorney, agent, or employee and to divulge names and
addresses of any person having relevant information as well as to indicate
generally the type of information held by the person listed." '344 Under
this rule, the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed part of a district court
of appeal decision which approved the refusal to order a party to answer
an interrogatory which sought the identification of any witness who had
given an opinion to the party or his attorney regarding the negligence or
carelessness of that party.345 However, the supreme court quashed a por-
tion of the district court of appeal's opinion which held that a party could
not be required to respond on behalf of his attorney to the extent of the
party's knowledge in a nonprivileged area.346
In a case of first impression, the District Court of Appeal, Fourth
We hold that these grounds are insufficient to provide a basis for the court's
order to produce defendant's work product.
Dade County v. Monroe, 237 So.2d 598, 601 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
339. 247 So.2d 474 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
340. Of particular interest in this case is the use of the word, "privileged." Strictly
speaking the documents described in this case were in the work product category since they
were prepared in anticipation of litigation. Privilege is a different category altogether. The
language in the case ventures back and forth between work product concepts and privilege
concepts. See Urich, Evidence, 1969-71 Survey of Florida Law, 26 U. MLAmi L. REv. 147,
163-65 (1971).
341. Grand Union Co. v. Patrick, 247 So.2d 474, 475 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
342. See Section VII, A, supra.
343. See Section VII, A, 2, supra.
344. Surf Drugs, Inc. v. Vermette, 236 So.2d 108, 113 (Fla. 1970).
345. Id., aff'g in part 226 So.2d 871 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
346. This holding was based upon Dupree v. Better Way, 86 So.2d 425 (Fla. 1956).
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District, held that rule 1.340 does not warrant the designation of a spe-
cific officer to respond to an interrogatory on behalf of a corporate party.
In Ohio Realty Investment Co. v. Lawyers Title Insurance Corp.,47 the
insurance company had filed interrogatories against Ohio Realty and had
specified that the corporate president respond. Within the proper time
period, Ohio Realty responded to the question through the offices of its
Assistant Secretary. A motion to strike the pleadings was made and
granted by the court on the grounds that Ohio Realty had failed to com-
ply with an order of court by not having its president reply to the in-
terrogatories. On certiorari, the Fourth District reversed.
In the absence of Florida precedent, the court looked to federal au-
thority and quoted extensively from Professor Moore's treatise.848 It was
suggested that since the federal discovery rules, as amended in 1946, pro-
vided that a corporation was bound by the answers of its officers when
questions were propounded to the corporation as a party, any justification
in selecting a particular officer to respond to the interrogatories was no
longer present. 349 Noting the similarity between the federal and Florida
discovery rules, the court held that interrogatories can only be addressed
to a party, and "[i]f [the] party is a corporation, it, rather than the
propounder, is the sole judge of the officers or agents who shall furnish
the information available to the interrogated corporate party. 3 50 The
Fourth District went on to indicate, though, that "[i] f the testimony of
any particular officer or agent is expressly desired by the propounder of
the interrogatories, such can be obtained under Rule 1.310 (deposition
347. 244 So.2d 176 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971) [Ohio Realty Investment Co. will be referred
to in the text as Ohio Realty].
348. 4 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE g 33.07, at 33-47 (2d ed. 1970).
349. These considerations have led the courts to the position that the interrogatories
must be served on the party, and that the party may select the officer or agent who
is to answer them and verify the answers. Prior to the 1946 amendment, when
ignorance of the officer selected to answer could be raised as an excuse for not
answering an interrogatory, it could be argued that it was an important right of the
interrogating party to choose the person who was to provide the answers. It is clear
since the 1946 amendment, however, that whoever answers the interrogatories and
verifies the answers on behalf of the corporation, the corporate party is the only one
'to meet the responsibility arising from such answers', and will be estopped to deny
the authority of the person chosen by it to speak for it, or to deny the truthfulness of
the answers. It is equally clear that whoever it is who answers the interrogatories,
the answers must include whatever information is available to the party. This being
true, it seems to make little or no difference to the interrogating party who verifies
the answers and since there seems to be no reason why the interrogated party might
not choose any agent it likes, the interpretation of who may be termed an "agent"
under the Rule becomes completely unimportant. (Footnotes omitted)
Id., quoted in Ohio Realty Inv. Co. v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 244 So.2d 176, 178 (Fla.
4th Dist. 1971).
350. Ohio Realty Inv. Co. v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 244 So.2d 176, 179 (Fla. 4th
Dist. 1971).
There is no basis under Rule 1.340 to warrant the propounder of the interrogatory
designating the particular officer or agent of the interrogated corporate party who
must answer the interrogatories, and likewise there is no basis upon which the court
may order that interrogatories propounded to a corporate party under Rule 1.340 be
answered by a specific officer or agent designated by the court.
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upon oral examination) or Rule 1.320 (depositions of witnesses upon
written interrogatories).""'
In addition, even though rule 1.560352 allows the usage of discovery
techniques "provided in these rules for taking depositions . . . ," the
Fourth District has recently held that "within our rules post judgment
discovery may be obtained by deposition or by written interrogatories. '
In so ruling, the court noted that rule 1.560 did not supplant regular dis-
covery procedures available in aid of execution, but rather supplemented
them. Adopting language of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, it was suggested that the use of interrogatories was the
most efficient and useful means for a judgment creditor to obtain neces-
sary information in the case of a small judgment.?54
2. DEPOSITIONS
There are several provisions in the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure
which deal with the different types of depositions which may be em-
ployed, 55 their application,3 56 and scope.35
Under some of those provisions, a court can modify the timing of the
devices and make certain other adjustments in the interests of justice.
While the trial court clearly "has the authority to regulate as well as to
prevent the taking of depositions,... when the authority is exercised it
should be only upon a showing of 'good cause' .... M358 In Brennan v.
Board of Public Instruction,'"9 the District Court of Appeal, Fourth Dis-
trict, found "good cause" lacking. The trial court had quashed the tak-
ing of a deposition which had been noticed at the time of the pretrial
conference on the sole ground that the conference had been held and that
there was insufficient time (seven days) remaining before the case went
to trial. In reversing this order, the Fourth District indicated that the
351. Id.
352. Discovery in aid of execution. See note 353 infra.
353. Wilde v. Wilde, 237 So.2d 203, 205 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970) (emphasis added). See
In re The Florida Bar: Rules of Civil Procedure, 265 So.2d 21 (Fla. 1972) (rule amended
in conformance with the holding in this case and broadened even further).
354. Limiting the manner in which post-judgment discovery may be obtained solely
to depositions would preclude discovery in situations where, as here, the judgment is
small. In actual practice the taking of testimony under the rules providing for
depositions is costly, time consuming, and in some circumstances complicated ....
Where the judgment is small the cost of discovery under these rules is prohibitive.
Written interrogatories, on the other hand, are simple and inexpensive. They afford
a direct, efficient, and accurate means by which the judgment creditor can obtain the
desired information. For the holder of a small judgment, they are the only practical
means of discovering the assets of judgment debtors ....
Id. at 205, adopting the language of United States v. McWhirter, 376 F.2d 102, 106 (5th Cir.
1967).
355. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.280, 1.290, 1.310, 1.320, 1.390.
356. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.280(c)-(g), 1.290(a)-(d), 1.300, 1.310, 1.320, 1.330,
1.390(b) (d).
357. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.280(b). See also Section VII, A, supra.
358. Brennan v. Board of Pub. Instr., 244 So.2d 463, 464 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971). See IV,
C, supra.
359. Brennan v. Board of Pub. Instr., 244 So.2d 463, 464 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
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holding of the pretrial conference could not be said to terminate the right
of a party to notice or take depositions."'
The trial court has the power to alter the place where a deposition is
taken. For instance, while a non-resident plaintiff who invokes the juris-
diction of the Florida courts must make himself available for discovery
depositions in the place where the suit is pending, "a nonresident defen-
dant, who does not seek affirmative relief in [a case], should not be re-
quired to travel into the state . . . , but should be deposed by
interrogatories, or by oral examination in the state and place of his resi-
dence."'
Frequently, the question of where, when, and how a deposition may
be used is advanced. Rule 1.330(d)(3) [formerly 1.280(d)(3) (1969)]
specifies that a deposition may be used at trial if the deposed witness is
at a distance greater than 100 miles from the situs of the trial. However,
in Thrifty Super Market, Inc. v. Kitchener,6' it was held that even though
it was not shown on the record that one of a number of plaintiffs in an
action was more than 100 miles away from the trial location at the time
that his deposition was read into the record, an appellate court would not
disapprove its inclusion in evidence where the defendant had not objected
thereto at trial. In this same spirit, where the record clearly shows that
a witness whose deposition is sought to be introduced is not within the
100 mile radius, an appellate court will probably not disturb the admission
of the deposition .
03
A court also has the discretionary power to admit a deposition into
evidence which was taken in another case not before the court. In Curtiss
National Bank v. Street,804 it was held not to be an abuse of discretion for
a trial judge to refuse to admit a deposition from another action into evi-
dence in the case before him, especially in light of the fact that the de-
position had only touched upon collateral issues in the other proceeding.
Exactly what constitutes an expert deposition is a sensitive question
especially since such a deposition is admissible regardless of the place of
the expert's residence. 05 If, however, the court finds that the personal
appearance of an expert at trial is necessary to insure a fair and impar-
tial trial, rule 1.390(b) provides that the expert may be compelled to
personally attend. Obviously, since the expert will normally not be avail-
able at trial, it is extremely important that proper notice be afforded to
alert opposing counsel of the special nature of the noticed deposition. In
\
360. The court indicated that if indeed the defendant would be unable to adequately
deal with the information arising out of the deposition, the proper remedy would be a
continuance, not a denial of the deposition. See note 249 supra and accompanying text.
361. Godshall v. Hessen, 227 So.2d 506, 508 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969), cert. denied, 237 So.2d
530 (Fla. 1970).
362. 227 So.2d 500 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
363. See, e.g., Vacation Prizes, Inc. v. City National Bank, 227 So.2d 352 (Fla. 2d Dist.
1969).
364. 233 So.2d 453 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
365. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.390.
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Haldane v. Hall,3 6 the question arose as to what precisely constituted
adequate notice. In that case, the defendants had noticed for deposition
the doctor who had treated the plaintiff for the injuries which were the
basis for the plaintiff's claim. At trial, the plaintiff was allowed to read
the deposition of the doctor without any showing of the physician's un-
availability. The defendants objected strenuously on the grounds that the
deposition was improperly admitted since it had not been noticed as an
expert deposition under rule 1.390. After the return of an adverse ver-
dict, the defendants moved for and were granted a new trial on the grounds
that the deposition should not have been admitted into evidence.
On appeal, the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, looked to
the rule 1.390 requirement of "reasonable notice" and a decision of the
District Court of Appeal, Second District, Bondy v. West,36 7 which had
interpreted "reasonable notice" to require a specification in the deposi-
tion notice that it was being taken pursuant to that specific rule. Accord-
ing to Bondy, "if the notice omits this reference ... the deposition cannot
be used in the manner contemplated by Rule 1.390.""36' The Fourth Dis-
trict rejected the Bondy requirement and held that "'reasonable notice'
within the meaning of Rule 1.390(b) is any notice which clearly indicates
that the deponent is an 'expert witness' as defined in Section (a) of the
rule." '3 69 Accordingly, when parties are forewarned in that fashion, "they
are put on notice by the Rules of Civil Procedure of all possible uses of
the deposition and can govern themselves accordingly."3 7 The court con-
cluded, then, that at the time notice was served upon the doctor, all parties
had adequate knowledge and notice that he was an expert and that his
deposition was an expert deposition. On writ of certiorari to the Supreme
Court of Florida, the Haldane test was expressly approved and the Bondy
test expressly rejected.3 7'
3. PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
Upon notice and without leave of court, a party may examine docu-
ments, books, or things owned or controlled by an adverse party within
the scope of rule 1.280(b)."' There is, of course, as with all discovery
procedures, an implied condition of reasonableness in materials sought
to be produced. In City of Miami v. Florida Public Service Comm'n,373
in a 3-1-3 decision, the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed a ruling by the
Public Service Commission refusing the City of Miami's motion to produce
all of a power company's books and records in a proceeding involving
366. 234 So.2d 739 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970) [hereinafter cited as Haldane].
367. 219 So.2d 117 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969) [hereinafter cited as Bondy].
368. Haldane v. Hall, 234 So.2d 739, 740 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
369. Id.
370. Id.
371. Hall v. Haldane, 243 So.2d 571 (Fla. 1971). See In re The Florida Bar: Rules of
Civil Procedure, 265 So.2d 21, 38-39 (Fla. 1972).
372. See FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.350.
373. 226 So.2d 217 (Fla. 1969) [hereinafter cited as Miami].
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proposed utility rate increases. The Commission had held that its discovery
provisions were to be interpreted and used in the same fashion as rule
1.350, and that
[t]he burden rests upon the party desiring to utilize the rule in
that he must show that those documents and papers he wishes to
be produced for inspection are relevant to the proceeding, and
not merely for the purpose of a 'fishing expedition'; that good
cause for producing is shown; and, that the documents and
papers are specified with reasonable particularity. Unless the
movant complies with all of the three requirements, the motion
should be denied.
7 4
Applying those criteria to the matter before them, the administrative body
found that the materials sought by the city were too broad and that infor-
mation and data sought to be discovered must be specific and not general.
The supreme court affirmed the Commission's ruling and added that "[t]o
permit examination of all records of income and expenditure would un-
reasonably interfere with the operation of the Power Company. Numerous
demands for large scale examination of this type would make it difficult
to conduct ordinary electric service.
''37
1
One of the grounds stated by the Florida Public Service Commission
for rejecting the city's motion to produce in Miami was the lack of speci-
ficity in describing the documents sought. This objection was also raised
in Dade County v. Monroe,876 where certain accident reports were sought
to be produced in a wrongful death action. Although certain documents
were held to be inaccessible because they constituted work product, the
court rejected the contention that requests which sought nonprivileged
accident reports, voice recordings, and written statements in connection
with a specific accident were so broad as to not sufficiently describe the
documents.
Two cases were decided during the survey period which dealt with
the previously required showing of "good cause." However, the cases came
to contrary conclusions. In Grand Union Co. v. Patrick,377 the District
Court of Appeal, Third District, held that where a trial record did not
contain a manifest showing of good cause to justify the granting of a
motion to produce certain documents, reference to the pleadings which
would allegedly demonstrate good cause was not sufficient to fulfill the
requisites of the rule. The court felt that the requisite showing was of a
mandatory nature and had to be clearly demonstrated.87 8 However, in
374. Id. at 218, quoting Florida Pub. Service Comm'n. Order No. 4487 (December 31,
1968). Good cause is no longer required to be shown. See FLA. R. Crv. P. 1.350; note 381
infra and accompanying text.
375. Id. at 219.
376. 237 So.2d 598 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970). See Section VII, A, 2, and notes 335-38 supra and
accompanying text.
377. 247 So.2d 474 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
378. It is argued on behalf of the respondent that the failure of the motion to state
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Haynes v. International Harvester Co., 3 79 the District Court of Appeal,
Second District, presumed a finding of good cause and a showing of same
when the record had been silent on the point. The court stated:
The petitioners' motion to produce.., requested the respondents
to produce other documents, which request was granted in part.
Therefore, we must assume that the trial court was satisfied that
the petitioners' motion to produce met the requirements of a
showing of good cause as required by Rule 1.350 . .. "0
The point has been mooted, however, before it was ever resolved by the
supreme court since that body has promulgated new discovery rule amend-
ments effective January 1, 1973. 11'
In addition to the now defunct "good cause" ruling, the Haynes court
also ruled that documents prepared in the ordinary course of business
were discoverable and could not be hidden behind a work product mantle.
In Haynes, forms submitted by a truck dealer for a warranty claim were
sought by a party in litigation which stemmed partly from repairs made
to the vehicle. The Second District held that the form was an ordinary
business record and was "in no way a document, memoranda, report, or
statement made in anticipation of a claim. It [was] ... a report solely for
the benefit of the dealer ... so that he [might] . . .receive credit ...
under the warranty.18 2 Because of allegations contained in the appellee's
brief relating to notations made in anticipation of litigation on that specific
form, the appellate court remanded the matter to the trial court for exam-
ination of the forms in their entirety since the record on appeal did not
contain the disputed documents.
4. BLOOD TESTS
Rule 1.360 provides that upon motion and the demonstration of good
cause, a court may issue an order compelling a party to submit to a
physical or mental examination prior to trial if the physical or men-
tal condition of a party is at issue. The rule provides elaborate safe-
guards for the examined party including the right to a full report from
the examiner upon demand. It also provides that the party requesting the
examination is entitled to any other reports prepared for the examined
party if demand for and delivery of the first report is made."83
or show good cause was not material because reference to the pleadings should be
sufficient to disclose a need or cause therefor. That argument is unsound. The re-
quirement in the rule that such a motion to produce should show good cause is clear
and appears mandatory. The motion in this case failed to conform to the require-
ment of the rule in that respect.
Id. at 475.
379. 227 So.2d 51 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969) [hereinafter cited as Haynes].
380. Id. at 52 (emphasis added).
381. See In re The Florida Bar: Rules of Civil Procedure, 265 So.2d 21 (Fla. 1972).
Under those provisions, "good cause" is no longer required. See also FED. R. Civ. P.
34, the precursor of the new Florida rule.
382. Haynes v. International Harvester Co., 227 So.2d 51, 52 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
383. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.360(b).
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In In re Adoption of Samples,884 the adoption proceedings of a young
girl were under review. The child had been born while her mother and her
mother's first husband were still married. Subsequently, the two were
divorced, and the mother married her second husband, but this marriage
also ended in divorce. The second spouse filed for adoption of the child
claiming that he was the natural father, and that this fact was sufficient to
rebut the presumption that the first husband was the legal and natural
father. The child's mother filed a consent to the adoption and alleged in
that document that the second husband was indeed the natural parent. On
his motion, the court ordered that all three "parents" submit to blood
tests; the first husband appealed. The District Court of Appeal, Second
District, held that "the court has wide discretion in determining these
matters and particularly in determining the best interests of the child."
The Second District then concluded that if the judge "in his discretion
believes a blood test to be of importance in determining the paternity and
therefore the best interest of this child [the] court will not disturb the
order appealed." '885
C. Refusal to Make Discovery
Stiff sanctions are built into the discovery provisions of the rules for
failure to comply with their dictates. These sanctions include the striking
of pleadings, a party's admission of certain issues for purposes of the
action, dismissal of the action, or entry of a default judgment""8 and con-
tempt citations. In addition, if less severe penalties are found to be in
order, certain costs and attorney's fees may be awarded."8 7
Regardless of the gravity of the sanction undertaken, a court has
wide discretion in fixing penalties and sanctions;' 8 however, the old rule
did not operate unless a refusal to comply with discovery provisions had
occurred. This was not a waivable condition as is evident from the District
Court of Appeal, Fourth District, opinion in Ohio Realty Investment Co.
v. Lawyers Title Insurance Corp."s9 There, citing an earlier case decided
by the court, 90 the Fourth District stated that "in the absence of an ex-
press finding by the court that the... failure to comply.., was a refusal,
384. 226 So.2d 135 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
385. Id. at 136 (emphasis added).
386. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.380(b), (d). See Riley v. Gustinger, 235 So.2d 364 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1970), where the court held that a trial judge was justified under rule 1.380(b) (2) (iii) (1969)
in striking an answer and entering a default judgment for failure to give fuller answers to
interrogatories after two extensions of time had been granted.
387. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.380(a) (4), (b)(2)(F), (c), (d).
388. When a plaintiff is given time by order of the court within which to abide
by the rule or suffer a dismissal, the only question for review by an appellate court
upon an appeal from an order dismissing the cause with prejudice would be upon
the question of an abuse of discretion by the trial court in the making of the
order directing the performance of the act within the time limit.
Webber v. Brickley, 239 So.2d 633, 634 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970), quoting Rashard v. Cappiali,
171 So.2d 581, 583 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
389. 244 So.2d 176 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971). See notes 347-51 supra and accompanying text.
390. Swindle v. Reid, 242 So.2d 751 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
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or in the absence of the record conclusively revealing such, it was an
abuse of discretion . . ."I for the court to dismiss the action with preju-
dice in the earlier case and to strike pleadings and enter a default judg-
ment in the case before it. In the earlier decision, Swindle v. Reid,392 the
court had indicated that sanctions such as dismissal of an action with
prejudice "is a drastic punishment and should not be invoked except in
those cases where the conduct of the party shows a deliberate and con-
tumacious disregard of the court's authority.
'3 03
The Swindle court had before it a case in which a grantor and chief
beneficiary of a trust brought suit to enjoin the collection of intangible
taxes on the grounds that the situs of the trust's corpus was in Oklahoma.
The defendant tax assessor moved for and was granted extensive motions
for the production of documents. While the grantor was able to produce
some of the documents, others were allegedly in the custody of Oklahoma
trustees who provided depositions to the court setting forth their refusal
to provide the documents. On defendant's motion, the trial court dismissed
the suit with prejudice for failure to comply with discovery orders, and
an appeal was taken. The Fourth District noted that the trial court found
that the grantor had an "insufficient excuse for her failure to comply," but
emphatically stated that this did not constitute a refusal, "a distinction
which [the court felt] to be significant."3 The court did stress, however,
that it was not holding that the grantor's action failed to constitute a
refusal, but indicated that the record did not demonstrate a refusal. Con-
sequently, the court reversed the dismissal and remanded the suit. 95
In Canella v. Bryant,9 6 recent house-buyers brought suit for mis-
representation against the real estate broker through whom the house had
been purchased and the multiple-listing service which had advertised the
home. The broker filed a motion to dismiss and scheduled the plaintiffs
for depositions on three weeks' notice. On the day prior to the deposition,
the plaintiffs' attorney telephoned the defendant's attorney and informed
him that as a result of last minute filings in a previously scheduled hear-
ing (which otherwise would have concluded well in advance of the sched-
uled hour of the depositions), he would be unable to attend at the
prescribed time and asked that the depositions be rescheduled. The
defendant's attorney refused, and the plaintiffs' attorney subsequently
391. Ohio Realty Inv. Co. v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 244 So.2d 176, 179 (Fla. 4th
Dist. 1971).
392. 242 So.2d 751 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970) [hereinafter cited as Swindle].
393. Id. at 753.
394. Id.
395. The trial court clearly has the authority under Rule 1.380 R.C.P. to dismiss a
complaint as a sanction against the plaintiff for a failure to make discovery, and the
dismissal may be with prejudice where the plaintiff refuses to obey an order of
court .... We merely hold that in the absence of either an expressed finding to that
effect or the record conclusively revealing that there was a refusal to obey the order,
it was an abuse of discretion to dismiss the complaint with prejudice for plaintiff's
[grantor] failure to comply with the order.
id.
396. 235 So.2d 328 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970) [hereinafter cited as Canella].
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was unable to secure a continuance from the court because of the lateness
of the hour. On the following day, at the appointed hour, the defendant's
attorney telephoned plaintiffs' counsel at which time a second request for
a rescheduling was offered and rejected. The defendant's attorney then
moved to strike and dismiss the complaint and for the entry of default
judgment against the plaintiffs "for their willful failure to appear at the
taking of the depositions." ' 7 The motion was granted and judgment
entered; the plaintiffs appealed.
In a decision which cut squarely to the heart of the theory of dis-
covery sanctions, the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, reversed
the trial court and repudiated its holding. The court looked to the central
question, whether the plaintiffs' failure to attend was willful, and found
that it was not. In so holding, the court reflected the current liberalized
approach towards discovery sanctions in both federal and Florida
courts. 9 '
From the tenor of these decisions it is quite apparent that severe sanc-
tions may be levied under certain conditions. Often, though, when the most
severe penalties are considered, questions arise as to exactly which sanc-
tions should be levied. For instance, in Canella, the court held that the
trial judge had improperly entered a default judgment against the plain-
tiffs because "[b]y the plain language of the rule [ 1.380(d)], it is obvious
that the portion of the rule permitting entry of judgment by default applies
only against the defendant and not against the plaintiff."' 9 9 The court
reasoned that the only available penalties to be employed against a
plaintiff were to strike the pleadings or dismiss the action or any part
thereof. This was not, however, the unanimous holding of the court. In an
opinion concurring with the result, Judge Walden took exception to this
last holding and stated that a default judgment could be entered against a
plaintiff. In so stating, the judge compared the provisions of rule 1.380(d)
with rule 37(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (after which the
former rule was modeled) and concluded that a default judgment could
be properly entered against either side under appropriate circumstances.
The question of which rule controls the imposition of discovery sanc-
tions is a question of paramount importance. There are two rules which
could conceivably be involved, rule 1.380 (which explicitly deals with
397. Id. at 330.
398. In strong dictum of the majority opinion, Chief Judge Cross criticized the conduct
of the defendant's attorney and the lower court.
[Tihe rules of civil procedure were not designed to be used in a manner to cause
oppression or harassment to the parties of a lawsuit, but should be liberally construed
to effectuate the intended purposes of allowing a complainant to state his cause and
facilitate an expeditious trial on the merits. When a strict enforcement of the letter of
practice rules tends to prevent or jeopardize administration of justice, the rules
should yield to a higher purpose. We expect trial judges to oversee the using of the
rules to the end that they shall be tools for obtaining justice as well as a speedy
determination of causes.
Id. at 332.
399. Id. at 331.
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refusals to make discovery) and rule 1.420 (which governs involuntary
dismissals). In the Committee Note which accompanies rule 1.380, it is
clearly stated that "RCP 1.420 and 1.500(a) and (b) do not apply to such
a refusal," but two recent decisions, Webber v. Brickley
400 and Canella,401
have suggested a contrary conclusion. In Webber, a per curiam opinion,
the District Court of Appeal, Third District, noted that an appellant's
grounds for appeal were insufficient because a survey of the record indi-
cated that the conduct of a rehearing fulfilled "the purpose of the notice
provision of rule 1.420 (b) . . )402 This is an unusual reference to rule
1.420(b) since rule 1.380 clearly contains sanction powers within its provi-
sions with the same degree of severity. This same course, though, was
followed in Canella.403 The apparent reliance on rule 1.420(b) is not only
contrary to the intent of the rules,4 14 but is also redundant since that rule
provides for involuntary dismissal "for failure of an adverse party to
comply with these rules .... 114o5 Thus, the very language of rule 1.420(b)
could well justify the sanction of an involuntary dismissal even if rule
1.380 had not been enacted. °
VIII. DIsMISSAL
A. Voluntary
Generally, a plaintiff may dismiss an action once without a court order
if a notice of dismissal is filed before a hearing on a motion for summary
judgment, or in the event that no motion is heard or such a motion is un-
400. 239 So.2d 633 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970) [hereinafter cited as Webber].
401. 235 So.2d 328 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970). See notes 396-98 supra and accompanying text.
402. Webber v. Brickley, 239 So.2d 633, 634 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
403. Since the dismissal referred to in Rule 1,380(d) would be an involuntary dis-
missal as opposed to a voluntary dismissal, it is necessary to review Rule 1.420(b),
which concerns itself with involuntary dismissal and provides in part as follows:
Involuntary Dismissal. Any party may move for dismissal of an action or of
any claim against him for failure of an adverse party to comply with these
rules or any order of court. * * *
It should be noticed that Rule 1.420(b) permits involuntary dismissal upon motion
for two separate reasons: (1) failure of an adverse party to comply with these rules,
or (2) failure of an adverse party to comply with any order of court.
In the instant case, the plaintiffs did not fail to comply with any order of court
requiring their deposition as the defendant sought no order of court compelling
depositions of the plaintiffs. Defendant merely after scheduling the depositions of
plaintiffs for the first time and upon plaintiffs' failure to attend that deposition,
moved the court to strike and dismiss.
Canella v. Bryant, 235 So.2d 328, 332 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970) (emphasis supplied by court).
404. See discussion of Committee Note accompanying rule 1.380 supra (pre-1972).
405. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.420(b).
406. Canella and Webber take one other tack which seems inconsistent with the express
language of the rules. Both cases hold that a dismissal with prejudice is allowable in the
court's discretion, but that such a dismissal may only be granted for violation of an order of
court. Implicit in this reasoning is that a court could not dismiss an action with prejudice if
a party grossly ignored the time periods for answering interrogatories unless the opposing
party had moved for an order to compel discovery (unless, of course, one year has elapsed and
the court dismissed pursuant to rule 1.420(e)). This interpretation is in opposition to the
clear language of both rule 1.380 and rule 1.420(b) and is radically opposed to the spirit and
intent of the liberalized discovery rules which are designed to operate extrajudicially.
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successful, at any time before the jury retires (in a jury action) or before
the case is submitted to the court (in a nonjury case).47 At other times
leave of court is required, but if a counterclaim is filed before dismissal
notice is served, the court may not dismiss the case unless the counter-
claim has independent jurisdictional status.408 Under either method, dis-
missal is without prejudice unless the court so orders or the parties so
stipulate according to rule 1.420.
The right to a dismissal without prejudice under rule 1.42 0 (a) (notice
dismissal) is absolute and may not be abridged by a court. In Gate City,
Inc. v. Arnold Construction Co.,41 9 the District Court of Appeal, Fourth
District, reversed the entry of summary final judgment against a plaintiff
on the grounds that the trial court lost jurisdiction to enter judgment after
the plaintiff had filed a notice of dismissal, even though the defendant had
filed motions for dismissal and summary judgment before notice was filed.
The court held that a plaintiff had an absolute right to dismissal without
prejudice as long as notice was filed before the hearing of a motion for
summary judgment or dismissal, regardless of the date on which those
motions were filed. In another case, Briner v. Gilmore,41° the plaintiff had
filed suit for reformation and foreclosure of a mortgage on real property.
The action was dismissed by the trial court upon the defendants' motion,
which set forth the statement of another judge outlining the details of a
case before him which involved the same parties and the same claim.
Noting that the first suit was terminated by the voluntary dismissal of the
plaintiff pursuant to rule 1.420(a), the District Court of Appeal, Second
District, reversed and held that "a voluntary dismissal is without preju-
dice and ... the plaintiff has an absolute right to one such dismissal."41'
There is, however, one significant exception to the complete deter-
mination by a plaintiff of the timing of a voluntary dismissal, that is, when
"property has been seized or is in the custody of the court .... ,112 For
instance, a condemnor who has commenced eminent domain proceedings
may not voluntarily dismiss the case pursuant to rule 1.420(a)(1). In
O'Sullivan v. City of Deerfield Beach,41 3 the city had deposited monies into
the registry of the court and commenced condemnation proceedings as
prescribed by Florida Statutes ch. 74 (1967) .4 " Later, the city filed a
voluntary dismissal, and an appeal was taken. On review, the District
Court of Appeal, Fourth District, reversed and held that the city could
407. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.420(a)(1).
408. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.420(a) (2).
409. 243 So.2d 637 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
410. 229 So.2d 874 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
411. Id. at 875.
412. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.420(a) (1).
413. 232 So.2d 33 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
414. See FLA. STAT. §§ 74.041, 74.051, 74.061, 74.071 (1967). These statutes have remained
the same in the last official (1969) compilation of the Florida Statutes with the exception of
two provisions which were amended in 1970 which do not effect holding in this case. See
FLA. STAT. § 74.041 (Supp. 1970), amended by Fla. Laws 1970, Ch. 70-286; FLA. STAT.
§ 74.051 (Supp. 1970), amended by Fla. Laws 1971, 70-365, § 1.
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not voluntarily dismiss the suit because of the property exclusion provision
of rule 1.420(a)(1) and the express statutory language of chapter 74
which provided that title to all property involved in condemnation pro-
ceedings became immediately transferred and vested in the condemnor
upon deposit of funds in the court registry.415 The court barred the dis-
missal because it left "important matters in limbo," such as the fixing of
damages, the status of the seized land, the title of that land, and the
deposit held by the court.416 This holding was seen by the court to be a
logical adoption of dicta of Justice Terrell of the Supreme Court of Florida
in Conner v. State Road Dept.41 7 The Fourth District also held that the
action could be dismissed pursuant to rule 1.420(a) (2) if the parties could
be returned to the status quo "upon such terms and conditions as the
court deems proper ... ,"if the condemnor wished to dismiss, and the
condemnee wished to recover title.41 8
A conflict has arisen, though, regarding the precise time that a court
relinquishes jurisdiction in an action which has been voluntarily dismissed
pursuant to rule 1.420. The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, in
Rich Motors, Inc. v. Loyd Cole Produce Express, Inc., 1 held that a trial
court loses jurisdiction as soon as a voluntary dismissal is filed. In that
case, the plaintiff had taken a voluntary dismissal when it appeared that
the judge was about to deny him the admission of critical evidence. Sub-
sequently, the plaintiff filed a petition for review stating that his voluntary
"non-suit" was tantamount to an involuntary dismissal and moved for a
rehearing on the grounds of excusable neglect in the untimely filing of the
petition. The rehearing was granted, and the cause reinstated. The Fourth
District reversed and stated that non-suits no longer existed in Florida
even though under older procedural rules "a non-suit made compulsory
415. FLA. STAT. § 74.061(1) (1967) provides:
Immediately upon the making of the deposit, the title or interest specified in the
petition shall vest in the petitioner, and the said lands shall be deemed to be con-
demned and taken for the use of the petitioner, and the right to compensation for
the same shall vest in the persons entitled thereto. Compensation shall be deter-
mined in accordance with the provisions of chapter 73, except that interest shall be
allowed at the rate of six per cent per annum from the date of surrender of posses-
sion to the date of payment on the amount that the verdict exceeds the estimate of
value set forth in the declaration of taking.
416. O'Sullivan v. City of Deerfield Beach, 232 So.2d 33, 34-35 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
417. 66 So.2d 257 (Fla. 1953).
[Ilt seems to be the legislative intendment that the making of the deposit would
absolutely seal the transfer of title and right of possession in the condemnor to the
end that it could not be undone by dismissal. This view is further buttressed by
the comment of Mr. Justice Terrell by way of obiter dictum in the case of Conner
v. State Road Dept. of Florida, Fla. 1953, 66 So.2d 257:
"This Court is committed to the doctrine that proceedings for condemna-
tion of private property may be dismissed by the condemnors at any_ time.
We construe 'any time' to mean that time before which compensation is
made or actual possession of the property is taken by the condemnors."
O'Sullivan v. City of Deerfield Beach, 232 So.2d 33, 35 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
418. Id. at 36. In the case before the court, though, the condemnee did not wish to return
to the status quo. Consequently, the court vacated the dismissal and remanded the action for
trial.
419. 244 So.2d 526 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
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because of an adverse ruling which was preclusive of recovery was con-
sidered to be an involuntary non-suit, since at that point the plaintiff had no
absolute right to a non-suit.""2" The court then held that the plaintiff had
filed a voluntary and not an involuntary dismissal which had ousted the
court of jurisdiction by his own act of filing the notice of dismissal.
[The filing of a voluntary dismissal] is an absolute right of the
plaintiff without order of court, which gives to the plaintiff abso-
lute control over continuation of the litigation.... Since a trial
court has no discretion under F.R.C.P. 1.420(a)(1)(i) in
granting or denying a voluntary dismissal by a plaintiff, it fol-
lows, then, that a trial court has no authority to review a volun-
tary dismissal. A voluntary dismissal.., serves to terminate the
action and to divest the court of jurisdiction.42
However, in Cooper v. Carroll,422 the District Court of Appeal, Third
District, came to a contrary conclusion. There, a plaintiff filed a voluntary
dismissal against a number of defendants and subsequently moved the
court pursuant to rule 1.540 to grant relief from the dismissal on the
grounds that he had mistakenly dismissed all defendants when he only
intended to dismiss one. The court granted the motion, reinstated the
action as to all but one of the defendants, and one of the defendants ap-
pealed. The appellant contended that the court had lost jurisdiction at the
moment that the plaintiff filed his notice of dismissal, and that any actions
taken by the court after that point were improper. The appellant also con-
tended that rule 1.540 did not apply to voluntary dismissals. The Third
District disagreed and held that the voluntary dismissal of an action by a
plaintiff "provides a short cut, or expeditious manner of disposition of a
cause which otherwise would be accomplished by order of the court on
motion of the party." The court continued: "Such action in the cause,
equivalent to dismissal by court order, constitutes a 'proceeding' therein
from the effect of which the party involved can be granted relief by the
trial court under Rule 1.540(b) in an appropriate instance."4 's Conse-
quently, there appears to be a conflict between the Fourth District and
the Third District on this question. 24
420. Id. at 527.
421. Id. at 527-28.
422. 239 So.2d 511 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
423. Id. at 513. The court also held that rule 1.420 did not authorize the dismissal of an
action against one of a number of defendants, but that a dismissal would have to operate
against all defendants or none of them. However, the Third District held that the court by
order could dismiss the complaint against some but not all defendants under rule 1.250, and
that "[t]he acceptance by the trial court of the proffered amended notice as a basis for
dismissal as to [one defendant] made the dismissal as to that party one which was authorized
by the court's order." Id. See notes 598-603 infra and accompanying text.
424. In the authors' opinion, the Fourth District holding is more persuasive than that
of the Third District on this particular point. When a plaintiff files a notice of dismissal
pursuant to rule 1.420(a), the action comes to an end; a defendant is precluded from
reaching a judgment on the merits even if a motion has been filed (but not heard). To hold
that a plaintiff may reopen an action upon whim would render an inequality of justice which
certainly could not be consistent with the spirit and intent of the rules.
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The avenue of voluntary dismissal may be a safe way out of unsuc-
cessful litigation, but it is not necessarily a "free trip." Rule 1.420(d)
provides that costs may be assessed at the time judgment is entered or at
such time that a plaintiff files a second action with the same claim and
parties. In Keener v. Dunning,25 a defendant's motion for the assessment
of costs for depositions of medical experts and copies of documents and
reports at the time of a plaintiff's voluntary dismissal was denied. The
trial court noted that there was no way of knowing at the preliminary
stages of the first proceeding whether such costs would have been allowed
in a regular action. Reasoning that the action had been refiled and that the
proper course of action was to wait and see what occurred during the
course of that second trial, the judge refused to assess costs. On appeal, the
District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, reversed, noting that while the
assessment of costs was a matter which largely rested in the discretion of
a trial judge, costs "incurred in the taking of depositions and the acquisi-
tion of documentary evidence... should not be disallowed merely because
the use of the depositions and the documentary evidence was obviated by a
voluntary dismissal. '426 The trial judge was ordered on remand to examine
each requested cost and rule on it individually "depending upon his inter-
pretation of the reasonableness of its amount and the necessity for in-
curring it."
Where a cause is voluntarily dismissed by a plaintiff under Rule
1.420(a) (1), F.R.C.P., and a motion is filed in the cause to tax
costs, the trial judge should specifically rule in that cause on the
taxability of each cost item to be taxed. Thereafter, the trial
judge should enter a judgment assessing against the dismissing
party those items of costs determined to be taxable. He has, how-
ever, no authority to defer a ruling on costs pending the outcome
of other actions.427
B. Involuntary
For failure to comply with the rules of procedure or an order of court,
an involuntary dismissal may be entered against a plaintiff pursuant to
rule 1.420(b). In addition, after a party seeking affirmative relief has
presented his evidence in a non-jury trial, the opposing party may move
for an involuntary dismissal which will not prejudice that party's right to
present his own case.428 An involuntary dismissal of the second variety is
tantamount to a directed verdict.429 Generally, notice of a hearing of a
425. 238 So.2d 113 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
426. Id. at 114.
427. Id.
428. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.420(b).
429. In non-jury trials, a motion for directed verdict is tantamount to a motion fol
involuntary dismissal under Rule 1.420(b), 30 F.S.A. Thus, the trial judge as [a]
trier of fact [is] governed by different criteria and [is] entitled to weigh the evi-
dence, resolve conflicts and pass upon the credibility of witnesses. If in this light
the court finds the plaintiff's evidence is insufficient to merit judgment, the court may
enter judgment at that point for the defendant.
Tillman v. Baskin, 242 So.2d 748, 748-49 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971). This has been and continues
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motion for involuntary dismissal must be served a reasonable time prior
to the hearing,43 0 but in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Caos,43' an intermediate
Florida appellate court held that an ore tenus motion for involuntary dis-
missal at trial for failure to provide a witness list was properly granted.
When the failure to comply with a court order is involved, the trial
court is given wide discretion in granting a dismissal which will only be
overturned when it is shown that the court order had been improper. Such
dismissals are generally with prejudice and operate as an adjudication on
the merits.432 In Lasley v. Cushing,"8 the court distinguished between the
severity of penalties for failure to comply with the rules and failure to
comply with an order of court. It held that when a court order was not com-
plied with and an involuntary dismissal was entered, the only question left
for review was "whether the trial court's discretion was abused by the entry
of the dismissal order."4 4 In that case, a plaintiff had failed for 13 months
to comply with a court order prescribing the time for amending a com-
to be the rule in the federal courts also. See 5 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE IT 41.13[4] (2d ed.
1971).
However, subsequent to the period covered by this survey, the Supreme Court of Florida
reversed Tillman [260 So.2d 509 (Fla. 1972)] and abolished the distinction between an
involuntary dismissal test in non-jury trials and the directed verdict test in jury actions.
The supreme court noted that in so holding it was rejecting both the federal standard and
the rule of two of the four district courts of appeal in Florida. See Gibson v. Gibson, 180
So.2d 388 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965); Tampa Wholesale Co. v. Foodtown, U.S.A., Inc., 166 So.2d
711 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965). Contra Wayjay Bakery, Inc. v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., 177
So.2d 544 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965). In conclusion, the court held:
There is nothing in Rule 1.420(b) making mandatory a weighing of the facts before
the end of all the testimony. Fairness and justice demand that this not be done where
the plaintiff has presented a prima facie case in his favor .... It is inconceivable that
a trial judge can fairly find for a defendant after hearing nothing more than testimony
from a plaintiff establishing a prima fade case in that plaintiff's favor. When a prima
facie case is made by plaintiff, fairness would appear to require that the trial judge
weigh it in light of the strength or weakness of the defendant's defense evidence, if
any, as in the case of a jury trial. We hold that a trial judge cannot weigh evidence
when ruling on a defendant's Rule 1.420(b) F.R.C.P. motion for involuntary dis-
missal following the presentation of a prima fade case by a plaintiff.
Tillman v. Baskin, 260 So.2d 509, 511-12 (Fla. 1972), rev'g 242 So.2d 748 (Fla. 4th Dist.
1971).
430. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.090(d), 1.420(b).
431. 237 So.2d 53 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970). The defendant, who was also a counterclaimant
in that action, filed an oral motion (without notice) at trial to dismiss the action for failure
of the plaintiff to provide a witness list to the defendant. The court noted that the defendant
counterclaimant had also failed to supply such a list and dismissed both actions with preju-
dice. This final order was later amended to a dismissal without prejudice. The District Court
of Appeal, Third District, affirmed the trial court's action and noted with approval language
contained in Coggan v. Coggan, 213 So.2d 902 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968) which stated that
regardless of the time requirements of the rules, as long as counsel for both parties were
present, there was no surprise, the motion and order were reduced to writing, and the motion
favored a just and expeditious disposition of the case, the dismissal would be upheld. All-
state Ins. Co. v. Caos, 237 So.2d 53, 53-54 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970), citing Coggan v. Coggan,
213 So.2d 902, 903 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
432. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.420(b). See E & E Electric Cont., Inc. v. Singer, 236 So.2d 195
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1970), cert. dismissed, 239 So.2d 827 (Fla. 1970), where the court held that the
failure to amend a complaint within the time prescribed by court order justified a dismissal
with prejudice. See notes 171-74 supra and accompanying text.
433. 244 So.2d 770 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
434. Id. at 772.
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plaint. The court noted, though, that "[e]ach case of this sort must be
viewed in light of its own peculiar circumstances, including the extent of
the tardiness involved in compliance with a court order in determining
whether an abuse of discretion occurred.1
43 5
C. Failure to Prosecute
If in any action no activity has taken place for one year, any inter-
ested person or the court may move to dismiss the action for failure to
prosecute. Unless the offending party shows good cause in writing at least
five days before a hearing on the motion, the case will be dismissed with
prejudice. 86
One of the most frequently litigated points is the determination of
what exactly constitutes "activity" so as to forestall dismissal and toll the
one-year time period. Rule 1.420(e) states that pleadings and court orders
constitute "action," and some recent cases expand on the category. In
Whitney v. Whitney,4 7 two executors became embroiled in a dispute which
led to the courts. Shortly before trial, one executor moved for and was
granted a continuance to acquire new evidence. A year and one day later,
the other executor was granted a dismissal for failure of the plaintiff
executor to prosecute.
On appeal, the District Court of Appeal, Second District, looked to
the record which demonstrated a number of contacts between counsel for
both parties which resulted in the imminent transfer of certain documents
(check stubs) to the plaintiff executor, the actual delivery of which was
cut off by the court's dismissal order. The Second District held these
communications between the two lawyers to be "activity" under the rule's
"or otherwise" clause.488 In handing down its decision, the court enu-
merated the following events which have been held to constitute sufficient
"activity" to forestall dismissal: a verbal request made to a trial court
clerk asking that a trial be docketed, 48 and the filing of a notice to take
a deposition.4 40 In short, the Second District recognized that "the 'activity'
435. Id. The court, in this case, quoted language from Rashard v. Cappiali, 171 So.2d 581
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1965), which drew a distinction between failure to comply with an order of
court as compared with a failure to comply with a procedural rule. The quoted Rashard
language seems to indicate that an involuntary dismissal may only be employed when an
order of court rather than a procedural rule has been violated. The authors take exception
with this restrictive interpretation of the rule. (See note 406 supra) A court should be able
to respond just as effectively and decisively to a flagrant violation of procedural rules as it
is able to respond to a serious violation of a court order. The court's discretionary actions
should be governed by the gravity of the violation, not by its label.
436. FLA. R. Crv. P. 1.420(e).
437. 241 So.2d 436 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970), cert. denied, 245 So.2d 88 (Fla. 1971).
438. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.420(e) provides in part: "All actions in which it affirmatively
appears that no action has been taken by filing of pleadings, order of court or otherwise for
a period of one year . . . ." (emphasis added).
439. See Adams Eng'r. Co. v. Construction Prod. Corp., 156 So.2d 497 (Fla. 1963).
440. See Rosenfeld v. Glickstein, 200 So.2d 242 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967); Ownes v. Ken's
Paint & Body Shop, 196 So.2d 17 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967). See also Cyprus Corp. v. Smith, 218
So.2d 481 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969) (defendant's answer constitutes a filing); City of Jackson-
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that tolls the running of the Rule may be outside the record as well as on
the record. The only difference is that if it is outside the record it must be
proven at a hearing before the Court .... ""'
In a second case, DeVaney v. Rumsch,442 a plaintiff filed suit against
five defendants. Later, four of the defendants filed motions to dismiss for
failure to prosecute. The file showed that the plaintiff had noticed one of
the defendants for a deposition and sent notification of the deposition to
a second defendant. The noticed defendant then filed a motion to quash
service of process and the deposition and a notice of hearing, copies of
which were sent to the second defendant. All of this activity occurred
within one year of the dismissal for failure to prosecute, and the District
Court of Appeal, First District, reversed the dismissal on the grounds that
the aforementioned activity tolled the running of the one-year period for
all the defendants.
While it is true that the said pleadings and orders pertained pri-
marily to [one defendant], they may well have had a bearing
upon the potential liability of the other four defendants. In any
event, we think that, in view of the said pleadings and order, it
cannot be correctly said that "no action" was taken during the
said period.44
The rule is to be interpreted literally. Any pleading, motion, or other
qualifying "activity" filed by either party will toll the running of the one-
year period-including the filing of a motion to dismiss for failure to
prosecute. In Fund Insurance Co. v. Preskitt,4"4 the defendant had filed
a motion for summary judgment on January 30, 1967. The following day,
the plaintiff filed an affidavit in opposition to the motion for summary
judgment. On January 30, 1968, the defendant served an amended sum-
mary judgment by mail which was not filed in the court clerk's office until
February 1, 1968. Meanwhile, on January 31, 1968, the defendant filed
a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute which the court granted. On
appeal, the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held that while
"filing" rather than "service" controlled under the rule, the distinction
made no difference in the case before it since the plaintiff's affidavit con-
stituted "activity" within a one-year period of the filing of a dismissal
motion. Noting that the defendant had not seasonably filed his motion and
that rule 1.420(e) was not self-executing, the Fourth District reversed
the dismissal.
If good cause is demonstrated and the necessary procedures fol-
ville v. Hinson, 202 So.2d 806 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967) (filing of additional interrogatories and
answers to same also constitutes a filing) [both of these cases are cited in Fund Ins. Co. v.
Preskitt, 231 So.2d 866, 867 n.2 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970)].
441. Whitney v. Whitney, 241 So.2d 436, 439 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970), cert. denied, 245
So.2d 88 (Fla. 1971).
442. 247 So.2d 69 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
443. Id. at 70.
444. 231 So.2d 866 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
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lowed,445 a dismissal for failure to prosecute may be avoided. The con-
stituent elements of good cause and the proper time to assert same were
involved in two District Court of Appeal, Third District, cases. In the
first decision, Dade County v. Moreno,446 it was held that a sworn state-
ment alleging that the cause should not be dismissed because the statute of
limitations had run was insufficient to measure up to the good cause
standard even though the plaintiff's claim would be barred if dismissed.
The court also cited one of its sister appellate courts which held that good
cause was not shown even though a case was ready for trial, a dismissal
would cause severe hardship, or the parties had unsuccessfully attempted
to negotiate a settlement.44 7 The second case, Curry Corp. v. Greenfield,448
discussed the proper timing of the good cause showing. There, it was held
that the demonstration must be made prior to the entry of a dismissal. Any
attempt to show good cause after the entry of dismissal was held to be
both untimely and insufficient.
Previously, the entry of a dismissal order pursuant to rule 1.420(e),
could be reconsidered within 30 days, before the court lost jurisdiction.
This point was driven home in Wilds v. Permenter,449 where a plaintiff
suffered a dismissal under rule 1.420(e) and did not seek to review same
within the 30-day period. Nine months later, though, the case was tried
before a jury over the defendant's objections, and a verdict was returned
for the plaintiff. Apparently after the trial, the court, sua sponte, rein-
stated the cause by post trial order. The District Court of Appeal, Fourth
District, was not impressed. It reversed the judgment on two grounds:
first, no motion for reinstatement had been made within the 30-day period,
and second, the record demonstrated no showing of good cause. The court
concluded that "[w] hen a cause of action is dismissed for lack of prosecu-
tion and where a motion to reinstate the cause is not made within one
month thereafter, the order of dismissal becomes final and the jurisdiction
of the trial court over the subject matter and the cause is finally
ended. 45 o
IX. CONTINUANCES
"A motion for continuance may be made only before or at the time
the case is set for trial, unless good cause for failure to do so is shown or
unless the ground for the motion arose after the action was set for trial.11451
The motion must be in writing and must state all of the facts giving rise
to a need for continuance. If the continuance is being sought because of the
445. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.420(e).
446. 227 So.2d 548 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
447. Id. at 549, citing Laug v. Murphy, 205 So.2d 695, 697 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968).
448. 235 So.2d 49 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970) (per curiam).
449. 228 So.2d 408 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
450. Id. at 409. Now, under FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.420(e), notice must be filed within five
days before the hearing on a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute.
451. FLA. R. CIv. P. 1.460(a).
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non-availability of a witness, the date when such witness will be available
must be included in the filing. In any event, the amount of time granted
for a continuance shall be governed by the requisites of justice." 2
The granting of a continuance is a matter for the court's discretion,45
but the exercise of that discretion can be over-extended. In a District
Court of Appeal, Third District, case,454 numerous delays had been en-
countered in setting a case for trial including one continuance because of
the illness of plaintiff counsel's father. The case was reset for trial at a later
date. On the morning of trial, plaintiff's counsel moved for a continuance
on the grounds that he was unaware that the case was to be tried on that
date, but was under the impression that a calendar hearing had been
scheduled. The motion was denied, and the case tried. After an apparently
less than impressive presentation which included only one witness' testi-
mony, a directed verdict on both the main claim and later the defendant's
counterclaim was granted. Plaintiff's counsel then successfully moved for
a new trial on the grounds that the continuance motion had been im-
properly denied. The defendant appealed. The Third District reinstated
the final judgment and held that the trial judge had misapplied existing
case law in Florida on the point of continuances. 455 The court stated that
the motion was properly refused initially by the court for two reasons:
first, it was not in writing as required by rule 1.460(b); and second, the
grounds stated, misunderstanding of the date for trial, fell short of the
required good cause standard.
However, in Tsavaris v. Tsavaris,456 a trial court was held to have
abused its discretion by denying a continuance in a divorce action where
the plaintiff had replaced her counsel one day before trial, and a continu-
ance had been moved for the next day. This was thought by the District
Court of Appeal, Second District, to have been amply supported by good
cause, and the lower court's denial was reversed. The Second District
452. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.460(b)-(c).
453. See, e.g., S & S Pharm., Inc. v. Hirschfield, 226 So.2d 874 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969),
where it was held not to be an abuse of discretion for a trial judge to deny a motion for a
continuance sought the morning of the trial when the defendant-movant had adequate time
to complete discovery weeks before the trial date.
454. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co. v. A & P Bakery Sup. & Equip. Co., 240 So.2d 73
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1970), cert. denied, 244 So.2d 432 (Fla. 1971).
455. The court determined that the initial ruling on the motion for continuance
was error because of the law set forth in Courtney v. Central Trust Co., 112 Fla.
298, 150 So. 276 (1933), and Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Suit, 153 Fla. 490, 15
So.2d 33 (1943). In the Courtney decision the Supreme Court held that a continuance
of trial was improperly denied where a written motion for a continuance had been
made and where the facts presented by the record showed that by reason of his wife's
illness defendant's attorney had not been able to prepare defendant's case and that the
attorney, because of worry over his wife's condition, was not in a mental condition
to enable him to properly conduct his client's case. In the Western Union decision the
Supreme Court held that it was improper for a trial judge to proceed to trial where
he was informed that the absence of the defendant and its attorney was due to the
actual illness of counsel, and defendant had no knowledge of this fact or notice of the
case.
Id. at 74-75.
456. 244 So.2d 450 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
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specifically rejected the trial judge's determination that "there ha[d] been
no sufficient showing to constitute a reason for the plaintiff to discharge her
counsel . . and that her rejection of proposed settlement and voluntary
discharge of counsel [did] not constitute grounds for a continuance. 457
The court ruled that the plaintiff had no burden of demonstrating sufficient
reason to discharge her counsel unless the court found "some dereliction on
her part prejudicial to an orderly disposition of the cause or prejudicial
otherwise to the court or other parties."4 '
X. DIRECTED VERDICTS
Rule 1.480 provides that a party may move the court to direct a verdict
in an action at the close of the presentation of the opposing party's evi-
dence without prejudicing his own opportunity to present evidence in the
event the motion is denied. In addition, "[w] hen a motion for a directed
verdict made at the close of all of the evidence is denied or for any reason
is not granted, the court is deemed to have submitted the action to the
jury subject to a later determination of the legal questions raised by the
motion."45 However, the power to direct a verdict should be exercised in
a cautious manner, "and a motion for a directed verdict should not be
granted unless the evidence is such that under no view which the jury
might lawfully take of the evidence favorable to the adverse party could a
verdict for the latter party be sustained." 6° For instance, the District
Court of Appeal, Fourth District, used this test to reverse a directed
verdict granted by the circuit court. The case, Little v. Publix Super-
457. Id. at 452.
458. Id. at 453 (emphasis supplied by court). In this case, the plaintiff's attorney had
died, and his partner continued the representation. He received, submitted, and encouraged
acceptance of a settlement agreement of which plaintiff did not approve. The plaintiff subse-
quently lost faith in her attorney and after the first day of trial removed him and substituted
new counsel. The Second District stated in response to these facts:
First of all, appellant had an absolute right to reject counsel's recommendations as
to the proffered settlement and submit the matters to the court, even though the
wisdom of such course may be open to question; and she had an equal right to
change attorneys as long as there is no basis for a determination that she was
attempting to frustrate trial determination of the cause. We can find no such basis.
Indeed, as she was the plaintiff, for all that appears a speedy conclusion of the cause
inured to her benefit.
Id. at 452-53.
459. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.480(b).
Within ten days after the reception of a verdict a party who has moved for a
directed verdict may move to have the verdict and any judgment entered thereon set
aside and to have judgment entered in accordance with his motion for a directed
verdict or if a verdict was not returned, such party may move for judgment in
accordance with the motion for a directed verdict within ten days after the jury has
been discharged.
Id.
460. Bell's Fish & Poultry Co. v. Jenkins, 227 So.2d 512, 513 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1969),
cert. denied, 237 So.2d 175 (Fla. 1970). In that case, a defendant appealed from an adverse
judgment claiming that the trial court improperly denied a motion for directed verdict on
the grounds that no evidence showing negligence had been presented. (Defendant's truck had
collided with plaintiff's after defendant was struck in the rear by another vehicle.) The
court affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion.
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markets, Inc.,"' involved a personal injury action where a plaintiff, who
had been standing at one end of a store aisle for 15 to 20 minutes and
reportedly heard nothing unusual during that time, slipped and fell on
clear liquid spilled on the floor minutes later. The defendants successfully
moved for a directed verdict on the grounds that there had been no evi-
dence presented which demonstrated that the store had adequate notice of
the condition.
The Fourth District reversed, noting that the defendant, for purposes
of the motion, admitted "every reasonable inference that a jury might
fairly and reasonably arrive at favorable to the adverse party. 4 6 2 The
court concluded that the 15 to 20 minute period "could be deemed suffi-
cient for the defendant to be charged with knowledge of the condition and
a reasonable time in which to correct it.1
4 6
In determining the merits of a motion for a directed verdict in a negli-
gence action, the trial judge may not reconcile conflicting evidence, nor
determine the credibility of witnesses. The sole function of the court is to
examine the trial evidence to determine if a jury of reasonable men could
properly conclude that the defendant was guilty of negligence proximately
causing injuries to the plaintiff.4 64 If there are any evidentiary conflicts
which arise during a trial, those conflicts should be resolved by the jury
and not by the court. "Similarly, if there are any conflicting reasonable
inferences which may be adduced from the evidence, the case should be
submitted to the jury as a question of fact and not taken from them and
passed upon by the court as a question of law. 4 6 5 On appeal, a directed
verdict undergoes close scrutiny and is subjected to these same stringent
461. 234 So.2d 132 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970). -
462. Id. at 133.
463. Id. at 134.
464. Bell's Fish & Poultry Co. v. Jenkins, 227 So.2d 512 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969), cert. denied,
237 So.2d 175 (Fla. 1970). See Ameisen v. Royal Con. Hotels Corp., 226 So.2d 463 (Fla. 4th
Dist. 1969), a slip and fall case where a directed verdict was reversed on the grounds that a
reasonable jury question had been formulated on the question of improper maintenance giving
rise to a dangerous condition. See also Thee v. Manor Pines Cony. Center, Inc., 235 So.2d
64 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970); Katz v. Harrington, 226 So.2d 11 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
465. Armstrong Cork Co. v. Crook, 227 So.2d 64, 67 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969). This case
involved an adverse possession claim. The trial court directed a verdict for the defendant
on the grounds that he had presented uncontroverted evidence of adverse possession including
color of title. The plaintiff had objected to the entry of a directed verdict on the grounds
that the deed which constituted "color of title" did not correctly describe the land in question.
The appellate court agreed with the plaintiff and reversed the entry of final judgment. The
appeals panel also found the evidence on all of the elements of adverse possession to fall short
of the "clear and positive proof" standard required for the entry of a directed verdict. Id.
at 66.
See also Evin R. Welch & Co. v. Johnson, 228 So.2d 425 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969), a brokerage
commission action, where the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, reversed a directed
verdict and stated that "[if a recovery can be lawfully had upon any view taken of facts
which the evidence tends to establish, a case should not be taken from the jury by directioi
of verdict." Id. at 427.
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standards46  "to prevent any infringement upon the organic right of trial
by jury.
' 467
Two cases recently decided by the Supreme Court of Florida reflect
the hesitancy of the high court to allow the entry of a directed verdict to
cut off jury consideration of triable factual issues. Interestingly enough,
both cases, Lopez v. Buck468 and Reyes v. Parsons,"9 quashed district
court of appeal opinions which had ordered the issuance of directed
verdicts (where the circuit courts had refused to enter such orders at trial),
and the reinstatement of the jury verdicts. In Lopez, an automobile
accident involving personal injuries was under consideration. The plain-
tiff's car had been sideswiped from the front to the rear, and the plaintiff
claimed that defendant had hit him from the rear as plaintiff was starting-
up from an intersection after stopping for a traffic signal. Defendant ad-
mitted liability, and the question of contributory negligence and damages
went to the jury. At the conclusion of all of the evidence plaintiff moved
for, but was denied a directed verdict, and a judgment for defendant was
subsequently rendered. On appeal, the District Court of Appeal, Second
District, reversed the denial of the directed verdict. In so holding, the
court held that the conflict between Lopez' claim that he had been hit from
behind and the defendant's claim that he hit plaintiff initially in the front
was immaterial to the question of contributory negligence and irrelevant to
the question of liability or damages.47° On conflict certiorari to the su-
466. See, e.g., Williams v. Dade Cty., 237 So.2d 776, 777 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970) where the
court stated:
In examining each of the grounds appellees have presented for affirmance [of a
directed verdict], we shall be governed by the principle that directed verdicts should
be cautiously granted and will not be sustained unless the record when viewed in
the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion is directed fails to
show any reasonable view of the evidence which could sustain the position of that
party.
See also Valdes v. Prudence Mut. Cas. Co., 226 So.2d 119 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
467. Bell's Fish & Poultry Co. v. Jenkins, 227 So.2d 512, 514 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969), cert.
denied, 237 So.2d 175 (Fla. 1970).
468. 250 So.2d 6 (Fla. 1971), rev'g 239 So.2d 103 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970) [hereinafter cited
as Lopez].
469. 238 So.2d 561 (Fla. 1970), rev'g, 226 So.2d 43 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969) [hereinafter
cited as Reyes].
470. In denying appellant's motion for a directed verdict, the trial court judge was
apparently of the opinion that the conflicting versions as to which part of the Lopez
vehicle was initially struck created a fact question, pertinent to the issue of con-
tributory negligence, which was for the jury. Although disputed issues of fact are
to be resolved by the jury, there is no need for its deliberation when the facts in
question have no bearing upon the issue of liability or damages. Appellant's testimony
that he was in the right-hand lane prior to and at the time of the accident is un-
rebutted and cannot be seriously questioned. Whether defendant cut in front of
appellant's vehicle, turned into its side, or hit it from the rear is not controlling on
the issue of contributory negligence in this case. Plaintiff demonstrated that he was
proceeding in a normal direction, within normal speed, in his lane of traffic. No
evidence was presented by either party indicating any negligence on appellant's part.
Lopez v. Buck, 239 So.2d 103, 104 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
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preme court, the Second District's opinion was quashed, and the jury
verdict reinstated.47' The court suggested that the very language of the
Second District's opinion which pointed up the conflict between the two
versions of the location of initial impact gave rise "to materially conflicting
inferences on the question of contributory negligence . 72 The court con-
cluded that in ruling as it did, the Second District ignored the well estab-
lished rule that conflicting inferences deducible from the evidence and all
other reasonable inferences presented by the evidence must be indulged
on behalf of the non-moving party.
478
In Reyes, the trial court had held that a beautician who was traveling
with her employer (the driver) in an automobile involved in an accident
could not be held absolutely to have been "a guest" and susceptible to the
provisions of the guest passenger statute. 74 Consequently, the trial judge
refused defendant's motion for a directed verdict and sent the question of
the plaintiff's status as guest or business invitee to the jury, which re-
turned a verdict for the plaintiff. The defendant appealed, and the District
Court of Appeal, Fourth District, reversed the lower court and held that
while evidence which "is susceptible of reasonable contrary inferences..."
should be submitted to the jury for determination, "the legal sufficiency
of the evidence to support an issue is always a question of law for the
court."
4 75
The court reasoned that the question of whether or not the plaintiff
was simply a guest or actually conferred a business benefit upon the
defendant was a question of law for the court to decide.4 76 The Fourth
District consequently reversed the first judgment and ordered the issuance
of a directed verdict. As in Lopez, the Supreme Court of Florida took a
dim view of the use of the directed verdict. The court held that while the
evidence "may not have been conflicting in any material matter," it did
471. Lopez v. Buck, 250 So.2d 6 (Fla. 1971).
472. Id. at 8.
473. Id., citing Vanzant v. Davies, 215 So.2d 504, 505 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968):
[U]nder our court system, the jury in an action at law is the trier of the facts and
in such capacity resolves the conflicts in the evidence, as well as the conflicting in-
ferences deducible from the same evidence. Neither the trial court nor the appellate
court is authorized to substitute its judgment for that of the jury as to questions
of fact. [emphasis supplied by court]
and Lloyd v. McKenna, 179 So.2d 583 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
474. FLA. STAT. § 320.59 (1967). The guest statute was repealed by Fla. Laws 1972,
ch. 72-1.
475. Reyes v. Parson, 226 So.2d 43, 44 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
476. The guest passenger statute has been the subject of numerous decisions as a
consequence of which the courts have announced certain minimum standards that
the passenger must meet in order to be removed from the scope of the statute.
When the evidence, viewed most favorably to the plaintiff passenger establishes
circumstances which fail to meet these minimum standards, then as a matter of
law the evidence is legally insufficient to remove the plaintiff passenger from the
guest passenger statute and where, as here, plaintiff seeks to recover on simple
negligence only, the court has a duty to direct a verdict for the defendant.
Id. at 44, citing FLA. STAT. § 320.59 (1967); Swilley v. Economy Cab Co., 56 So.2d 914
(Fla. 1951).
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"admit of different reasonable inferences ... ,, and the factual issue of
the plaintiff's status was thus properly sent by the trial judge to the jury.
The court concluded that since the judge and the jury had considered
evidence relating to the nature of plaintiff's and defendant's relationship,
the Fourth District had acted improperly when it overturned the verdict.
The court then quashed the appellate decision and reinstated the jury
verdict.
In Holman v. Ford Motor Co., 478 the District Court of Appeal, First
District, was faced with a situation involving numerous procedural
maneuvers at the trial level. The plaintiff had brought an action against a
new car dealer and the Ford Motor Company alleging negligence and
breach of implied warranty. The judge entered a directed verdict against
both defendants on the implied warranty count, but ruled that the negli-
gence issue would have to go to the jury. The case looked good for the
plaintiff since Ford had admitted on the record that it was obvious that
either one of the defendants was liable. Sensing victory, the plaintiff
voluntarily dismissed the dealer to remove him from the jury's considera-
tion of damages and decided to go after the big money. Unfortunately,
things began to break down at this point. The trial judge withdrew the
directed verdict on the warranty count, and the plaintiff withdrew the
motion for voluntary dismissal against the dealer, withdrew his abandon-
ment of the negligence count, and moved for directed verdicts against
both defendants. The court refused to grant the directed verdicts; the
plaintiff again dismissed the dealer and went to the jury against Ford
alone on both counts. He lost.
On appeal, the plaintiff argued, inter alia, that the trial judge acted
improperly when he vacated his directed verdicts once they had been en-
tered. The District Court of Appeal, First District, disagreed and held that
a directed verdict was an interlocutory decree and as such was "always
under the control of the court until final disposition of the suit, and...
[could] be modified or rescinded upon sufficient grounds at any time
before final judgment. ' 479 In any event, the First District held that all of
the directed verdicts were improperly granted since the record contained
evidence with inferences which would block the entry of such an order.
480
A motion for a directed verdict which is reserved for determination
until after a jury verdict has been returned is commonly called a judgment
477. Parson v. Reyes, 238 So.2d 561, 564 (Fla. 1970).
478. 239 So.2d 40 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970). See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
479. Id. at 43, citing Alabama Hotel Co. v. J. L. Mott Iron Works, 86 Fla. 608, 98 So.
825 (1924) ; Mitchell v. Mason, 90 Fla. 201, 106 So. 430 (1925).
480. The case was, however, reversed on other grounds and sent back for retrial. One
year later, the case was back before the First District. The plaintiff had suffered a summary
judgment on the grounds that he had collected a judgment from the dealer for negligent
installation of equipment in another action and was thus barred from asserting a claim of
negligent manufacture against the manufacturer. This ruling was affirmed. Arenson v. Ford
Motor Co., 254 So.2d 812 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
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notwithstanding the verdict48' and is subjected to the same severe stan-
dards of application as is a motion for a directed verdict.
Motions for judgment notwithstanding verdict, like motions for
directed verdict, should be resolved with extreme caution since
the granting thereof holds that one side of the case is essentially
devoid of probative evidence . . . . The movant admits all ma-
terial facts as attested by his adversary and also admits all infer-
ences of fact favorable to the adversary that reasonably might
be drawn from the evidence as a whole .... If there is room for
difference among reasonable men as to the existence of a material
fact sought to be established, or as to a material inference which
reasonably might be drawn from established facts, the case
should be submitted to the jury.82
Consequently, in Miller v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co.,483 the District
Court of Appeal, First District, reversed the entry of such an order on the
grounds that the jury verdict on the question of the intentional infliction
of mental distress should not have been overturned by the trial judge. In
that case, a woman of little formal education had applied for and had been
given a medical insurance contract with the defendant, had fully disclosed
her prior medical history to a salesman, and had authorized her doctors
to release any requested medical information to the defendant. Shortly
thereafter, plaintiff was diagnosed as suffering from Addison's Disease,
which she claimed she had never heard of before. The defendant's agent
went to plaintiff's home, was quite abusive, and took the health insurance
policy away from plaintiff without her permission. The next day plaintiff
became ill and was hospitalized. The First District viewed this evidence
as sufficiently probative to have sent the issue of the taking of the policy
without permission and wrongful mistreatment of plaintiff to the jury.
However, once all of the criteria of a directed verdict have been met in a
particular case, and the court finds that the jury verdict is contrary to
law and the evidence presented, upon proper motion setting forth the
grounds with particularity, a judgment notwithstanding the verdict may
properly be granted.4 84
XI. DEFAULT JUDGMENTS
"When a party against whom affirmative relief is sought has failed
to file or serve any paper in the action," the party seeking the relief
481. Under the present practice provided for by Rule 1.480 RCP, the ruling made on
the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, properly entitled "motion for
judgment in accord with directed verdict," is a deferred ruling on the motion for
directed verdict.
Cheek v. Long, 235 So.2d 349, 352 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
482. Miller v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 235 So.2d 33; 35 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970), cert.
denied, 238 So.2d 423 (Fla. 1970); citing with approval the language of Deese v. White Belt
Dairy Farms, Inc., 160 So.2d 543, 545 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964); quoted in Smith v. Peninsular
Ins. Co., 181 So.2d 212, 217 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
483. 235 So.2d 33, 35 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970), cert. denied, 238 So.2d 423 (Fla. 1970).
484. Cheek v. Long, 235 So.2d 349 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
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may have the clerk enter a default against the other party.485 In addi-
tion, the court may upon application or by its own motion enter a de-
fault judgment when a party (against whom affirmative relief is sought)
fails to plead or otherwise defend as provided by the rules of procedure,
any applicable statutes, or orders of court.48 It should be noted that a
party who has filed any paper in the court file from the time an action
has been commenced is entitled to notice of the application for entry
of default pursuant to rule 1.500(b). Also, if a party pleads or other-
wise defends prior to the entry of a default or a default judgment, none
can be entered.
4 87
In Freedman v. Freedman,"' the defendant filed an unsuccessful
motion attacking the validity of substituted service of process. Later,
after the motion was denied, the plaintiff filed a motion to enter a de-
fault before the court. Prior to the hearing, the defendant filed an answer,
but the court entered a default and final judgment, which it refused to
vacate. On appeal, the default was vacated pursuant to rule 1.500(c),
and the case remanded 89 Similarly, in Pollack v. Korn,490 a plaintiff's
complaint was dismissed, and he was given 20 days to amend. On the
twenty-first day the defendant filed a motion to enter a default and de-
fault judgment which the judge signed. The following morning at 9:18
a.m. the plaintiff filed his amended complaint, and at 10:20 a.m. the
judge's order of default judgment was filed. On motion, the judge re-
fused to set aside the judgment. An appeal was taken to the District
Court of Appeal, Third District. It reversed and held that regardless
of all other errors, the trial judge "under these circumstances ... abused
his discretion in not setting aside the order of default."49'
Generally, the Florida courts "follow a liberal policy in setting aside
defaults. If there is any reasonable doubt in the matter it is resolved
485. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.500(a).
486. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.500(b).
487. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.500(c).
488. 235 So.2d 544 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970), cert. denied, 241 So.2d 859 (Fla. 1970).
489. It should be noted, however, that the plaintiff's attorney could have avoided this
result by a simple procedural maneuver. Instead of moving the court to enter what amounted
to a motion for a default judgment, the attorney should have entered a default with the clerk
of the court. Then, the defendant would not have been able to file his responsive pleading until
he moved the court to vacate the default. Meanwhile, the plaintiff could then have asked the
court for the entry of a default judgment.
The important procedural difference between the two techniques is that no matter how
egregious a defendant's failure to comply with the rules of court, if he further pleads before
the entry of a default, the court may not enter a default or a default judgment because of
rule 1.500(c). However, once a default is entered, the defendant's filings, save a motion to set
aside the default, will not be accepted by the clerk. Then, the court may consider the gravity
of the defendant's conduct and fashion an adequate remedy. While the entry of a default
judgment at that juncture might not necessarily be affirmed on appeal unless there were
appropriate circumstances, the court in setting aside the default might well apply sanctions
against the defaulting party.
490. 237 So.2d 556 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
491. Id. at 557. Among the errors which apparently were made were the failure to notify
the plaintiff of an application for the entry of default pursuant to rule 1.500(b) and the failure
of the judge in not immediately rescinding the default order upon discovering that the com-
plaint had been filed before the order in contravention of rule 1.500(c).
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in favor of . . . allowing a trial upon the merits of the case." However,
"those principles are to be considered together with the principle that
judgments should have a finality which ought not lightly be set aside.
'492
Consequently, the failure of an insurance company to defend an action
for many months when the defendant presumes that the company will
is insufficient to justify the setting aside of a default judgment. If a
default were set aside under those circumstances, "[s]uch a ruling would
cast doubt upon the finality of every judgment entered after a de-
fault . . ." in similar actions4 93 Similarly, where a default was entered
because of the failure of a corporation to defend in an action, the cor-
poration's default was not set aside because there had been no allegation
or proof of excusable neglect on the part of the corporation. 94
However, even if a default is entered and upheld on appeal, that
does not mean that the litigation has come to an end. In the case of a
claim involving unliquidated damages, a court must have a trial on the
question of damages, 495 but if the claim is liquidated, the order entering
default judgment may contain the damage judgment also. 96 In addition,
a defendant who suffers a default for failure to file an answer in an
equity suit "can only be said to have admitted the well-pleaded facts
and to have acquiesced in the relief prayed for. ' 497 Thus, in Williams v.
Williams,49 8 where a plaintiff-husband had not pleaded facts sufficient to
warrant custody of a child, nor demanded such relief, but had simply
sought a divorce, due process would prevent a court from awarding
custody where a default had been properly entered against the defendant-
wife.
Even if a court must set aside a default entered for one reason or
another, it "may, in exercising its judicial discretion, fix reasonable terms
and conditions in the order vacating a default. ' 499 On interlocutory ap-
peal, the District Court of Appeal, Third District, in Jordan v. Jordan,00
approved the application of this doctrine by a trial judge who set aside
a default judgment in a divorce action, but refused to grant temporary
alimony, legal costs, and attorney's fees. The court also struck the de-
fendant's counterclaim. However, the court did take issue with the trial
judge's ruling that defendant had permanently lost any claim to any of
492. Lawn v. Wasserman, 226 So.2d 261, 263 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
493. Id. See notes 610-11 infra and accompanying text.
494. Winky's Inc. v. Francis, 229 So.2d 903 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
495. When a default is entered on an unliquidated damage claim, the defendant should be
afforded the right to notice; "an opportunity to participate in the trial on damages, and to
have the damage issues tried before a jury . . . ," if the plaintiff has properly moved for a
jury trial during the proceedings. Riley v. Gustinger, 235 So.2d 364, 366 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
See also Winky's Inc. v. Francis, 229 So.2d 903 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969) and authorities cited
therein.
496. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.500(e).
497. Williams v. Williams, 227 So.2d 746, 748 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
498. Id.
499. Jordan v. Jordan, 243 So.2d 607, 608 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
500. Id.
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the three aforementioned costs. The Third District reversed this section
of the order on the grounds that it was too soon for the trial judge to
so rule since the proper time to consider such matters on a permanent
basis was at the final hearing.
XII. SUMMARY JUDGMENTS
A. In General
Summary judgments are generally not a favored device for ter-
minating litigation in Florida. They are viewed with special scrutiny,
and a jury trial is favored whenever possible." 1 The purpose of a sum-
mary judgment, when allowed, is threefold: first, to determine if there
is sufficient evidence to justify a trial on the issues raised by the plead-
ings; second, to expedite litigation; and third, to obviate expense. 5 2
The District Court of Appeal, First District, has set forth two re-
quired elements to successfully maintain a summary judgment: first,
there must be no genuine issue as to any material fact; and second, the
moving party must be entitled to a summary judgment as a matter of
law.50 3 Additionally, it is well settled that the "burden of proving the
absence of any material facts so that no genuine issue is left for a jury
determination is on the movant."50 4 This burden extends to the bounds
of all reasonable inferences which may be drawn in favor of the non-
moving party, 0 5 and, of course, all evidence will be viewed in a light
most favorable to the nonmovant.506
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a trial judge may not
pass on the credibility of witnesses or weigh the evidence,° nor may
a summary judgment procedure become a "trial by affidavit. '" 8 How-
ever, when the "movant with competent witnesses shows to the point of
a prima facie case and beyond, based on personal knowledge and ad-
missible evidence, [that] there is no dispute, no issue, and . . . no evi-
dence to the contrary," he is entitled to a summary judgment. 9 However,
where a plaintiff moves for summary judgment, the burden is also upon
him to "conclusively refute" any affirmative defenses raised by the de-
fendant.51 0 Failure to do so will leave a material issue of fact in con-
501. McClain v. McDermott, 232 So.2d 161 (Fla. 1970), rev'g 220 So.2d 394 (Fla. 3d
Dist. 1969) (summary judgment allowed in negligence action).
502. Page v. Staley, 226 So.2d 129 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
503. Parkhurst v. Noble, 238 So.2d 691 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970); Hart v. Hart, 234 So.2d
393 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1970).
504. Byrd v. Leach, 226 So.2d 866, 868 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969). "The term 'genuine issue'
means a real, as opposed to a false or colorable, issue." Id.
505. Id.
506. Shollenberger v. Baskin, 227 So.2d 79 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
507. Industrial Sales & Serv. Corp. v. Duval Motors, 245 So.2d 891 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
508. Durkin v. Morgan, 227 So.2d 231, 232 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
509. Page v. Staley, 226 So.2d 129, 131 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969) (uncontroverted denial of
defendant that he had not uttered slander entitled him to summary judgment).
510. Jenkins v. Graham, 237 So,2d 330, 332 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970). There, the defendant
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troversy regarding that defense sufficient to preclude the granting of a
summary judgment.
Turning to specific areas of the law, it is generally accepted that
issues of negligence are usually not properly disposed of by a summary
judgment. For instance, in Avampato v. Markus,51' a defendant testified
that he had "blacked out" at the time of an accident sued upon and
that he had no prior medical history of this type of disorder. A summary
judgment entered in his favor was reversed by the District Court of
Appeal, Fourth District. The court held that the evidence contained in-
ferences which might indicate prior physical condition which might have
been responsible for the "black out," thus negating the entry of sum-
mary judgment." 2
In Shollenberger v. Baskin,13 a summary judgment was reversed
on the grounds that the testimony of the plaintiff raised conflicting in-
ferences regarding the condition of a ladder which he fell from. Similarly,
in another case dealing with injuries suffered by a spectator struck by
a baseball while sitting in stands behind a backstop, the court held that
while there did not appear to be any substantial conflict in the evi-
dentiary facts, various conclusions were seen to be logically deducible
from the facts which would relate to the ultimate factual issues of negli-
gence, contributory negligence, and assumption of the risk.51 4 The court
consequently reversed a summary judgment which had been granted in
favor of the defendants. Fraud cases, like negligence, are also not gen-
erally subjects of the summary judgment procedure.1 5
While a heavy burden lies with the movant in summary judgment
procedures, the nonmoving party is not without a certain degree of bur-
den also. The nonmovant, for instance, "may not merely assert that an
issue does exist, but he must go forward with evidence sufficient to gen-
erate an issue of material fact . . . ," but this does not require him to
present his entire case.51 6 The nonmovant also cannot raise a factual issue
had raised a defense based upon plaintiff's duty to mitigate damages in a suit on a mechanic's
lien foreclosure. The only evidence put forward by the plaintiff on this point was an affi-
davit stating that he had no knowledge of defendant's financial plight. This was held to be
insufficient, and the summary judgment granted to the plaintiff was reversed.
511. 245 So.2d 676 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
512. It is a well settled proposition that the issue of negligence is not to be deter-
mined on motion for summary judgment where the record suggests a factual issue
or presents circumstances from which a jury might properly draw conflicting infer-
ences. Any doubt as to the propriety of the entry of a summary judgment should
be resolved in favor of the party against whom such summary judgment is sought.
Id. at 678.
513. 227 So.2d 79 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969). See also Cefkin v. Florida Power & Light Co.,
227 So.2d 48 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969) (moving party's failure to conclusively demonstrate
absence of all genuine issues of material fact fatal to validity of summary final judgment).
514. Jackson v. Atlanta Braves, Inc., 227 So.2d 63 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969), cert. dismissed,
237 So.2d 540 (Fla. 1970).
515. Bryant v. Small, 236 So.2d 150 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970) (per curiam). See also Tippett
v. Frank, 238 So.2d 671 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
516. Byrd v. Leach, 226 So.2d 866, 868 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969). "The burden is upon
the moving party to demonstrate the nonexistence of a genuine issue of material fact an
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by merely disagreeing with the facts established by the competent evi-
dence of the moving party, or because he would like a jury to examine
the evidence.517 Finally, the party who is being moved against may not
alter the position of his previously filed pleadings, admissions, affidavits,
depositions, or testimony for the sole purpose of defeating the summary
judgment.51
When a question of law arises in summary judgment proceedings,
it is, of course, determined by the court. For instance, where the ab-
sence of probable cause for arrest was required to be established as a
condition for recovery in an action, the nonexistence of any evidence
on this point on the record and the lack of allegations in the pleadings
will entitle a defendant to a summary judgment regardless of any other
factual disputes." 9 Likewise, in a workmen's compensation action, when
no facts are in dispute, save a determination of whether one of the par-
ties is an "employer" under the law, a question of law is presented for
the court to decide and not a factual question to be determined by a
jury.52° As far as affirmative defenses are concerned, regardless of the
number of defenses put forward and despite the rule requiring the mov-
ing party to refute all affirmative defenses,52" ' if the defenses put for-
ward are legally insufficient, the action is ripe for summary judgment.522
Rule 1.510(c) provides that a motion for summary judgment must
be served at least 20 days prior to the hearing on the motion. In Blatch v.
Wesley, 2 only 18 days had elapsed between the filing of the motion and
the actual hearing. On appeal after the entry of final summary judgment,
the appellant maintained that the judgment was void because of the short-
ened time period. The District Court of Appeal, Third District, did not
agree and held: "The time set for 1.510(c), R.C.P., is not jurisdictional.
It may therefore be waived by a failure to object or move for a continu-
ance.M 24 The obvious point made by the Third District was that reason-
there is no duty on the party moved against to demonstrate the existence of such an issue
until after the movant has satisfied his initial burden." Hurricane Boats, Inc. v. Certified
Ind. Fab., 246 So.2d 174, 175 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
517. Robinson v. Loyola Foundation, Inc., 236 So.2d 154 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1970).
Issues of fact do not arise merely because a party disagrees with the facts established
by competent evidence submitted by the moving party in a summary judgment
proceeding, nor merely because the party moved against would like the opportunity
of having a jury pass upon such facts and make an independent determination as
to the correctness thereof.
Id. at 160.
518. Home Loan Co. v. Sloane Co., 240 So.2d 526 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
519. Starkenstein v. City of Daytona Beach, 229 So.2d 274 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969) (per
curiam). See also Blatch v. Wesley, 238 So.2d 308 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970), cert. denied, 240
So.2d 645 (Fla. 1970) (summary judgment entered because of prior judgment-regardless
of material facts relating to grounds for garnishment).
520. Hamilton v. Shell Oil Co., 233 So.2d 179 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970), cert. denied, 237
So.2d 762 (Fla. 1970).
521. See note 510 supra and accompanying text.
522. Tippett v. Frank, 238 So.2d 671 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
523. 238 So.2d 308 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970), cert. denied, 240 So.2d 645 (Fla. 1970).
524. Id. at 309.
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able notice had been provided even though such notice was two days
shorter than required.
Earlier in 1970, that same court decided Bernard Marko & Associ-
ates, Inc. v. Steele. 2 In that case, the defendant's motion for summary
judgment had been filed at least 20 days prior to the hearing, but during
the hearing one of the co-defendants moved for and was granted leave to
join in the motion without any objections by the plaintiff. The summary
judgment was granted, and the plaintiff appealed on the grounds that there
had been improper notice. The Third District upheld the judgment on
two grounds: first, the plaintiff had not been prejudiced in any way be-
cause the co-defendant was in the same legal position as the moving de-
fendant; and second, the plaintiff had waived any right to object to the
timing or the joinder by failing to object at the time of the hearing. Thus,
it is clear, at least in the Third District, that any objections to the timing
of a motion for summary judgment must be made prior to or at the actual
hearing or they will be waived.
B. Sufficiency of Affidavits
"If the evidence [presented] by affidavit, deposition or otherwise
demonstrates the existence of a genuine issue, summary judgment should
be denied. '5 26 Consequently, the types and contents of those documents
are of critical significance. Rule 1.510(e) prescribes that affidavits must
be based on personal knowledge, must set forth facts which are admissible
in evidence, and must show that the affiant is competent to testify on the
matters contained therein. In addition, any documents referred to in the
affidavit must be attached to it,527 and an affidavit "may not be based upon
factual conclusions or conclusions or law.
'528
The law is clear that the specification in rule 1.510(e) that affidavits
must contain facts reflecting personal knowledge is strictly construed.
Thus, an affidavit which states that the affiant has read a pleading and that
"the allegations contained therein [are] true and correct to the best of
his own personal knowledge and belief . . ." are insufficient and will not
be considered by the court.529
525. 230 So.2d 42 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
526. Byrd v. Leach, 226 So.2d 866, 868 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
527. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.510(e). In Ferris v. Nichols, 245 So.2d 660 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971),
an affidavit was invalidated because a note referred to by the affidavit was not attached
to it, and there was not a sufficient reference in the affidavit to identify the note.
528. Hurricane Boats, Inc. v. Certified Indus. Fab., Inc., 246 So.2d 174, 175 (Fla. 3d
Dist. 1971).
529. Id. In this case, the affidavit was disapproved for three reasons: first, it did not
state that it was made with personal knowledge; second, it did not set forth evidentiary
facts which would be admissible in evidence; and third, there was no statement contained
within it which indicated the competency of the affiant to testify on the points embraced in
the affidavit.
See also Orthwein v. Cobbs Fruit & Preserving Co., 229 So.2d 607 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969)
(affidavit based upon "information and belief" insufficient) ; P & T Elec. Co. v. Spadea, 227
So.2d 234 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969), cert. discharged, 235 So.2d 510 (Fla. 1970) (affidavit based
upon "best information and belief" insufficient).
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A statement that an affidavit was made on personal knowledge is not
always necessary, however. In United Bonding Insurance Co. v. Dura-
Stress, Inc.,530 a corporate officer had executed an affidavit for his em-
ployer-corporation in support of a motion for summary judgment which
did not contain the "personal knowledge" language. On appeal from sum-
mary final judgment, the District Court of Appeal, Second District, re-
jected the appellant's contention that the affidavit was insufficient because
it did not state that it was made on affiant's personal knowledge and did
not delineate the sources of information.
While it is true that the affidavit in question did not specifically
state that it was made on personal knowledge, the facts were
stated positively, and not merely as a matter of belief, or "to the
best of affiant's knowledge and belief." . . . It is generally held
that when an officer of a corporation makes an affidavit in its
behalf, it is not necessary that he should state the sources of his
knowledge, or information and belief.... An officer must be pos-
sessed of the requisite knowledge, but such knowledge on his
part is presumed."'
An affidavit can take many forms. For instance, in Avampato v.
Markus,532 the court had before it an affidavit in deposition form. It
contained a series of leading and suggestive questions posed by the de-
fendant's counsel which were affirmed or denied by the defendant-affiant.
The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, noted the unusual form
of the affidavit, but held that the affidavit was "no more [or] less reliable
than an affidavit written in narrative form, usually by counsel, which is
then read and sworn to by the party whose statement it purports to be. 533
In addition, pursuant to rule 1.510(e), affidavits may be supple-
mented. This provision was interpreted by the District Court of Appeal,
Fourth District, in Ferris v. Nichols,534 to permit the use of a previously
filed deposition in a later summary judgment hearing. In Ferris, a plain-
tiff had filed a motion for summary judgment and a supporting affidavit.
The motion was denied, but several months later, the plaintiff filed another
supplemental affidavit, and the court granted summary final judgment
relying on both affidavits. The Fourth District found no fault in this pro-
cedure and held that it was acceptable to rely both on the earlier document
and its later supplementation since each of the affidavits had been filed
at least 20 days prior to the hearing on the motion.
530. 243 So.2d 244 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
531. Id. at 246.
532. 245 So.2d 676 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
533. Id. at 678 (summary judgment reversed on other grounds). See notes 511-12
supra and accompanying text.
534. 245 So.2d 660 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971) [hereinafter cited as Ferris].
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XIII. MOTIONS FOR NEW TRIAL AND REHEARING
A. Motions for New Trial
1. IN GENERAL
The Florida Rules of Civil Procedure provide that a judge in a jury
action may grant a motion for new trial on some or all of the issues tried.
Likewise, in a non-jury action, the judge may open the final judgment,
take additional testimony, and enter a new final judgment. Both of these
provisions are conditioned upon action being taken within 10 days of the
entry of final judgment.585
535. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.530.
Exactly what constitutes a final judgment often poses problems. For instance, in Con-
boy v. City of Naples, 226 So.2d 108 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969), cert. denied, 234 So.2d 117 (Fla.
1969), 400 U.S. 825 (1970), a class action was brought by a taxpayer against two corpo-
rations (among others) which allegedly were not bearing their fair share of the tax burden.
Between the second and third day of trial (divided by a two month hiatus), one of the
defendants moved for and was granted a directed verdict. The trial then continued as to
the other defendant, and six months later a final judgment was entered in favor of the
remaining defendants. The plaintiff took an appeal against all the defendants, and the de-
fendant which had been victorious early in the litigation argued that final judgment as far
as it was concerned had occurred at the time the verdict was directed in its favor, irre-
spective of that date of final judgment against the other defendants. The District Court of
Appeal, Second District, agreed with the disgruntled defendant and noted that:
The general rule is that where suit is against several defendants, jointly liable,
disposition of the cause as to some of them with no determination as to the others
is not final . . . . However, as was approved by the Supreme Court of Florida in
the Hillsboro Plantation case, supra, "a judgment affecting one but not all of
multiple defendants where the claim adjudicated is separable from and collateral
to rights asserted in the action" the judgment is final.
Id. at 110, citing Hillsboro Plantation v. Plunkett, 55 So.2d 534, 535 (Fla. 1951) [herein-
after cited as Hillsboro].
In another case touching upon Hillsboro, the Supreme Court of Florida overturned a
District Court of Appeal, Second District, order dismissing an appeal as not timely filed.
Rice v. Doyle, 232 So.2d 163 (Fla. 1970), rev'g 223 So.2d 783 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969) [here-
inafter cited as Rice]. In Rice, a plaintiff had instituted an action against two codefendants
for personal injuries arising out of an automobile mishap. The plaintiff was granted a partial
summary judgment on liability, and after a trial on damages was conducted, final judgment
was entered. One of the codefendants moved for a new trial, but the trial court denied the
motion. Within 30 days after the denial of codefendant Booker's motion, codefendant Rice
filed notice of appeal. The Second District held that her appeal time ran from the date of
the rendition of the final judgment, not from the date of the denial of the new trial motion.
The supreme court disagreed.
In order to properly reason that the definition of "final" judgment as set forth
in the Hillsboro Plantation case applies under the present facts to warrant a similar
designation of the instant judgment insofar as it pertains to Petitioner, it must first
be demonstrated that the motion for new trial filed by Petitioner's codefendant did
not raise any issues which could possibly affect the result of the litigation as be-
tween Petitioner and Respondent.
In the present case, by virtue of codefendant Booker's motion for new trial,
the trial court was charged with the task of testing the verdict against the suffi-
ciency of the evidence. Discharge of this task could have entailed ascertaining
whether the damages awarded were supported by the evidence, a judicial consid-
eration which under the verdict and judgment here involved necessarily would
affect the litigation as it related to all the parties. Thus, in the present case, we
do not have a situation where the litigation as between Petitioner and Respondent
is placed in repose and thereby rendered immune to any future judicial labor of
the trial court acting on the motion for new trial. Accordingly, the motion for new
trial filed by codefendant Booker destroyed the finality of the judgment . . . both
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The three most prevalent grounds for a new trial in a jury action are:
first, the verdict was contrary to the law or weight of the evidence,"'
second, the jury was improperly influenced for one reason or another dur-
ing the course of the litigation;'" and third, the damage verdict was in-
adequate or insufficient. 38 For a court to grant a new trial on the first
ground, "requires more than a cursory disposition ... that 'the verdict is
contrary to the evidence.' "'9 The order granting the new trial must set
forth the grounds giving rise to its order with specificity, or they must
clearly appear from the record.
Likewise, it is not sufficient for a trial judge who grants a new trial
on the grounds of improper jury considerations to find that "the verdict
reached by the jury in the light of the evidence clearly indicates ..."
improper influences.5"' Such a finding is merely the opinion of the court
and will not be afforded any weight on appeal. Of course,
[a] new trial may be required under certain circumstances as a
matter of public policy for the purpose of maintaining confi-
dence in the integrity of jury trials, but such relief will ordinarily
be denied where the act or conduct complained of does not, in the
opinion of the trial court, threaten the integrity of the jury or
verdict or public confidence in trial by jury in any serious
sense.
541
as to Booker and Petitioner and said judgment was not appealable by any of the
parties until disposition of the motion for new trial.
Id. at 165. As regards the possibility that a defendant, satisfied with the judgment, might
be unfairly prejudiced by having to wait for the end to a codefendant's exercise of rights
under rules 1.530 and 1.540 the, supreme court added:
We do not foresee that by constructing such a judgment as not final for purpose of
appeal we have in any way jeopardized the prerogative of a nonmoving defendant
party to accept satisfaction of a judgment. Such a party could easily inform the
trial court of his satisfaction with the prior judgment and his desire not to join
in the motion for new trial. Under F.R.C.P. 1.530(a), 31 F.S.A. the trial court is
empowered to grant a new trial to all or any of the parties and on all or a part
of the issues. A motion to invoke the authority conferred under this rule would in
most cases suffice to protect the exercise of such a privilege by a satisfied party.
Id.
536. See generally Hodge v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 234 So.2d 645 (Fla. 1970)
[cert. denied, 400 U.S. 904 (1971)], rev'g in part 222 So.2d 483 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969);
Archer-Daniels-Midland Co. v. A & P Bakery Sup. & Equip. Co., 240 So.2d 73 (Fla.
3d Dist. 1970), cert. denied, 244 So.2d 432 (Fla. 1971); Fletcher Co. v. Melroe Mfg. Co.,
238 So.2d 142 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970), cert. denied, 242 So.2d 463 (Fla. 1970); Ratner v.
Pressman, 235 So.2d 547 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
537. See notes 540-43 infra and accompanying text.
538. See notes 544-61 infra and accompanying text.
539. Hodge v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 234 So.2d 645, 647 (Fla. 1970) [cert. denied,
400 U.S. 904 (1971)], rev'g in part, 222 So.2d 483 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969); citing Cloud v.
Fallis, 110 So.2d 669 (Fla. 1959), aff'g 107 So.2d 264 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1958). The supreme
court in this case disapproved of the court's approach of assuming proper grounds by the
trial court when they were not stated in the order nor demonstrated in the record.
540. Sutton v. Gomez, 234 So.2d 725, 727 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
541. Snelling v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 236 So.2d 465, 466 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970). See also
(for the same identical opinion) Flowers v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 237 So.2d 803 (Fla. 1st
Dist. 1970); Wood v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 237 So.2d 801 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970); Shad v.
Florida E. Coast Ry., 236 So.2d 477 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
1972]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVI
Thus, a trial judge did not act improperly in refusing to grant a new trial
where two jurors drove past an accident site, but claimed that they did
not do so to get a better insight into a case, and where another juror was
found to have lied when asked on voir dire if he had any relatives who
were employed by insurance companies.542 Thus, it can be seen that to
justify the granting of a new trial on the grounds of improper jury influ-
ence, it is necessary to demonstrate that there were improprieties giving
rise to the undue influence, and that there was sufficient prejudice caused
to warrant this remedy. 543
2. ADEQUACY OF THE VERDICT
One area which clearly merges the rules regarding verdicts based
upon improper jury influence and verdicts against the manifest weight
of the evidence is an attack on the adequacy of a jury's award. In Griffis v.
Hill,544 the Supreme Court of Florida reviewed four prior decisions touch-
ing upon the granting of a new trial because of an inadequate award of
damages.545 In one of these cases, Shaw v. Puleo,141 the court had formu-
lated a test which required a showing that
the verdict was induced by prejudice or passion, some miscon-
ception of the law or the evidence or .. .that the jury did not
consider all of the elements of damage involved, missed a con-
sideration of the issues submitted or failed to discharge their
duty as given them by the court's charge.547
Six months later in City of Miami v. Smith, 48 the supreme court reiterated
the language of Puleo and quashed a district court of appeal ruling which
had held that it was unreasonable to assume that a jury had considered
damages for pain and suffering when the verdict returned was the exact
amount of the medical expenses claimed. The court held that "absent a
542. Snelling v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 236 So.2d 465 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
543. An improper jury instruction regarding the law, when recognized by a judge, may
be sufficient to warrant the granting of a new trial. Such an error fulfills the requisites of
the law as set forth in Cloud v. Fallis, 110 So.2d 669 (Fla. 1959), aff'g 107 So.2d 264
(Fla. 2d Dist. 1958): first, that the jury did not reach a substantially just conclusion; and
second, that it appeared to the judge from first hand observation of the jury and witnesses
that the jury was influenced by erroneous considerations. See Pepin v. Retail Disc. Ass'n,
Inc., 226 So.2d 145 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969). See also Webster v. Harmon, 240 So.2d 69, 70
(Fla. 4th 1970), cert. denied, 245 So.2d 631 (Fla. 1971), where the court stated that
"[a] motion for new trial may be granted where it is shown that the jury misconceived
the law or the evidence or did not consider all elements of damage."
544. 230 So.2d 143 (Fla. 1970), quashing 217 So.2d 358 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969) [herein-
after cited as Griffis].
545. Roberts v. Bushore, 182 So.2d 401 (Fla. 1966); Hayes v. Hatchell, 166 So.2d 146
(Fla. 1964); City of Miami v. Smith, 165 So.2d 748 (Fla. 1964); and Shaw v. Puleo, 159
So.2d 641 (Fla. 1964).
546. 159 So.2d 641 (Fla. 1964) [hereinafter cited as Puleo].
547. Id. at 644, citing Radiant Oil Co. v. Herring, 146 Fla. 154, 157, 200 So. 376, 378
(1941).
548. 165 So.2d 748 (Fla. 1964) [hereinafter cited as Smith].
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showing of vitiating circumstances such as were enumerated in the Radiant
Oil case [set forth in Puleo], . . . we must assume that the jury considered
all elements of damage." '49 Thus, the trial court's refusal to grant a new
trial was affirmed. Two weeks later, in a per curiam opinion, the court
reaffirmed its holding in Smith."10
In 1966, the supreme court appeared to modify its position on the
question, when it stated:
Our decisions in the three cases [Puleo, Smith and Hayes] were
not intended to indirectly preclude a review by the District
Courts of verdicts challenged for inadequacy. We reiterate that
a verdict for grossly inadequate damages stands on the same
ground as a verdict for excessive or extravagant damages and
that a new trial may be as readily granted in the one case as the
other. Moreover, we did not mean by the language employed in
any of our prior decisions or the results therein that neither the
trial court nor the District Court is precluded from disturbing a
verdict which as an end result is so grossly inadequate that it
shocks the conscience of the Court. 5
However, on remand, the District Court of Appeal, First District, stated
that it had re-examined the evidence in light of the high court's mandate,
but reaffirmed its decision on the grounds that "so long as the decisions of
the Supreme Court in ... [Puleo, Smith and Hayes] remain the law of
the land, the judgment appealed in this case must be affirmed."
'552
To relieve the confusion caused by Roberts and its previous three
decisions, the court handed down Griffis, wherein a District Court of Ap-
peal, First District, ruling which denied a new trial motion on the grounds
of adequacy of damages was reversed on the authority of Smith and
Puleo.555
The test to be applied in determining the adequacy of a
verdict is whether a jury of reasonable men could have returned
that verdict. This test is simply stated but may be difficult to
apply in a particular case. We are aware of the difficulties and
frustrations courts experience in the search for the mythical jury
of reasonable men. The appellate court must be ever alert against
the temptation to substitute its "verdict" for that of the jury. On
the other hand, we must not refuse to act to relieve the injustice
of either a grossly inadequate or excessive verdict.
To the extent that this Court's decision in Roberts or our
holding herein are inconsistent with the decisions in Shaw, Hayes
and Smith, these latter decisions are modified. 54
549. Id. at 750.
550. Hayes v. Hatchell, 166 So.2d 146 (Fla. 1964) [hereinafter cited as Hayes].
551. Roberts v. Bushore, 182 So.2d 401, 402 (Fla. 1966) [hereinafter cited as Roberts].
552. Roberts v. Bushore, 183 So.2d 708, 711 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1966).
553. Griffis v. Hill, 230 So.2d 143 (Fla. 1969), quashing 217 So.2d 358 (Fla. 1st Dist.
1968).
554. Id. at 145. See Sebold v. Bushman, 230 So.2d 198 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970), which
reiterated this rule.
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The test of reasonableness, though, often poses a problem. It is clear,
for instance, that a jury does not have to return a verdict which reflects
the total amount requested by a plaintiff, but "there must be some ration-
ale in the amount assessed by the jury . . . .'Il5 Consequently, where a
jury was instructed that the measure of damages in an action, if granted,
would be the difference between the value of property immediately before
and immediately after a fire, and uncontroverted testimony was presented
which set those two figures at $25,000-26,000 and $10,000 respectively
and established other damage in the amount of $7,000, there could be no
rationale basis to support a verdict of $8,500 returned by a jury.
55
6
When a judge grants a new trial because of an excessive verdict, a
party contesting that determination on appeal has the burden of over-
coming a strong presumption that the judge was correct. Indeed, to meet
this burden, it must be demonstrated from the record "that the trial judge
greatly abused his discretion." '557 However, "the trial judge does not sit
as a seventh juror with veto power.'' s In Laskey v. Smith,550 a trial judge
had given a party the alternative of accepting a remittitur of $21,200 or
a new trial in a wrongful death action of an infant. The District Court
of Appeal, Fourth District, rejected this alternative and reinstated the
verdict.5 60 On certiorari review, the supreme court affirmed.
A jury's determination of damage is reviewable by the trial
judge on precisely the same principles as govern his superinten-
dence of determinations of liability .... The record must affirma-
tively show the impropriety of the verdict or there must be an
independent determination by the trial judge that the jury was
influenced by considerations outside the record.
.. . His setting aside a verdict must be supported by the
record, as in Cloud v. Fallis, Fla. 1959, 110 So.2d 669, or by
findings reasonably amenable to judicial review. Not every ver-
555. Dybalski v. Nichols, 227 So.2d 510, 512 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969).
556. The plaintiff's evidence was not even questioned by the defendants insofar as
the reasonableness of the repairs-the costs thereof, or the necessity therefor....
Therefore, the jury had only the testimony of the plaintiffs and their building
contractor to fix the value of damages. While it is true that a jury does not have
to assess damages in the total prayed for or testified to by the plaintiff, there must
be some rationale in the amount assessed by the jury and where it appears that
the jury not only believed the plaintiff's claims to be inaccurate and excessive, but
so completely disregarded all the uncontroverted testimony as to actual damage,
it brings us to the conclusion that the verdict must have been the result of mistake,
misapprehension, or some other reason de hors the evidence.
Id. at 512. The trial court's order denying a motion for a new trial was subsequently
quashed, and the cause remanded for a new trial on the question of damages only.
557. Materials of Miami, Inc. v. Matthews, 227 So.2d 524, 525 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969),
cert. denied, 237 So.2d 178 (Fla. 1970). In this case, the trial judge found that the evidence
relating to damages was speculative.
558. Laskey v. Smith, 239 So.2d 13, 14 (Fla. 1970), aff'g 222 So.2d 773 (Fla. 4th Dist.
1969).
559. 239 So.2d 13 (Fla. 1970), aff'g 222 So.2d 773 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
560. Smith v. Laskey, 222 So.2d 773 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
1972] CIVIL PROCEDURE
dict which raises a judicial eyebrow should shock the judicial
conscience.
In its movement toward constancy of principle, the law
must permit a reasonable latitude for inconstancy of result in the
performance of juries. The trial judge's review of that perfor-
mance is likewise sustainable within a broad range provided that
the record or findings of influence outside it support his determi-
nation.561
3. JUDICIAL DISCRETION
A motion for new trial, if granted, is immediately reviewable by
appeal without waiting until the rendition of a final judgment.6 2 However,
"[i] t is a long settled rule that the discretion allowed ... a trial judge in
the granting of new trials is a very broad and liberal one."563 The appel-
late courts, though, may review the record, "for the purpose of ascertain-
ing whether the exercise of judicial discretion . . .has been abused." '564 If
there has been an abuse, the appellate court will set the order aside. This
same exercise of discretion is afforded a court when it reopens a case to
allow additional testimony and other evidence to be presented.56 5 On the
other hand, when a new trial is granted, and a question of law is involved,
the breadth of judicial discretion is not as broad. In fact, in the words
of the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, it is "drastically
reduced." '566
561. Laskey v. Smith, 239 So.2d 13, 14 (Fla. 1970).
562. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-316, amending FLA. STAT. § 59.04 (1969).
563. Ratner v. Pressman, 235 So.2d 547, 548 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970) (per curiam). See
Fletcher Co. v. Melroe Mfg. Co., 238 So.2d 142 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970), cert. denied, 242
So.2d 463 (Fla. 1970) ; Stopko v. Farrington, 235 So.2d 28 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970) ; Kowalski
v. Wilder, 233 So.2d 159 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
564. Stopko v. Farrington, 235 So.2d 28, 29 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970), quoting Russo v.
Clark, 147 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1962).
565. See, e.g., Hudson Pulp & Paper Corp. v. Futch, 232 So.2d 763 (Fla. 1st Dist.
1969).
566. Smith v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 232 So.2d 195, 197 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970). See
Wheeler v. Nelson, 229 So.2d 11 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969), cert. denied, 237 So.2d 533 (Fla. 1970).
See also Archer-Daniels-Midland Co. v. A & P Bakery Sup. & Equip. Co., 240 So.2d 73,
75 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970), cert. denied, 244 So.2d 432 (Fla. 1971), where it was stated:
Appellate courts are reluctant to reverse orders granting new trials. Neverthe-
less, as pointed out in Nunberg v. Brodsky, ... there is a difference between cases
in which the trial court grants a new trial because of a finding that the verdict
is against the manifest weight of the evidence and those cases in which the trial
court finds that it must grant a new trial because of an error it considers it has
made. In the first instance the trial court is acting upon an evidentiary question,
in the second, the question is one of law. The function of a motion for new trial
where a party claims it was aggrieved by the rulings of the trial court is to fur-
nish an opportunity for the trial court to correct its own errors, if any ...
Implicit in this rule is the rule that a new trial should not be granted on the
basis of a ruling which was free from error.
In that case, a trial judge had refused a motion for continuance (See notes 454-55 supra and
accompanying text), and after trial had granted a new trial motion because of an error the
judge saw in his denial of the continuance. The appellate court found the denial of the
continuance proper and struck down the new trial order.
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Generally speaking, "[a] stronger showing is required to reverse an
order granting a new trial than to reverse one denying it."5 ' But, the
rules prescribing time limits under rule 1.530 are strictly observed, and
a court may not grant a new trial after the 10 day period has run for filing
such motions.568
B. Motions for Rehearing
In non-jury actions, upon a motion for rehearing, a judge may open
the final judgment under certain circumstances.569 In Scott v. Cummings,57
an assault and battery action, the trial judge entered a final judgment in
the amount of $960.00, but later increased it to $4,000.00 on the grounds
that he had failed to consider pain and suffering in setting the judgment.
On appeal, the appellant claimed that the court could not open a judgment
pursuant to rule 1.530(a) unless additional testimony was taken. The
District Court of Appeal, First District, affirmed the trial judge's action
and cited the following rule:
"In a court action . . . there will be many times when proper
relief may be accorded by something far less than actual new
trial, such as the taking of additional testimony, the amendment
of the findings of fact, conclusions of law, or the judgment."57
However, this provision encompassed only permanent judgments entered
by the court and not interlocutory orders. Thus, a motion for rehearing
directed to the denial of a motion to dismiss for improper venue is not
authorized by the rules of practice, and the filing of such a motion will
consequently be insufficient to toll the time period for an interlocutory
appeal.5 72
An order entering final summary judgment in an action cannot be
reviewed after ten days have passed according to a recent case decided by
the Supreme Court of Florida. In Shelby Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Pearson,57 3 an insured had brought action against his insurer for an
alleged breach of duty to exercise good faith. The defendant insurer filed
for and was granted summary final judgment, and the plaintiff filed a
timely motion for rehearing pursuant to rule 1.530(a). Three days later
the court denied plaintiff's petition. Thirty-two days after the entry of final
judgment, the plaintiff filed a "Motion for Reconsideration" petitioning
the court to reconsider the merits of the petition for rehearing. Eleven
days later the court set aside its final order and its order denying plaintiff's
petition for rehearing and reinstated the action. In order to protect his
567. Wheeler v. Nelson, 229 So.2d 11, 12 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969), cert. denied, 237 So.2d
533 (Fla. 1970). See also Zabner v. Howard Johnson's Inc., 227 So.2d 543 (Fla. 4th Dist.
1969).
568. See, e.g., Allen v. Allen, 230 So.2d 29 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1969).
569. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.530(a).
570. 238 So.2d 449 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
571. Id. at 450, quoting Pensacola Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Costa, 195 So.2d 250, 253
(Fla. 1st Dist. 1967) (emphasis added).
572. Home News Pub. Co. v. U-M Pub. Co., 246 So.2d 117 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
573. 236 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1970).
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interests in the event the trial court's order was invalid, the plaintiff filed
a timely "Notice of Appeal from the Summary Final Judgment" and
from the denial of the petition for rehearing. Assignments and cross-
assignments of error were filed by both parties. Plaintiff then filed a
"Suggestion of Lack of Jurisdiction," which claimed that the district court
of appeal was without jurisdiction to consider the case since final judgment
had been set aside. The District Court of Appeal, Third District, subse-
quently dismissed the appeal 74 in purported reliance upon Floyd v. State
ex rel. La Vigne Electric Co.
5 7 5
On petition for writ of mandamus to reinstate the appeal, the supreme
court reversed the dismissal and ordered the Third District to quash the
trial court's order reinstating the plaintiff's action and to consider plaintiff's
appeal from summary final judgment for proper disposition. The supreme
court held that the Third District had incorrectly relied on Floyd since
that decision had been handed down prior to the adoption of a rule for
reconsideration of the entry of summary final judgments. Now, according
to the court, there are specific provisions under rule 1.530 "for correction
of error by the trial court ... within ten days after rendition of judgment
or order. Unless a proper motion or petition is filed within the allotted
time, the judgment or order of the trial court becomes absolute." '576 Thus,
the trial court loses jurisdiction over the cause after that period has run
in the absence of a timely filed motion. In so holding, the high court ex-
pressly rejected the plaintiff's contention that the trial court retained
jurisdiction until the time for filing a Notice of Appeal had run.577 Thus,
it is clear that reconsideration of summary final judgments is governed by
the provisions of rule 1.530, and that after the 10 day period for filing of
petitions for rehearing have run, the trial court irrevocably loses jurisdic-
tion over the action.
XIV. RELIEF FROM JUDGMENTS, DECREES, OR ORDERS
A. Clerical Mistakes of the Court
Rule 1.540 provides for relief from final judgments, decrees, or orders
caused by oversights by the court"'8 (or by the parties) .17 Errors made
574. Cloud v. Shelby Mutual Ins. Co., 227 So.2d 911 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
575. 139 So.2d 873 (Fla. 1962) [hereinafter cited as Floyd].
576. Shelby Mutual Ins. Co. v. Pearson, 236 So.2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1970). The period of
time set forth by FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.530 is ten days from entry of the final order. It should
be noted that the court specifically denied that FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.540 applied in this case,
and that the longer periods for modification (in some cases, up to one year) did not apply.
No argument has been made that the trial court here has acted on the "Motion
for Re-consideration" under the provision of Florida Rule of Civil Procedure
1.540, allowing relief from judgments, decree or orders for clerical mistakes or
other reasons listed in Section "b" thereof. Indeed this rule was not intended to
cover the situation at bar where the trial court reconsidered the legal propriety
of the previously entered summary judgment.
Id. at 4.
577. "The argument that the time in which an appeal must be taken has anything to
do with the jurisdiction of the trial court is without merit." Id.
578. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.540(a).
579. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.540(b). See section XIV, B, infra.
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by the court, pursuant to rule 1.540(a), "may be corrected... at any time
on its own initiative or on the motion of any party. .. ." If an appeal has
been taken, though, the court may only act until such time as the appeal
record is docketed with the appellate tribunal at which time the appeals
court acquires sole jurisdiction for such review.580
The root evil that rule 1.540(a) is directed towards is mistake. But,
as the District Court of Appeal, Second District, noted in Fatolitis v.
Fatolitis,58' only a clerical mistake is reviewable under 1.540(a) and not a
mistake of law.582 In Fatolitis, a court had dismissed with prejudice a
plaintiff's complaint for divorce and dismissed without prejudice the defen-
dant's counterclaim for separate maintenance. In its final order, though,
the court inadvertently failed to retain jurisdiction over the parties for the
purpose of awarding attorney's fees to the defendant. Two months later,
on defendant's motion, the court reopened the case and awarded attorney's
fees to the defendant. In so doing, the court rejected plaintiff's motion to
strike and based its ruling upon the fact that inadvertence had caused the
court to lose jurisdiction; that the court had intended to award attorney's
fees later; and that the parties were aware at the time of the entry of the
dismissal of the court's intention to do so. The Second District approved
this correction under the authority of rule 1.540(a). One month later,
that same court approved a similar correction where a trial judge mis-
takenly dismissed one of two consolidated actions, even though the rein-
statement of the dismissed action was effected more than two years
later.583
B. "Mistakes" of the Parties
Rule 1.540(b)(1)-(3) provides that a judgment may be set aside
within one year because of "(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excus-
able neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could
not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial or rehearing;
[and] (3) fraud (whether ... intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or
other misconduct of an adverse party . . . ." No time limit, though, will
bar a court from setting aside a judgment which is void; "has been satis-
fied, released or discharged ... ;" or is based upon a prior decree or
judgment which has been reversed, or otherwise vacated, or can no longer
be held to be prospectively equitable.584
The filing of a rule 1.540(b) motion will not suspend or affect the
finality of a previously entered final judgment, and the existence of the
remedy does not deprive any court from entertaining "an independent
580. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.540(a).
581. 247 So.2d 525 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
582. A mistake of law is not correctable pursuant to FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.540(a). See
Constant v. Tillitson, 214 So.2d 91, 93 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968), cited in Fatolitis v. Fatolitis,
247 So.2d 525, 525-526 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
583. State ex rel. Florida Dept. of Transportation v. Hall, 247 So.2d 777 (Fla. 2d
Dist. 1971).
584. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.540(b)(4)-(5).
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action to relieve a party from a judgment, decree, order or proceeding or
to set aside a judgment or decree for fraud upon the court." '585 A trial
court may not, however, set aside a summary final judgment pursuant to
any provision of rule 1.540(b) after a hearing has been held and disposed
of under the provisions of rule 1.530.586
In determining a motion to set aside a judgment, both questions of law
and fact arise. It has been suggested that the factual questions presented
by such motions ought to be submitted to a jury for determination. In two
recent cases, though, the District Court of Appeal, Third District, has
flatly rejected that contention. 587 In Fagan v. Powell, 8 the appellant
argued that since rule 1.540 was a substitute for the common law writ of
coram nobis which provided for jury determination of factual issues, and
since this "right existed at the time of the adoption of the Constitution
of the State of Florida, it ... [could not] be abrogated by the portion of
Rule 1.540(b) that abolishes writs of coram nobis.
'5 9
After reviewing and distinguishing three decisions from other juris-
dictions which were cited by the appellants as standing for the position
they espoused,59 the Third District disagreed with the fourth case cited,
an Arizona decision.59' The court held that there was no right to a jury
determination of the factual issues presented in a motion to set aside a
judgment pursuant to rule 1.540; the factual findings were to be made
only by the court. Three reasons were furnished as supporting this hold-
ing: (1) "trying by jury the factual issues raised by a motion to vacate
has unsatisfactory results and should be avoided because it would intro-
duce needless confusion and uncertainty... ; M92 (2) the very language of
rule 1.540(b) indicates that such factual determinations are solely within
the court's province,5 93 and (3)
the rule that relief under Rule 1.540 is to be granted at the dis-
cretion of the court and cannot be invoked as a matter of right
[citations omitted] is an implied declaration that it would be an
585. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.540(b).
586. See notes 573-77 supra, authorities cited therein, and accompanying text.
587. Fagan v. Powell, 237 So.2d 579 (Fla. 3d Dist.), appeal dismissed, 239 So.2d 826
(Fla. 1970), See also Outler v. Berman, 234 So.2d 724 (Fla. 3d Dist.), cert. denied,
238 So.2d 430 (Fla. 1970).
588. 237 So.2d 579 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
589. Id. at 580-81. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.540(b) provides that "[wirits of coram nobis
. . . are abolished and the procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment or decree
shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action."
590. See Fagan v. Powell, j37 So.2d 579, 581 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
591. Preston v. Denkins, 94 Ariz. 214, 382 P.2d 686 (1963) (right to have a jury
determination of factual issues in an equitable action to vacate a judgment). The Third
District did not pass on the question of an equitable action to vacate a judgment, but
rather rejected the Arizona court's reasoning as it might be applied to the facts in Fagan.
See Fagan v. Powell, 237 So.2d 579, 581 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
592. Id., citing 7 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 60.28[31, at 329 (2d ed. 1970).
593. "'On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party * * *
from a final judgment * * *.'" Fagan v. Powell, 237 So.2d 579, 581 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970),
citing FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.540(b) (emphasis supplied by court).
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improper infringement of a court's power to require the court to
have a jury resolve the factual issues raised by a motion for relief
and, in effect, have the jury determine whether the movant is
entitled to relief. 94
After a court has ruled on both the factual and legal questions
involved in a rule 1.540 motion and entered an order, the proper avenue
of review is by direct appeal and not by writ of certiorari. 95 However,
such an appeal will be limited to a review only of the propriety of the
denial of the motion.590 Consequently, the appeal of an unfavorable rule
1.540 order cannot be used to attack a judgment itself in an attempt to
cure a failure to timely file an appeal after final judgment.
As a general rule, once a plaintiff voluntarily dismisses an action, the
court loses jurisdiction of the case,597 and a defendant is thus powerless to
attack that dismissal by resort to rule 1.540. However, in a suit involving
multiple defendants with a voluntary dismissal entered against fewer than
all, the District Court of Appeal, Third District, has suggested that a
court may have the power to set aside a dismissal through a procedural
maneuver.
59 8
In Cooper v. Carroll,99 the Third District was reviewing a lower
court case where a plaintiff had filed a notice of dismissal against all
defendants pursuant to rule 1.420(a). Shortly afterwards, however, the
plaintiff successfully moved the trial court to set aside his notice of volun-
tary dismissal and allow the filing of an amended notice of dismissal
against only one of the defendants. On appeal, as previously discussed, °0
the Third District held that rule 1.540 applied to a "proceeding," and that
a voluntary dismissal was a proceeding contemplated under the rule. (In
so holding, the Third District set down a rule at variance with a later
decision of the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District). 6°1
In addition, however, Judge Carroll, speaking for a unanimous court,
594. Fagan v. Powell, 237 So.2d 579, 581 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970). The court disposed of
the appellant's argument regarding coram nobis when it stated:
The clear language of Rule 1.540 shows it is not a substitute for anything but is
a new and radical change in the procedure which the court may upon the proof
of certain facts to its satisfaction vacate its own judgment. The fact that the rule
abolished the writ of error coram nobis as a means for obtaining the relief out-
lined in Rule 1.540 does not constitute the rule a substitute for the writ.
Id.
595. Bland v. Mitchell, 245 So.2d 47 (Fla.), aff'g 231 So.2d 224 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970);
approving Rogers v. First National Bank, 223 So.2d 365 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969); Frank v.
Amara, 235 So.2d 537 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970), overruling in part Bursten v. Cooper, 127
So.2d 134 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961). See also Reizen v. Florida National Bank, 237 So.2d 30
(Fla. 1st Dist. 1970). According to Bland, FLA. R. App. P. 4.2(a) compels this conclusion.
596. Bland v. Mitchell, 245 So.2d 47 (Fla. 1970).
597. See section VIII, A, supra.
598. See Cooper v. Carroll, 239 So.2d 511 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970). See also notes 422-24
supra and accompanying text.
599. 239 So.2d 511 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
600. See note 422 supra and accompanying text.
601. Rich Motors, Inc. v. Loyd Cole Produce Express, Inc., 244 So.2d 526 (Fla. 4th
Dist. 1970). See notes 419-421 supra and accompanying text.
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held that "the rule relating to dismissal by notice filed by a plaintiff
refers to dismissal of 'an action,' and does not appear to authorize dis-
missal... as to one or more defendants without dismissal as to all defen-
dants. 6 °2 Consequently, it was held that the only proper method to be
employed by a plaintiff who wishes to dismiss an action against one of
many defendants without dismissing all defendants was by motion and
leave of court pursuant to rule 1.25 0.03 In the case before it, the court
viewed this condition as having been met by the trial court's order allow-
ing the "amended notice of dismissal." It may well be argued that this
ruling allows parties defendant to attack a plaintiff's ability to dismiss
another party defendant, when such a dismissal would be prejudicial to
that nondismissed party (if time is needed, for instance, to move for leave
of court to file a cross claim after the time under the appropriate rule has
run).
The greatest number of decisions handed down over the last two years
which involved rule 1.540(b) have dealt with setting aside verdicts due to
"mistake, inadvertance, surprise or excusable neglect."604 Three of the
cases reported which allowed a judgment to be set aside involved "notice"
insufficiency. In Rogers v. First National Bank,'" the Supreme Court of
Florida ordered that a judgment be set aside after the trial and appellate
courts had refused to do so. There, a plaintiff had been represented by an
attorney who had filed a faulty complaint and had been given, by order of
court (and later by stipulation), three weeks to amend. During this period,
the plaintiff's law firm dissolved, and the case was assigned to an associate
of a former partner who later discovered that a motion to vacate the
complaint had been filed and approved by the court, although no notice
had been served on the attorney. After a spate of procedural motions and
rulings, the trial court refused to set aside the judgment with the approval
of the Fourth District. In reversing, the supreme court focused on the
lack of notice.
When viewed in its totality, the series of events that transpired
below call for a liberal application of Rule 1.540(b), especially
since it appears that the rules for notice were not complied with.
While our procedural rules provide for an orderly and expedi-
tious administration of justice, we must take care to administer
them in a manner conducive to the ends of justice.60
A similar result was reached by the District Court of Appeal, First
602. Cooper v. Carroll, 239 So.2d 511, 513 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
603. Id. See Scott v. Permacrete, Inc., 124 So.2d 887, 889 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1960), cited in
Cooper v. Carroll, 239 So.2d 511, 513 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970), where it was stated:
The proper method of dropping parties defendant from a suit is to move for and
procure an order of court dismissing the complaint as to the designated defendant.
or defendants ....
604. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.540(b)(1).
605. 232 So.2d 377 (Fla. 1970), rev'g 223 So.2d 365 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
606. Id. at 378.
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District, in Woldarsky v. Woldarsky,60 7 where a party, who had not re-
ceived a copy of a judgment, moved to have a final decree set aside and
reentered so that he could take a timely appeal. Once the judgment had
been reentered, the successful movant presented the court with a timely-
filed motion for a new trial. The trial court then vacated the reentered
judgment and ruled that it had been without jurisdiction to enter same in
the first place. An appeal was taken; the First District reversed: "It is our
view that under the cited rule [1.540(b)], a trial court is vested with
discretion to grant relief to a party desiring to seek review of a final judg-
ment. . . , the rendition of which the party was without notice or knowl-
edge."60 8 The court, in analogizing Florida's rule to rule 60(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, made it clear, though, that the primary
factor in its decision was the lack of notice.609
Both Rogers and Woldarsky emphasized by implication that their
holdings were not based on attorney neglect, but that distinction was not
emphatically underscored in either case. However, the District Court of
Appeal, Third District, drove the point home concisely in a 1969 deci-
sion.61 In that case, the appellant had turned process over to his insurance
carrier under the terms of the policy. The insurer did not defend, and
default and default judgment were entered. When presented with a motion
by a defendant based upon good faith reliance upon the insurer providing
a defense and no notice of the trial on damages, the trial judge set aside the
default and the final judgment. On appeal, the Third District reversed the
order setting aside the default, affirmed the order setting aside the final
judgment, and ordered that a trial on damages be held. The court ex-
plained: "[M] isplaced reliance upon an insurance company for ... timely
defense is not excusable neglect by a defendant within the meaning of Rule
1.540(b) ... , [b]ut a different situation exists as to the setting aside of
the final judgment.. ."I" (since there had been no notice of the trial on
damages as required by the rules).
It is also clear that judgments are not to be set aside lightly because
of artfully drawn affidavits. "[A] petition containing only a naked con-
clusion that there has been a 'misunderstanding,' mistake, inadvertance,
or excusable neglect which is totally unsupported by evidence or proof of
facts is insufficient as a basis for the court to relieve a party from a final
judgment ... ."612
607. 243 So.2d 629 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
608. Id. at 630.
609. Care should be taken to note that our approval of vacating and setting aside
final judgments under Rule 1.540(b) on the grounds of mistake, inadvertance or
excusable neglect, in the context of this case, is restricted to those instances wherein
the party seeking to review a final judgment. or order had no notice or knowledge
of its rendition.
Id.
610. Lawn v. Wasserman, 226 So.2d 261 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969), rev'd on other grounds,
248 So.2d 548 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
611. Id. at 263. For an identical holding, see Osceola Farms Co. v. Sanchez, 238 So.2d
477 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
612. In re Estate of Ashton, 245 So.2d 674, 676 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971). In Ashton, the
CIVIL PROCEDURE
According to rule 1.540(b) (2), a judgment may be set aside when
the court is presented with "newly discovered evidence which by due
diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial
or rehearing ... ." However, it is proper for a court to deny a motion to
set aside a judgment where an affidavit fails to state that evidence was not
available at the start of the trial regardless of quantity or detail in which
new evidence is presented.61
A void judgment may be set aside at any reasonable time; the one
year limitation does not control.614 However, this rule does not apply to
voidable judgments. For instance, in Craven v. J.M. Fields, Inc.,..5 process
was served upon the manager of defendant's store. Later, when the de-
fendant did not answer or defend, a default was entered, trial had on the
unliquidated damages claim, and final judgment entered. When the judg-
ment was executed upon more than one year later, defendant moved to
vacate the judgment on the grounds that the service was void because the
return had not stated that process was served on the defendant's manager
because of the absence of corporate officers as set forth in Florida Statutes
chapter 48 (1967). An amended return was filed, but the court held this to
be insufficient and vacated the default and default judgment. The District
Court of Appeal, Fourth District, reversed on the grounds that the judg-
ment was not void, but merely voidable since the defendant did actually
have notice of the action, even though the return was irregular. 16
court had entered a final order construing a will and determining that a power of appoint-
ment had been exercised. Sixty-seven days later, two beneficiary-trustees filed an affidavit
stating that "through misunderstanding" they had not secured counsel to represent their
individual rights under the will. They asked that the final order be set aside. Treating the
motion as one under rule 1.540(b), the trial judge did so. The appellate court reversed on
the basis that only conclusions were stated in the affidavit, not any facts or circumstances
which might give rise to a rule 1.540(b) order setting aside a judgment. "Consequently,
that was a failure of pleading and proof which stood fatally in the way of the trial court
to make a decision that remedial mistake or neglect existed with reference to the rule." Id.
613. Rushing v. Chappell, 247 So.2d 749 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
614. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.540(b) (4). See also Osceola Farms v. Sanchez, 238 So.2d 477
(Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
615. 226 So.2d 407 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
616. See id. at 410.
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